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THE

SĀṀKHYA--KĀRIKĀ

ś'vara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāṁkhya Philosophy with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णप्रणीताः सगौडपादभाष्याः

सांख्यकारिकाः

ritically edited with Introduction, Translation and Note:

BY

'idyāsudhākara **Dr Har Dutt Sharma**, M.A., Ph.D.

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संस्कृतपाठशालाविद्यार्थिनां कृते

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BY

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INTRODUCTION

I. *The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry*

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Saṁsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain ; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. *The Significance of Sāṁkhya Philosophy*

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṁkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the S'āstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this S'āstra is recognised by all the systems. S'aṅkarācārya says—"The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-

difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read—"There is no knowledge like that of Sāṁkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṁkhya being the highest knowledge." (S'ānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word *Sāṁkhya* is found first of all in the S'vet. Up.—तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāṁkhya reflections are found even in the Ṛgveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Sāṁkhya is derived from the word *saṁkhyā*. The word *saṁkhyā* is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I. V. 3). Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and *as'akti*, *atuṣṭi*, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh.—

"संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत्तेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥"

So, *Sāṁkhya* means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word *Sāṁkhya* was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n. and pp. 190–191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to *Sāṁkhya* in *Saṁskṛta-Candrikā*, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṁkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi-purāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 *S'aka*, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really

Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṁkhya to S'ruti. Truly speaking, Sāṁkhya could be divided into two—one *ses'vara*, the other *nirīs'vara*. Let the theists not take the *nirīs'vara-Sāṁkhya*, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in S'ruti, but who can take exception to the *vaidika* character of the *ses'vara-Sāṁkhya* as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas ? For instance, we come accross '*yathā-s'rutinidars'ana* as a synonym of Sāṁkhya in —

एतानि नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वानि च नराधिप ।
चतुर्विंशतिरुक्तानि यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शनात् ॥

(Mbh., S'ānti., 310, 25)

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the *vibhūtis* of *Prakṛti* many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṁkhya are met with; *e. g.*, ब्राह्मणास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः (*v.* 1) तत्त्वार्थदर्शिनः, (2) योगप्रदर्शिनः, (3) संख्यानदर्शिनः, (4) योगनिदर्शिनः, (5) यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शिनः, (6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्त्वबुद्धिविशारदाः, (10) यथाशास्त्रविशारदाः, (11) तत्त्वनिदर्शिनः, (12) यथावदभिदर्शिनः, (13). Here the word '*Yathās'rutinidars'inaḥ*' being repeated four times establishes the *vaidika* character of theistic Sāṁkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṁkhya is *vaidika* in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṁkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṁkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. *vide*—Ent. Gott. p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the *ācāryas* of Sāṁkhya in the offering to Ṛṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṁkhya. (S. S., p. 22). This could not have been possible if Sāṁkhya was not founded on S'rutis.

III. Germs of Sāṁkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāṁkhya categories in the S'rutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṁkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. *Tamas* described in the Ṛgveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आसीत्तमसा गूळ्हमग्रेऽप्रकेतं" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to *satkāryavāda*. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his *bhāṣya* on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains *Aja* (the unborn) as the name of *Pradhāna*—

तमिद्गर्भं प्रथमं दध्र आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्त विश्वे ।
अजस्य नाभावध्येकमर्पितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुवनानि तस्थुः ॥

(Ṛgveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. *The most ancient* : as, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauṣītaki.

2. *Ancient* : as, Kāṭhaka, Īśa, S'vetās'vatara, Muṇḍaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.

3. *Modern* : as, Praśna, Maitrāyaṇī and Māṇḍūkya.

4. *Most modern* : the many Atharvaṇa Upaniṣads.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (in

reality) as in " स वा एष एतस्मिन् संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा दृष्ट्वैव......... असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इत्येवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य " (IV. 3, 15 ff). The word *mahat* is indicative of the Sāṁkhya word *Buddhi* in " स यथा सैन्धव.....यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय etc. " (Bṛ. Up. II. 4, 12). The term *Vijñānaghana* expounds the intelligent nature of *Buddhi*. [Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāṁkhya attributes unconsciousness to *Buddhi* which is by nature intelligence. *vide*, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on the Gautama-Sūtra " बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम् " (I. 15).]

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of *satkāryavāda* in " सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् " the S'ruti in the same *mantra* mentions the *pūrva-pakṣa* of *asat-kāryavāda* in " तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायत ". It then advances in the next *mantra satkāryavāda* that is, (सतः सज्जायते), as a contradiction of the previous statement, *e. g.*, " कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति, सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् " (VI. 2, 2). Here the difference from S'āṅkara-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as *real* and not *unreal* like *māyā*. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds *satkāryavāda*. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the *mantra* यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् " (Ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the *Pariṇāmavāda* of the Sāṁkhyas (Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in " यदग्ने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं, यच्छुक्लं तदपां, यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्यापागादग्नेरग्नित्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम् " (Ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates *Rajas*. Just as

red colour colours cloth, etc., so *Rajas* colours *citta*, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates *Sattva*, because white water has the property of purifying things. *Sattva* also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of *anna* = Earth is an indication of *Tamas*. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient *Tamas* covers the knowledge born of *Sattva*. [See, Bāla, p. 3. What has been propounded by Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the *mantra* " अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम् " (S'v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., p. 141, Īśādi). The *trivṛtkaraṇa* (trebling) *S'ruti* found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word *trivṛta* has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in " तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतम् etc. " (S'v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Sāṁkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, *e. g.*, in Kaṭha " मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः (III, 10). *Mahat* is the synonym of *Ahaṅkāra*. Similarly we find *Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* in " महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः । पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥ " (*Ibid*, III, 11). Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of *Puruṣa* have been indicated in " द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥ " in the Muṇḍaka Up. (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1 n].

It is a well-known fact that S'vetās'vatara is essentially a Sāṁkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Sāṁkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words *Sāṁkhya* and *Kapila* have been used for the first time. " तत्कारणं सांख्य-

योगाधिगम्यम् " (VI. 13), " ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे " (V. 2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word *Kapila*. It is again in this Upaniṣad that the words *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jña* are found, *e. g.*, " संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः etc." (I. 8); also " ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशावजा ह्येका etc. " (I. 9). *vide* also the Mbh. " अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः " (III. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gauḍa. on the 61st Kārikā). Similarly, the use of the words *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *guṇa* is also found here, *e. g.* " क्षरं प्रधानम् " (I, 10), " मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् " (IV, 10). " देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् " (I, 13), etc. Also, *the mantra* " तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतं षोडशान्तं शतार्धारं विंशतिप्रत्यराभिः । अष्टकैः षड्भिर्विश्वरूपैकपाशं त्रिमार्गभेदं द्विनिमित्तैकमोहम् ॥ " (S′v. Up. I, 4) propounds the categories of Sāṁkhya. The word *trivṛta* refers to the three *guṇas*, the word *ṣoḍas′ānta* refers to sixteen *vikāras*, the word *s′atārdhāra* points to the fifty varieties o *pratyaya-sarga*. Keith's doubt about the Sāṁkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S. S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, " The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools. " But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṁkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṁkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like " मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् " (S′v. Up. IV, 10) though there is a technical term of Sāṁkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṁkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṁkhya categories of *kṣetrajña, saṁkalpa, adhyavasāya, abhimāna* and *liṅga* clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṁkhya system. As—"तमो वा इदमेकमास, तत्पश्चात्तत्परेणेरितं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद्व रजसो रूपं..............सोंऽशोऽयं यश्चेतनमात्रः प्रतिपुरुषं क्षेत्रज्ञः संकल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानलिंगः प्रजापतिः etc." (Maitrāyaṇī, Up. IV, 5), "पञ्चतन्मात्राणि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते पंचमहाभूतानि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते etc. (Ibid III,2), "पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्राः etc. (Pr. up IV. 8) and so on.

In the Mbh, and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṁkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three *guṇas* (Mbh. III, 209, 16–21; 211, 4). The distinction between *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* has been extensively expounded in S'āntiparvan (285, 33–40). Here the word *sattva* stands for *Prakṛti* and not *Brahman*. But Keith, seeing that *sattva* was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that *sattva* is referring to *Brahman* (S. S., p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :—" सृजते हि गुणान् सत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञः परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेष सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ध्रुवः ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावसिद्धमेवैतद्यदिमान् सृजते गुणान् । ऊर्णनाभिर्यथा सूत्रं विज्ञेयास्तन्तुवद् गुणाः ॥ ३८ ॥ ". We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṁkhya knowledge being called *Vais'eṣika* which was imparted to Janaka by Pañcaśikha of Parāśara *gotra*, *e. g.*, "यस्माच्चैतन्मया प्राप्तं ज्ञानं वैशेषिकं पुरा " (S'ānti. 330, 23*a*). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṁkhya lays down a third kind of path, *viz.*, a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, *vide* my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027*f*).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word *Sāṁkhya* in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence ,—" सौक्ष्म्यं सांख्यक्रमौ चोभौ निर्णयः सप्रयोजनः । पञ्चैतान्यर्थजातानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप ॥ दोषाणां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागतः । कंचिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य सा संख्येत्युपधार्यताम् ॥" (S'ānti. 320, 79 and 82). But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been metioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṁkhya philosophy *e. g.*, (1) *S'abda*, (2) *Spars'a*, (3) *Rasa*, (4) *Rūpa*, (5) *Gandha*, (6–10) the five senses, (11) *Manas*, (12) *Buddhi*, (13) *Sattva*, (14) *Ahaṁ-kartā*, (15) *Sāmagrya*, (16) *Saṅghāta*, (17) *Prakṛti*, (18) *Vyakti*, (19) *Dvandvayoga*, (20) *Kāla*, (21–25) the five gross elements, (26) *Sadbhāvayoga*, (27) *Asadbhāvayoga*, (28) *Vidhi*, (29) *S'ukra* and (30) *Bala* (S'ānti. 320, 97–112). So it has been said :—" विंशतिर्दशचैवं हि गुणाः संख्यानतः स्मृताः । समग्रा यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम् ॥" (ibid, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of *Prakṛti* and sixteen varities of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same *parvan*. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṁkhya books. They are as given below :—

(1) The creation of *mahat* from *avyakta*, (2) from *mahat* there is the creation of *ahaṁkāra*, (3) from the latter of *manas*, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of " connected with the senses (*aindriyaka*)," (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pañcas'ikha in S'ānti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāṁkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96–112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṁkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of *Brahman* or Īs'vara. Even though the plurality of *puruṣas* has been accepted, *Brahman* has been described as the basis of all. (*vide*— "बह्वनां पुरुषाणां स यथैका योनिरुच्यते," S'ānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāṁkhya to Pañcas'ikha, got merged in *Brahman*— " यत्तदेकाक्षरं ब्रह्म नानारूपं प्रदृश्यते । आसुरिर्मण्डले तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तदव्ययम् ॥ " (S'ānti, 218, 13).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṁkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṁkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gītārahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāṁkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; *e. g.* " सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः " (Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sāṁkhya path without *karman* is only a synomym of *Jñāna*. Therefore S'aṅkarācārya explains the word *kṛtānta* as " कृतमिति कर्मोच्यते । तस्यान्तः परिसमाप्तिर्यत्र स कृतान्तः कर्मान्त इत्येतत् ॥ " (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'aṅkarācārya explains the word *guṇasaṁkhyāna* (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three *guṇas*, *viz*. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāṁkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṁkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2–8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13–15; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. (S. S, p. 52) there is a detailed description of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (XII. 24–52) and reference to the three *pramāṇas* (ibid, 105). But the word Sāṁkhya is not found

in it. Medhātithi, commenting on " आकाशात्तु विकुर्वाणात् सर्वगन्धवहः शुचिः । (I. 76), says—विकुर्वाणादहङ्काराद्आकाशस्तस्माद्वायुः—, and thus indicates the presence of Sāṁkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmṛti, the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories, preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One of the stanzas (XX, 25) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds with the comment on the second Kārikā by Gauḍapāda (S. S. p. 52). In the S'aṅkha-saṁhitā we find twenty-five categories, but *Puruṣa* is identified with *Viṣṇu* (VII 21–25). Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṁkhya, *e. g.* "बुद्धेरुत्पत्तिरव्यक्तात्ततोऽहङ्कारसम्भवः । तन्मात्रादीन्यहङ्कारादेकोत्तरगुणानि च ॥" (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the Sāṁkhya categories expounded in these books give prominence to Īs'vara (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183–4, where Belvalkar points out five stages of the evolution of Sāṁkhya doctrines.)

IV. Sāṁkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṁkhya teachers are met with in the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:–

(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pañcas'ikha, (4) Vindhyavāsa, or Vindhyavāsaka or Vindhyavāsin, (5) Vārṣagaṇya, (6) Jaigīṣavya, (7) Voḍhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9) Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra, (13) Bhṛgu, (14) S'ukra, (15) Kās'yapa, (16) Parās'ara, (17) Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Ārṣṭiṣeṇa (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25) Vālmīki and (26) S'uka.

1. Kapila

Mentioned in the S'v. Up. (5, 2) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Budhists (S. Y., 2, § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with *Agni* or *Viṣṇu* or *S'iva*, and is, therefore, another name for *Hiraṇyagarbha* (S. S. 9, In; Mbh. S'ānti. 339, 66–67; 342. 92–93). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamaṅgalā published by me (p. 3). Bālarāma Udāsīna, in his footnotes to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25; "आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।" says :—

"(1) आदिविद्वान्=सर्गादावाविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभूः, निर्माणचित्तं =योगबलेन स्वनिर्मितं चित्तमधिष्ठाय=स्वांशेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्यपरमर्षिर्भूत्वा कारुण्याज्जिज्ञासवे आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः ॥ (2) 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः श्रूयते ॥ (3) पञ्चमे कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविप्लुतम्। प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम्। (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, I. 3. 11). इति स्मृतौ पञ्चमावतारत्वोक्तेर्विष्णोरवतारः कपिल इति भावः। 'अग्निः स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्रप्रवर्तकः' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम्। कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं' इति कपिलपदेनापि हिरण्यगर्भ एव गृह्यते ॥ 'यो ब्रह्माणं' इत्यादिबहुपूर्वोत्तरमन्त्रसंवादादित्याहुः॥" (Ch. S. S. p. 62).

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana (2, 6, 30), we learn that an *asura* Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the *s'rāddha*, *vivāha*, *prāyas'citta* ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'aṅkarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of *S*āṁkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhāsya II, 1, 1). Ānandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṁkhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila *alias* Vāsudeva taught the Sāṁkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught (the Sāṁkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1,

p. 4). But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (3. 25. 1) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūti कपिलस्तत्त्वसंख्याता भगवानात्ममायया। जातः स्वयमजः साक्षा-दात्मप्रज्ञप्तये नृणाम् ॥ "

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2–3 : Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamaṅgalā and the Māṭharavṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas'ikha " तत्र पञ्चशिखो नाम कापिलेयो महामुनिः।... आसुरेः प्रथमं शिष्यं etc. " (S'ānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, *viz*. " विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते। प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छो यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥" in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Saḍdars'anasamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pañcas'ikha

Pañcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works :

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) " एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम् " [१. ४]। (आ) " आदि-विद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच "। [१. २५] (इ) " तमणुमात्रमात्मानमनुविद्याऽस्मीत्येवं तावत्संप्रजानीते " [१. ३६]। (उ) " व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेना-भिप्रतीत्य तस्य सम्पदमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशोचत्यात्म-व्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः " [२. ५]। (ऊ) " बुद्धितः परं

पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन" [२.६] (ऋ) "स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः। कुशलस्य नापकर्षायालम् कस्मात्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं करिष्यति" [२, १३]। (ॠ) "रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते" [३. १३]। (ऌ) "तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं भवति" [३. ४१.]॥

Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

B. S. Sū.—

(ए) "आधेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः" [५. ३२]। (ऐ) "अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः [६. ६८]"

C. S. S. B.—

(ओ) "सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम्"। [१. १२७]।

D. Bhāmatī.—

(औ) "तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः" [ब्रह्मसूत्र, २. २. १०].

E. Gauḍa. (Kār. 1) and Māṭh. (Kār. 22)—

(क) "पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः। जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः॥"

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāgaṇes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadīpana and by Haribhadrasūri in S'āstravārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Māṭharavṛtti). Bhāvāgaṇes'a was the disciple of Vijñānabhikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is about 725 A.D.

F. Bāla.—

(ख) "उभयथा चास्य प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानव्यवहारं लभते ।" (p. 153).

We find no account of this Pañcas'ikha born in the family of Parās'ara (Mbh. S'anti. 320, 23). All the quotations ascribed to him are in prose except the "E". It is just possible that he wrote a prose treatise. According to Garbe Pañcas'ikha flourished in the first century A.D. (S. Y. p. 3). Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, flourished in the 4th century A.D. (I. P. II, 342). It is possible that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were very common in the 4th century A.D., and, therefore, Vyāsa did not give his name while quoting. As Vācaspati frequently mentions his name, we can safely infer that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were known to him. Was it the Commentary on the Samāsasūtras which fell into the hands of Vācaspati? Vijñanabhikṣu refers to Pañcas'ikha as the author of a commentary on the Samāsasūtras or the Tattvasamāsa; Bhāvāganeśa also says the same thing: "समाससूत्राण्यालम्ब्य व्याख्यां पञ्चशिखस्य च ।" (Int. to Māṭh. p. 2). According to Chinese tradition, Pañcas'ikha is the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra (S. S. 48). But this account is not to be believed, as is proved by many writers. Vācaspati, on the other hand, thinks that Ṣaṣṭitantra is a book on Yogaśāstra and its author was Vārṣagaṇya (see Tattv. V. on Y. S. IV. 13; and Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtra II. 1, 3). Kaviraja Gopinatha is of opinion that Vācaspati never saw the Ṣaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–7). But, according to the late M. M. P. Rāmāvatāra S'armā, Vācaspati knew Ṣaṣṭitantra (Bāla. p. 226). That this Pañcaśikha is different from his namesake in the Mahābhārata is evident from their views; he is different from Gandhabba Pañcas'ikha also (S. S., pp. 48, 51).

4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6–7). We find one quotation

from him in the Rājamārtaṇḍa of Bhoja: "सत्त्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुषतप्यत्वम्. (Y. S. IV 23). Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu I. 55: "सांख्या हि केचिन्नान्तराभवमिच्छन्ति विन्ध्यवासप्रभृतयः।". This seems to be derived from the S'lokavārtika : "अन्तराभवदेहस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना।" (p. 704). Also in the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him : "पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम्। मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपाधेः स्फटिको यथा॥" (p. 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adbhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāṁkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsin (H. Dh. I, 341, 793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Māṭharavṛtti (Ch. S. S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsin and Vyāḍi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Saṁyaminămamālā. He says: स च भगवतो वर्षस्य शिष्यो नन्दसमकालीनः (Kathāsaritsāgara, I. 2) पाणिनिसूत्राणां संग्रहाख्यटीकायाः कस्यचित् कोशस्य कर्ता, दाक्षायणेः पतञ्जलेरपि पुरोगामी सांख्ययोगाचार्यश्च ॥" (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsin *alias* Vyāḍi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsin wrote a Sāṁkhya work called Hiraṇyasaptati (Bh. Com. p. 175). According to Dr Belvalkar, Hiraṇyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāṁkhyakārikā (ibid 177). But Kaviraja Gopinatha says : "The Anuyogadvārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattari (Kanaksaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarṇasaptati or Hiraṇyasaptati, the name of Sāṁkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Māḍhara also in the list of the Anuyogadvārasūtra. If Māḍhara stands for the Māṭharavṛtti then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogadvārasūtra was written in the 1st

century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the Māṭharavṛtti we find : "यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ" a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of S'aṅkarācārya (*i. e.* 780–812 A.D., See Int., Māṭh., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Is'varakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanaga-sattari. And, if Vyāḍi *alias* Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiraṇyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṁkhykārikā, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarkṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣagaṇya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣagaṇya as about the former teachers of Sāṁkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) "मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूल-पृथक्त्वं इति वार्षगण्यः।" (III 53, (2) "गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति। यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्॥" (Ibid. IV, 13) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Ṣaṣṭitantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmatī with the remarks : "अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्ष-गण्यः।" (on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣagaṇya, "'पञ्चपर्वा अविद्या' इत्याह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः।" is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—"पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते।" found in the Gauḍ., and the Māṭh. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya by Keith (S. S. 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Saṣṭitantra to Pañcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣagaṇya being the author of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–6; Hiriyanna: " Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārṣagaṇya ",

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107–112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīṣavya

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigīṣavya was a class-fellow of Pañcas'ikha (S, S. 51). This Jaigīṣavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā as the author of Dhāraṇās'āstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12. 67), Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parās'ara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṁkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavya.

7. Voḍhu

Voḍhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Ṛṣitarpaṇa, we find the name of Voḍhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcas'ikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Voḍhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the *paris'iṣṭas* of the Atharvaveda (S. S. 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti., Ch., 274). There we find eight kinds of *bhūtas* (*bhāva, abhāva, kāla, pṛthhvī, āpas, vāyu, ākās'a* and *tejas*); and *kāla* impelled by *bhāva* creating all the five elements, *viz.*, earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the *kṣetrajña*. Higher than the senses is *citta*, higher than the latter is *manas*, higher than it is *buddhi*, and the highest of all is *puruṣa*. The ear, the skin, the eye

the nose, the tongue, the *citta*, the *manas* and the *buddhi* are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there : पुण्यपापक्षयार्थं हि सांख्यज्ञानं विधीयते । तत्क्षये ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्मभावे परां गतिम् ॥ " (Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāṁkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much (See Yājñavalkyasmṛti, Ānandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986–7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikāras, *viz.*, Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (see p. 218). But Udayavīraśāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr. S'āstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465–475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Māṭharvṛtti : " कापिलादासुरिणा प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पञ्चशिखेन तस्माद् भार्गव-उलूक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवल प्रभृतीनागतम् ". (p. 84), where the word *prabhṛti* is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Māṭharavṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māṭhara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9–26. Sanaka, *etc.*

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. I), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are : Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (S'ānti. 340, 67–69), *viz.*, Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः । (S. Su. VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛti, in the Nirṇayasindhu and the Tristhalīsetu (H., Dh., I, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, S'ukra, Kāśyapa, Parās'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parās'ara and Janaka named the Parās'ara-gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti., Chs., 290–299), deals with the duties of the *varṇas* and *ās'ramas* and has no vestige of Sāṁkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parās'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāṁkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcas'ikha (Mbh., S'ānti., 320–23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā, Īs'varakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay. Int. p. 2. 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmīki and S'uka as teachers of Sāṁkhya.

V. Standard Works on Sāṁkhya

A. Available :—

Of the standard works on Sāṁkhya, only three are available. They are "Sāṁkhya-Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sāṁkhya-Kārikā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्" (Br. S., IV. 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV. 3; "वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः" (Y. S., II. 46) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the *sūtras* establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V. 40–51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, quoted in the

Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8–9). Moreover, the commentator on the *Sarvopakārinī*, a commentory on the Samāsa–Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of " Sāṁkhya–Sūtras " is different from Kapila, the author of Samāsa–Sūtra (Ch., S. S., No. 246, pp. 93–94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcas'ika, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI. 68–69)?

But Udayavīra S'āstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article " Antiquity of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras " (P. C. C., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several *sūtras* have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the *sūtras* 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th *sūtra* is literally the same as the 55th *sūtra*, and because the 53rd and 54th *sūtras* are identical with the 15th and 16th *sūtras*. And as we find the names of *Srughna* and *Pāṭaliputra* in these interpolated *sūtras*, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B. C., to the 5th century A.D.). The *sūtras* 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. S'āstri thinks that 68 *sūtras* are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

hand, when S'aṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the *Sūtras* did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then S'aṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a *ṛṣi* and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkṛṣṇa

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is :—

(1) " प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्निष्पत्तिधर्मकं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् = कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये किंचिदुपादेयम् " (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. I, 48)—here उपादाननियमात् is borrowed from " उपादाननियमात् " (S. Sū., I, 115). This very *sūtra* has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., *viz.*, " यत्पुनरुक्तं—प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् इति ". Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after "उपादाननियमात्" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. I, 48) quoted above ? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "उपादाननियमात्" but the whole passage, *viz.*,—" प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नासत् उपादानानियमात्." Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti (Prāyas'cittādhyāya, *v.* 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the *sūtras* in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—" षड्भिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनु-

पलब्धिर्भवति — अतिसन्निकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तरव्यवधानात्तमसावृतत्वादिन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादतिप्रमादादिति ॥" On this, Kaiyyaṭa says in his gloss Pradīpa—इतरो विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सौक्ष्म्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह-षड्भिरिति ।"—According to Kaiyyaṭa, Patañjali here quotes from some other work. It seems that he took this view from "सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः" (S. Sū., I. 109) and "कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः" (S. Sū., I, 110). Moreover, we find only five causes of non-perception in the S. Sū., but in the Mahābhāṣya, there are six causes of non-perception and in the Sāṁkhya-Kārika, there are eight. Therefore, the S. Sū. are the oldest of these three. Moreover, the passage of Kaiyyaṭa *viz.*, "सदपि लिङ्गं सूक्ष्मत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेणाशक्यं ग्रहीतुं, तत्कृतकार्यदर्शनादनुमीयते ।" seems to be based on the two *sūtras* quoted above.

In reply to Mr. S'astri's arguments, the following may be stated. In the first place, the word इति is not a necessary and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author. Here, the word इति denotes conclusion of his remarks. How can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patañjali's own? In the second place if, depending upon the word इतर used by Kaiyyaṭa, it is even admitted that Patañjali quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove that it is the S. Sū., wherefrom, he borrowed? It is most probable that he borrowed the view from some other work. (See H. I. P., I, 218–219). Again, there is nothing to oblige Kaiyyaṭa, who flourished in the 13th century A.D. (H. S. L., p. 431), to borrow from the S. Sū. He might have borrowed from the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. Moreover, the causes of non-perception as given by Patañjali tally more with those in the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā than in the S. Sū.

(4) The following *sūtras* agree verbatim with the Kārikās (*a*) "हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्" (S. Sū., I. 124 = Kār., 10). (*b*) "सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात्" (S. Sū., II. 18 = Kār., 25). (*c*) "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च" (S. Sū., II. 31 = Kār. 29). In (*a*) and (*b*) we find different readings.

Avyāpi in (*a*) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word *pravartate* in (*b*) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. S'āstri's possession.

The arguments of Mr. S'āstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word *avyāpi*, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. S'āstri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. S'āstri says that if we change the order of words in "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च" and read it as "सामान्य-करणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्याः पञ्च वायवः" we attain *anuṣṭubh* metre in place of *āryā*. But this flight of imagination, *viz*., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S'āstri has failed to disprove that the S. Sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557–569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175–178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Sāṁkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣagaṇya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣagaṇya composed Hiraṇyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavāsa, the author of Hiraṇyasaptati and Īs'varkṛṣṇa, the author of Sāṁkhya-Kārikā are both identified, then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. [Das Gupta also thinks Īs'varkṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as two

different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Īs'varakṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A.D., see V. A. Smith: *Early History of India*, 3rd edn., pp. 328–334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya : "Some Problems of Sāṁkhya Philosophy and Sāṁkhya Literature", I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, pp. 519–520. According to Bhattacharya Īs'varkṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D.] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Svapnes'vara, identifying Īs'varakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken (See I. P., II, 255, In.).

The work of Īs'varakṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the *bhāṣya* of Gauḍapada running upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāṁkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot-note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S. S. Pathak has also attacked this problem (see, "The Problem of the Sāṁkhya–Kārikās", I. A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177–181). He says— (1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase "परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tilak. as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply : In the Kārikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely *referred to* and not *expounded.* The phrase परवादविवर्जिता: means the exclusion of *the expounding* of others' opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "दृष्टवदानुश्रविक: स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्त:" would also be open to fault, for, here there is *no exclusion* of the opinion of the Mīmāṁsakas. (2) Īs'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha in his own '*āryās*'. Now in the Ṣaṣṭitantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions (*viz.*, making one of *Brahman*, *Puruṣa S'akti*, *Niyati*. and *Kāla*, the cause of creation) which are to be rejected. But in this

Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent *S'akti*—To this we reply: Is'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Ṣaṣṭitantra is the work of Pañcas'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Is'varkṛṣṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the foot-note alluded to above.

B. **Unavailable.**

(1) *Ṣaṣṭitantra.* Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas'ikha or Vārṣagaṇya as the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Ṣaṣṭitantra in Jay.

(*a*) "तेषु च षष्टितन्त्रादिष्व्याख्यातेष्विति। विस्तरत्वात् षष्टितन्त्रस्य संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहार्थं सप्ततिकारम्भः।" (p. 1). (*b*) "'त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम्' इति षष्टितन्त्रे व्याख्यातम्। पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति।" (p. 7). (*c*) "एते षष्टि [:] पदार्थाः। तदर्थं शास्त्रं षष्टितन्त्रमुच्यते।" (p. 56). (*d*) "'तेन' इति। पञ्चशिखेन मुनिना बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्। षष्टितन्त्राख्यं षष्टिखण्डं कृतमिति। तत्रैव हि षष्टिरर्था व्याख्याताः।" (p. 68). (*e*) "ननु च षष्टितन्त्रमेवास्तु किं सप्तत्येति।" (p. 69). (*f*) "अत्र षष्टितन्त्रे बहवोऽर्थाः तेऽत्र नोक्ता इत्याह।" (p. 69).

From the above passages, Prof. Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See—"Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārṣagaṇya", J. O. R., April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112).—(*a*) Ṣaṣṭitantra has 60 parts, (*b*) its author is Pañcas'ikha and (*c*) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called "Ṣaṣṭitantra". Vārṣagaṇya is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं यातं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्॥

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmatī, Vācaspati alludes it to Ṣaṣṭitantra in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣagaṇya in Bhāmatī. On the basis of these two references, people have come to

the conclusion that Vārṣagaṇya is the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुच्छकम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmatī is मायैव सुतुच्छकम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣagaṇya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, *viz.*, "कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतषष्टितन्त्राख्यस्मृतेः" (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Ṣaṣṭitantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S'āstri states Ṣaṣṭitantra is the real *Sāṁkhya-dars'ana* written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Ṣaṣṭitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas'ikha in his Ṣaṣṭitantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22–30) from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark "तथाह कपिलाचार्यः". As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायैव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣagaṇya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्षगण्यः. The opinion of Vārṣagaṇya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakos'a (*viz.*, nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the *sat-kārya* theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāṁkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārṣagaṇya altered मायेव into मायैव. But that requires proof.

Therefore, the question of authorship of Saṣṭitantra is still undecided.

(2) *Rājavārtika.* In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika—

" प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥
शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।
विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥
करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः " ॥

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakāriṇī (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70–73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (S. Y. p. 7). These *maulikārthas* are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māṭh., Sāṁkhya-tattva-vivecana (Ch., S. S., No. 245, p. 22), Tattva-yāthārthya-dīpana (ibid, p. 80) and Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vṛtti (ibid, p. 135).

VI. The Teachings of Sāṁkhya

It has already been pointed out that the activity of all rational beings is directed towards acquiring happiness and avoiding misery, Thoughtful people, on the other hand, avoid happiness even as it is mixed up with misery. Now the nature of this misery, although known generally, is still outside the purview of ordinary people. Īśvarkṛṣṇa has broadly divided that misery into three classes; *viz.* (1) intrinsic, (2) extrinsic, and (3) superhuman. (1) The intrinsic misery is due to the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and is also caused by passion, anger and so on. (2) The extrinsic misery is caused by men, beasts, reptiles and the rest. (3) The superhuman is the outcome of evil influences of spirits, stars and so on.

It may be asked—Why should we engage in philosophical remedy, when we see that ordinary and obvious remedies can very well remove all the miseries ? We see that intrinsic miseries in the shape of various diseases are removed by physicians by means of medicines; as regards miseries due to passion, anger and the rest, they are removable by the acquisition of desires for objects in the shape of flowers, scent, women and so on. The extrinsic miseries can also be removed by the knowledge of Politics, residence in safe places and the rest. Similarly superhuman miseries can also be avoided by charms, incantations and the rest. Thus, when obvious means can uproot all the kinds of miseries, it is useless to engage in inquiring into the philosophical remedies.

We reply, yes; but these remedies are not absolute or final. Nobody can take the guarantee that the obvious remedies suggested above will remove the miseries certainly and absolutely.

Thus, as we see, the obvious remedies are not helpful to us, and we should, therefore, enquire into extraordinary remedies for removing the miseries.

If it be said,—' Well, granted that the obvious remedies are not of any help to us; but there are means revealed by the Vedas. By performing the various sacrifices prescribed by the Vedas, we can get over the miseries and acquire heaven and other higher regions,—then our reply is the same as above. We know that stay in the higher regions even is of temporary character. After enjoying the fruits of good actions performed on this earth the dwellers in heaven have to revert back to this earth and undergo all the miseries again. Moreover, there is impurity in the Vedic rites. One has to kill animals in performing some of them. Again, the heaven-dwellers are not free from jealousy. If one particular sacrifice leads to bare residence in heaven, the

other leads to supremacy over there. This must give rise to jealousy in the minds of the people over there. Thus, we see even the Vedic rites are not absolute or final means for releasing one from misery. Therefore, we should enquire after some other means.

That means is the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. The Sāṁkhya Philosophy divides the objects into four kinds *viz.*, (1) Root-matter, (2) Evolvent and Evolute, (3) Evolute and (4) the Spirit.

(1) The Root-matter or Nature is not a modification. It is the root-cause of all matter. Intellect and the rest are the evolutes of this Nature. Intellect, which is the product of Nature, produces Ego. Ego, born out of Intellect, produces the five subtle elements and the organs of sense and action. The five subtle elements, which are produced from Ego, produce the five gross-elements. The five gross-elements and the eleven organs produce nothing, and they are, therefore, Evolutes only. The Spirit is neither produced from anything nor itself produces anything; so it is neither an Evolute nor an Evolvent. Among these, the Nature has been termed as Unmanifest, the Spirit as the Knower and the rest as Manifest. So, by the discriminative knowledge of these three, one attains salvation.

The means of Right cognition (or *Pramāṇas*) recognised in this Philosophy are Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. The other *Pramāṇas* recognised by the rival schools are included under these three. The process of Perception may be stated thus :—

Suppose there is water in a tank. On account of the absence of any outlet, this water, the very nature of which is to flow, is tranquil. But now a small channel is dug. Then water flows through this channel and assumes the form of the object into which it flows. It will be rectangular if it

enters a rectangular field and so on. Similarly, intellect, the very nature of which is to apprehend all the objects, is at a stand-still, being enveloped by the Attribute of *Tamas* or Darkness. But after the contact of an organ of sense with any object, this darkness is removed. Then this intellect flows through the channel of an organ of sense and assumes the form of the object with which the organ of sense is in contact. This assuming of a particular form of an object by the intellect is called Perception or determination or knowledge. Of course, the result of this perception is experienced by the Spirit. For, intellect being a modification of matter and non-intelligent can produce only a non-intelligent determination. And the phrases like "I am happy" refer to the Conscious Spirit. So what really happens is this :—A part of intellect runs out through an organ of sense to assume the form of an object. The other part reflects the image of the Conscious Spirit. Now, the out-going part of intellect, having assumed the shape of an object presents itself to the part remaining behind and reflecting the Conscious Spirit. So the Spirit, which in reality is free from activity, contact, agency and such other qualities, becomes active or agent through its image reflected in the intellect. The real enjoyer or agent is the reflected image of the Spirit.

Inference is based upon Perception. The materialists like Cārvāka deny the authenticity of Inference. But, they may be asked—suppose you talk to a man. After his departure if you are asked about that man, you will very readily say about him that he is intelligent or ignorant. Now, how can you *perceive ignorance* or *knowledge* of another man ? You will have to infer them. Therefore, inference will have to be recognised as a means of Right Cognition. Inference leads to conclude the presence of Major term in the Minor term on the basis of the concomitance of Middle and Major

terms and the cognition of the presence of Middle term in the Minor term. For example,—we see smoke (Middle term) on the Hill (Minor term). Now we remember the concomitance of smoke (Middle term) and fire (Major term). Thus we conclude that there is fire (Major term) on the Hill (Middle term).

The Inference is of three kinds *viz.*, *Pūrvavat*, (*A priori*), *S'eṣa'vat* (*A posteriori*) and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (commonly seen). These are defined and explained in the notes on the 5th Kārikā.

Valid testimony is the assertion of a reliable person. A reliable person is that, who ascertains facts on the basis of strong proofs; and when he states a fact exactly as he has seen it, then his assertion is Valid Testimony. The other means of Right Cognition are included under these three. This has been exhaustively explained in the notes on the 4th and 5th Kārikās.

Thus, Nature, Spirit and the rest are cognised by Inference or Valid Testimony. It may be asked—why should not the non-perception of these lead us to conclude their total non-existence ? We reply—Mere non-perception of an object cannot lead to its total non-existence in every case. We see that even existent objects are not perceived for various reasons. For example, a man in Conjeevram cannot perceive the Himalayas; one cannot see a piece of straw fallen in one's own eye; a deaf person does not apprehend the sound of music; a person absorbed in something does not perceive anybody seated near him; one who is not a *yogin* cannot perceive an atom which is existent; people cannot see the moon or stars during the day-time because their light is overcome by the sun; drops of water, falling in water cannot be differentiated afterwards. Therefore, the non-perception of Nature and the rest is due to their minuteness and not total non-existence. For, when we see the effects of Nature,

in the shape of intellect, ego and so forth, we infer Nature as the cause of these effects.

Now, we state the theory of cause and effect according to the Sāṁkhyas. They state that an existent effect is produced from an existent cause. The Buddhists proclaim that the existent Effect is produced from the cause which is non-existent. The Vedāntins assert that there is no existence of Effects, but they are illusory forms of one existent. The followers of Nyāya and Vais'eṣika say that the non-existent Effect is produced from the existent cause.

The Theory of the Buddhists is:—"The existence comes into being from non-existence, for without destruction nothing can be produced." (N. S. IV. I. 14) We observe that a sprout is produced out of the destruction of seed, curds are produced from the destruction of milk. Thus, we see that destruction (= non-existence) produces an object.

But, really speaking, the Buddhists have missed the point. It is not the destroyed seed that produces sprout. It is simply the modification of the structure of particles of a seed that we see in a sprout. That is, when particular kinds of particles are in a particular form, they constitute a seed. When that particular form is changed, then those particles constitute the sprout. If non-existence in shape of destruction were to produce existence, then it will lead to great confusion. The point has been clarified by S'aṅkarācārya (Br. S. Bh. II. 2. 26) as follows :—

" If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For, the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of the horns of hares and the like, *i.e.*, non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no

sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, etc., originate from the horns of hares, etc.,—a thing certainly not observed." (S. B. E. XXXIV, p. 416).

The view of the Vedāntins, *viz.*, the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change, is also untenable. They say that as the cognition of silver in pearl-oysters is false, for it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition of the real pearl-oyster, so the superimposition of this inanimate world on the intelligent *Brahman* is also false. To this we reply:—The cognition of silver in pearl-oyster is contradicted by perception; we subsequently cognise pearl-oyster and thus our first cognition of silver is contradicted by the second cognition. But we do not find any such thing in the case of this world. There is no subsequent cognition which could render our first cognition of this world false. Therefore, this world cannot be regarded to be mere illusion. Moreover, we find a similarity between silver and pearl-oyster. Both are white. But what similarity is there between the non-intelligent world and the intelligent *Brahman*, both being poles asunder? How can the world now be superimposed on Brahman?

[The Vedantin replies—For the sake of illusion it is not necessary that only similarity between two objects can lead to superimposing of one on the other. We see that people whose minds are highly excited by passion, experience the illusion of embracing their wives in dream. The same can be said of waking state also. Moreover, when ignorant people superimpose dark colour on the sky which is beyond perception, then the question of similarity does not arise at all.]

The *Naiyāyikas* assert that the effect is non existent before the causal operation. Non-existence is produced out of existence. From the existent lump of clay is produced a jar which is non-existent in that lump of clay.

Their view is not correct. For, non-existence cannot be produced. Nobody can bring non-existence into existence. Who can produce yellow colour out of the blue wherein the yellow colour does not exist? It may be argued:—People use phrases like 'The jar is non-existent,' with regard to the lump of clay from which jar has not yet been produced, and 'The jar is existent,' after it is produced from that clay. Therefore, the jar has the quality of *existence* at times and *non-existence* at other times; otherwise, these phrases cannot be used—To this we reply:—All agree to the view that a quality exists in the qualified. According to the objector's view-point, the jar was non-existent before it was produced. That is, the qualified (jar) did not exist then. Then, where did the quality of non-existence reside in the absence of the qualified? Therefore, the objector will have to admit the existence of jar even against his will in the lump of clay. Moreover, the objector had stated, *non-existence* is a *quality* which resided in the jar before its production; for, otherwise one cannot use such phrases as 'The non-existent jar.' To this we reply:—How can you use such a phrase,—'The jar is *non-existent* before its production? Before its production, the qualified (jar) being non-existent, how can the quality of non-existence be appended to it? For example, we say 'A blue lotus.' Here lotus is the substratum of the quality of blueness. Similarly, 'A non-existent jar' means that the jar is the substratum of the quality of non-existence. Now, when the jar is not existing before its production, then how can it become the substratum of any quality as the lotus is of blueness; therefore, an effect does exist even before the operation of cause.

It may be asked :—If the effect does exist even before the operation of cause, then, wherein lies the utility of the causal operation ? To this we reply :—In the stage of cause an object remains latent and minute. The causal operation simply makes that object gross and patent. Thus the causal operation brings about the manifestation of an effect which is already existing in the cause. For example, the pressing of sesamum seeds manifests the oil which is already existent in those seeds.

Again, the effect is existent in its material cause, because the former is related to the latter. A lump of clay is related to a jar even before its production. If the jar were non-existent, then it could not have any relation with the lump of clay. A lump of clay cannot produce anything which is not related to it. If unrelated things could be produced out of anything, then why not produce cloth out of a lump of clay? Or for that matter, why not produce everything from everything. But this is not so. On the other hand, wherever cause is patent enough to produce a particular effect, that cause will produce only that effect. The sesamum seeds have the potency to produce oil and not jar or cloth. The yarns have the potency to produce only cloth. This potency is always related to a potent effect. Had there been no existence of jar before its production, then who can instil the *potency* to produce it in a lump of clay.

Again, it is observed that an effect is of the same nature as its cause. An effect is not different from its cause. A jar is not different from a lump of clay, but is of the nature of clay. If the jar were different from clay, then the jar could not be of the nature of clay. Only those things differ from each other which are produced out of different materials, as a jar and the yarns. The objects which are different can have conjunction or separation. A jar and a piece of cloth can be brought together. The Himalayas

are always separated from the Vindhyas. But in clay and jar there can be neither separation nor conjunction. Moreover, the weight of clay from which a jar is made is the same as the weight of the jar.—For example, a seer of clay will produce a jar weighing neither more nor less than a seer. Therefore, jar is not different from clay.

An objector says :—Well, jar is different from clay, because (1) We find that with regard to *jar*, we say it is born, and not with regard to clay ; (2) It is the jar which is destroyed and not the clay : (3) The notions about the jar and clay are also different ; (4) One is named jar, the other clay ; (5) The jar serves the purpose of bringing water which clay does not ; (6) We say that the jar exists in clay and not the reverse.

To this we reply that these arguments for proving a difference between a cause and its effect, do not prove the real difference. For, these apparent differences can be explained away by " attributing the notions to be *appearance* and *disappearance* of certain factors." For instance, the limbs of a tortoise appear from its body and again disappear into it. Nobody on this basis can call these phenomena to be the birth and death of its limbs ; similar is the case of a jar etc., which are said to be produced when they emanate from clay, etc., and destroyed when they merge into clay, etc. The difference of notions also can be similarly explained ; we call clay as clay as long as jar has not emanated from it. As regards the usage of such expressions as, jar exists in clay, it is like the usage of such phrases as, " Tilaka trees exist in forest. Really speaking the whole forest is made up of Tilaka trees only, still we use a phrase like that. With reference to the difference of purposes served by a cause and an effect (*e. g.*, by clay and jar), we reply that the same things serve different purposes collectively or singly. The atoms of clay collected in the form of a jar, can bring water ;

they cannot do so when they are single. "Each individual bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively they carry the palanquin." If the Naiyāyika were to say again :—

You say that an effect already existing in its cause is manifested by the operation of the cause. Now, tell us, does this manifestation exist before the causal operation or not? If it does, *i. e.*, if manifestation exists before causal operation then what is the use of the latter? If, on the other hand, you say that manifestion does not exist before causal operation, then it would mean that causal operation produces a non-existent thing. This goes against your *sat-kārya* theory.

We reply.—

The *Naiyāyika* has overlooked his own fault. For the same fallacy can be shown to exist in his theory also. He says that a non-existent effect is produced from its cause. Now, we ask—does this production exist before the cause or not? If it does then what purpose does your cause serve? If it does not, then that production must have another production and the latter another and so or *ad infinitum*.

If, on the other hand, it is said that this production of jar is nothing else but jar itself, then "jar is produced" would be tantamount to *production is produced*, which is absurd. It will be still more absurd when we say, "jar is destroyed," for, it would then mean *production is destroyed*.

Thus it is proved that the effect is always *existent*.

Pradhāna, *Prakṛti* and *Avyakta* are the synonyms of Nature. It is uncaused as it is not produced out of any other thing, eternal, one, of the nature of three Attributes and pervades all its products. The three Attributes are *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. *Sattva* is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, and is light. *Rajas* is of the nature of pain

and activity, and is mobile. *Tamas* is of the nature of delusion and enveloping, and is heavy. These Attributes are able to bring this world into being, and carry on its business by their nature of being mutually subjective, and supporting and productive, and co-operative. Sometimes, *Sattva* subjugates the *Rajas* and *Tamas*; sometimes, *Rajas* subjugates *Sattva* and *Tamas*; sometimes, *Tamas* subjugates *Rajas* and *Sattva*. These Attributes have no power of creation singly; they become productive by taking the support of each other. They are always found in union, all three together. And for the purpose of serving the end of the Spirit, they are seen to co-operate, although they are mutually opposed. The end of the Spirit is the worldly enjoyment or emancipation.

It may be argued that under these circumstances, every existing entity should have all the three qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion, as it is composed of the three Attributes. Vācaspati argues—If these external objects themselves are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, then sandle should impart pleasure in winter even. Sandal never ceases to be sandal. Similarly, paste of saffron should be pleasant even in summer. Saffron-paste never ceases to be what it is. In the same way, thorns which are pleasant to a camel should be pleasant to men also. They do not change their nature in the case of any particular individual. Therefore, sandal, saffron, etc., are not of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. They give rise to these different feelings on account of the difference of individuals, times, and condition, etc. (Bhāmatī on Br. S. II 2·1).

To this Bāla replies (p. 141)—Although pleasure, pain and delusion are common to all objects, still they do not spring up accidentally, so as to affect everbody uniformly. They require certain conditions for their generation. Pleasure for its generation, depends upon virtue, and stands in need of *Sattva*. Pain, for its generation, depends upon vice

and stands in need of *Rajas*. Delusion, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of *Tamas*. Vācāspati has also explained it well (Tatt. K., Kār, 13)—"A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why ?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives—why ?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or stupefies another man who is unable to get her—why ?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things." (Dr. Jha's translation, pp. 49–50)

Thus, the Nature also is made up of the three Attributes, because it is the cause of all the manifest objects which are made up of the three Attributes. The Attributes in the Nature are in equilibrium. Of course, the Attributes are not free from modification even at this stage, for modification is their very nature; but the modification of each Attribute is similar. *Sattva* is modified into *Sattva*, *Rajas* into *Rajas* and *Tamas* into *Tamas*, till the Nature does not come into contact with the Spirit. The moment Nature comes into contact with the Spirit, the equilibrium of the Attributes is disturbed. On account of this disturbance, diverse forms in this world are created from the Attributes. For example, one and the same water produces different kinds of juices in cocoanut, lemon, grape, etc.

It has already been pointed out that all this creation by Nature is for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Now, the existence of the Spirit is proved. We observe that all composite objects are for another's use. Bed, seat, etc., do not serve any end of their own, but are meant for a man. Similarly, the composite *Pradhāna*, *Mahat*, etc., being composed of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, much exist for another's use. This another cannot be a composite object. For, the latter would then require to serve another composite, and

this another and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, this another, *viz*., the Spirit, whose purpose is served by *Pradhāna*, etc., must be recognised to exist. Again, all what is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion is seen to require a controller, as a chariot does. Therefore, *Buddhi*, etc., also require a controller. And that controller is the Spirit. Moreover, Pleasure, Pain and Delusion presuppose the existence of an enjoyer who enjoys them. This enjoyer is the Spirit. Pleasure, etc., cannot be enjoyed by anything of the nature of Pleasure, etc. For, nothing can operate upon itself. Therefore, we must admit an entity devoid of Pleasure etc. And that entity is the Spirit. There is also another argument, which proves the existence of the Spirit. The scriptures tend to bring about Isolation, which is the final cessation of the three kinds of pain. *Buddhi*, etc., cannot be isolated, because, they are of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion. Pain is one of their ingredients from which they cannot be separated. Therefore, we have to admit the existence of something distinct from *Buddhi*, etc. And that is the Spirit.

There are as many Spirits as the bodies, and not one Spirit. Īśvarakṛṣṇa establishes the plurality of Spirits in the following verse (18)—"(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of the Spirits is established." (Dr. Jha's translation, p. 64).

We see in this world that one man dies, the other is born, one is blind, the other sees well,—one is deaf, the other listens well. All this can be explained only when we admit different Spirits in different bodies. If there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then, when the Spirit renounces one body, all beings should die; or when the Spirit takes up a new body, all beings should be born. Similarly, when one

becomes blind, all should be blind. Therefore, there is a plurality of Spirits.

If it be argued that just one Ākāśa appears many on account of coming into contact with jar, house, etc., similarly, one Spirit appears many on account of coming into contact with different bodies, then it would not be correct. For, as body is the *upādhi* (condition) of the Spirit, so the limbs are the *upādhis* of a body. And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, would such phenomena be called the births and deaths of the same body?

Moreover, if there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then when that Spirit moves one body all the bodies should move simultaneously. Again, we see that beings are divided into gods, men, beasts etc. on the basis of the three Attributes. Those abounding in *Sattva* are gods, those in *Rajas* are men and those in *Tamas* are demons. If there were only one Spirit, then these differences would never arise, but the whole creation would be uniform. Thus, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

The Spirit, being devoid of the three Attributes, is the seer or witness of this creation, which is of the nature of the three Attributes. The Spirit is isolated, inactive and indifferent, again because it is free from the three Attributes. This different Spirit appears to be active, although the activity really belongs to the three Attributes. This illusion arises out of the union of the insentient Nature with the Sentient Spirit. As a result thereof, the activity belonging to the insentient Nature is transferred to the Sentient Spirit.

A question arises—why should there be a union between the Nature and the Spirit? The reply is:—The Nature is an object of experience; it stands in need of the Spirit, the experiencer. Therefore, one cause of union is that the Spirit may experience the Nature. But, when the Spirit imagines

itself as suffering on account of its union with the Nature, then it desires isolation. This isolation is the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. And as this discrimination is impossible without the Nature, the second cause of union between the Nature and the Spirit is the purpose of bringing about the Spirit's isolation.

The Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit, desists like an actress who has shown her skill on the stage. The Spirit then attains isolation. And as a delicate and newly-wedded girl when seen by a stranger does not appear again before that stranger, so the Nature also, when seen by a Spirit does not come into union with that particular Spirit.

Thus, bondage and isolation which really belong to the Nature are ascribed to the Spirit by mistake. By practising such discriminative wisdom, a person never errs about bondage or emancipation. That is, he attains isolation or salvation.

Har Dutt Sharma

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णप्रणीताः

सांख्यकारिकाः

गौडपादविरचितभाष्यसहिताः

श्रीगणेशाय नमः

कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै येनाविद्योदधौ जगति मग्ने ।
कारुण्यात्सांख्यमयी नौरिव विहिता प्रतरणाय ॥
अल्पग्रन्थं स्पष्टं प्रमाणसिद्धान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तम् ।
शास्त्रं शिष्यहिताय समासतोऽहं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके[1] हेतौ ।
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

१ अन्वयः । —दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् तदभिघातके हेतौ जिज्ञासा (भवति) सा दृष्टे (हेतौ) अपार्था चेत्, न, एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ।

दुःखत्रयेति । अस्या आर्याया उपोद्घातः क्रियते । इह भगवान् ब्रह्मसुतः कपिलो नाम । तद्यथा—

सनकश्च सनन्दनश्च[2] तृतीयश्च सनातनः ।
आसुरिः कपिलश्चैव वोढुः पञ्चशिखस्तथा ।
इत्येते ब्रह्मणः पुत्राः सप्त प्रोक्ता महर्षयः ॥

कपिलस्य सहोत्पन्नानि[3] धर्मो ज्ञानं वैराग्यमैश्वर्यं चेति । एवं स उत्पन्नः सन्नन्धे तमसि[4] मज्जज्जगदालोक्य संसारपारम्पर्येण सत्कारुण्यो जिज्ञासमानाय आसुरिसगोत्राय ब्राह्मणायेदं पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानां ज्ञानमुक्तवान् । यस्य ज्ञानाद्दुःखक्षयो भवति ।

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१. वा०-तदपघातके; ज०-तदवघातके ।

२. ब०- 'सनन्दश्चेति पाठान्तरम्'

३. वि०—सहोत्पन्ना ।

४. वि०—सन्नन्धतमसि ।

पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र तत्राश्रमे वसेत्[१] ।
जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥

तदिदमाहुः—**दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासेति** । तत्र दुःखत्रयम्—आध्यात्मिकम्, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकं चेति । तत्राध्यात्मिकं द्विविधम्—शारीरं, मानसं चेति । शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्मविपर्ययकृतं ज्वरातीसारादि । मानसं प्रियवियोगाप्रियसंयोगादि । आधिभौतिकं चतुर्विधभूतग्रामनिमित्तं[२] मनुष्यपशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपदंशमशकयूकामत्कुणमत्स्यमकरग्राहस्थावरेभ्यो जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जेभ्यः सकाशादुपजायते । आधिदैविकम्—देवानामिदं दैवम्[३], दिवः प्रभवतीति वा दैवम् । तदधिकृत्य यदुपजायते—शीतोष्णवातवर्षाशनिपातादिकम् । एवं यथा दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् जिज्ञासा कार्या । क—

तदभिघातके हेतौ । तस्य दुःखत्रयस्य अभिघातको यो हेतुस्तत्रेति ।

दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेत् । दृष्टे हेतौ दुःखत्रयाभिघातके सा जिज्ञासा अपार्था चेद्यदि । तत्राध्यात्मिकस्य द्विविधस्यापि आयुर्वेदशास्त्रक्रियया प्रियसमागमाप्रियपरिहारकटुतिक्तकषायादिक्वाथादिभिः[४] दृष्ट एवाध्यात्मिकोपायः । आधिभौतिकस्य रक्षादिनाऽभिघातो दृष्टः । दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेदेवं मन्यसे—न ।

एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् । यत एकान्ततोऽवश्यं अत्यन्ततो नित्यं दृष्टेन हेतुना अभिघातो न भवति । तस्मादन्यत्र एकान्तात्यन्ताभिघातके हेतौ जिज्ञासा विविदिषा कार्येति ॥ १ ॥

यदि दृष्टादन्यत्र[५] जिज्ञासा कार्या, ततोऽपि नैव । यत आनुश्रविको हेतुर्दुःखत्रयाभिघातकः । अनुश्रूयत[६] इत्यनुश्रवः, तत्र भव आनुश्रविकः । स चागमात् सिद्धः । यथा—

अपाम सोमममृता अभूमागन्म ज्योतिरविदाम देवान् ।
किन्नूनमस्मान्[७] कृणवदरातिः[८] किमु धूर्तिरमृतमर्त्यस्य ॥

(अथर्वशिरस् ३.)

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१. ज०-कुत्राश्रमे रतः ।
२. वि०-चतुर्विधं भूतग्रामनिमित्तम् ।
३. वि०-दैविकम् ।
४. ब०-कटुतिक्तक्वाथादिभिः ।
५. ब०-वि०-दृष्टान्यत्र ।
६. वि०-अनुश्रवति ।
७. ज०-किमस्मान् ।
८. ब०, मा०-तृणवदरातिः ।

कदाचिदिन्द्रादीनां देवानां कल्प आसीत्, कथं वयममृता अभूमेति विचार्य[1] यस्माद्वयमपाम सोमं पीतवन्तः सोमं तस्मादमृता अभूम, अमरा भूतवन्त इत्यर्थः। किं च अगन्म ज्योतिः, गतवन्तो लब्धवन्तो[2] ज्योतिः स्वर्गमिति। अविदाम देवान्, दिव्यान् विदितवन्तः। एवं च किन्नूनमस्मान् कृणवत्[3] अरातिः, नूनं निश्चितं किं अरातिः शत्रुरस्मान् कृणवत्[4] कर्त्तेति। किमु धूर्तिरमृतमर्त्यस्य, धूर्तिर्जरा हिंसा वा किं करिष्यति अमृतमर्त्यस्य। अन्यच्च वेदे श्रूयते आत्यन्तिकं फलं पशुवधेन—'सर्वांल्लोकाञ्जयति मृत्युं तरति पाप्मानं तरति ब्रह्महत्यां तरति यो योऽश्वमेधेन यजते' इति। एकान्तात्यन्तिके[5] एवं[6] वेदोक्ते अपार्थैव जिज्ञासा—इति न। उच्यते—

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्॥ २॥

२ अन्वयः।—आनुश्रविकः (हेतुः) दृष्टवत्, स हि अविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः। व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् (भवति)।

दृष्टवदानुश्रविक इति। दृष्टेन तुल्यो दृष्टवत्। योऽसौ[7] आनुश्रविकः कस्मात् स दृष्टवत्[8], यस्मात्—

अविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः। अविशुद्धियुक्तः पशुघातात्। तथा चोक्तम्।

षट् शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि।
अश्वमेधस्य वचनादूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः॥

यद्यपि श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितो धर्मस्तथापि मिश्रीभावादविशुद्धियुक्त इति। यथा—

बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि देवानां च[9] युगे युगे।
कालेन समतीतानि कालो हि दुरतिक्रमः॥

एवमिन्द्रादिनाशात् क्षययुक्तः। तथाऽतिशयो विशेषस्तेन युक्तः। विशेषगुणदर्शनादितरस्य दुःखं स्यादिति। एवमानुश्रविकोऽपि हेतुर्दृष्टवत्। कस्तर्हि श्रेयान्—इति चेदुच्यते—

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१. वि०–विचार्य्यामुं।
२. वि०–गतवतो लब्धवतो।
३. ब०–तृणवत्।
४. ब०–तृणवत्
५. ब०–ऐकान्तात्यन्तिके।
६. वि०–एव।
७. वि०–कोऽसौ।
८. वि०–'दृष्टवत्' इति नास्ति।
९. ज०–व्यतीतानि।

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् । ताभ्यां दृष्टानुश्रविकाभ्यां विपरीतः श्रेयान् प्रशस्यतर इति । अविशुद्धिक्षयातिशयायुक्तत्वात् । स कथमित्याह—

व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् । तत्र व्यक्तं महदादि—बुद्धिरहंकारः, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्चमहाभूतानि । अव्यक्तं प्रधानम् । ज्ञः पुरुषः । एवमेतानि पञ्चविंशतिस्तत्त्वानि व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः[1] कथ्यन्ते । एतद्विज्ञानाच्छ्रेय इति । उक्तं च—'पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञ' इत्यादि ॥ २ ॥

अथ व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां को विशेष इत्युच्यते—

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

३ **अन्वयः**।—मूलप्रकृतिः, अविकृतिः; महदाद्याः सप्त प्रकृतिविकृतयः । षोडशकस्तु विकारः, पुरुषः न प्रकृतिः न (च) विकृतिः ।

मूलप्रकृतिः प्रधानम् । प्रकृतिविकृतिसप्तकस्य मूलभूतत्वात् । मूलं च सा प्रकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतिः । अविकृतिः अन्यस्मान्नोत्पद्यते तेन प्रकृतिः कस्यचिद्विकारो न भवति[2] ।

महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त । महान्[3] बुद्धिः । बुद्ध्याद्याः सप्त —बुद्धिः १, अहङ्कारः २, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि ७ । एताः[4] सप्त प्रकृतिविकृतयः । तद्यथा—प्रधानाद्बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तेन विकृतिः प्रधानस्य विकार इति, सैवाहङ्कारमुत्पादयति अतः प्रकृतिः । अहङ्कारोऽपि बुद्धेरुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः, स च पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रमहङ्कारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः, तस्मादाकाशमुत्पद्यत इति प्रकृतिः । तथा स्पर्शतन्मात्रमहङ्कारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः, तदेवं वायुमुत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । गन्धतन्मात्रमहङ्कारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः, तदेवं पृथिवीमुत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । रूपतन्मात्रमहङ्कारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः, तदेवं तेज उत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । रसतन्मात्र-

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१. वि०–०व्यक्तज्ञानि ।
२. 'इति अविकृतिः' इत्यपेक्षितम् ।
३. वि०–महाभूतादिति ।
४. वि०–एतानि ।

महङ्कारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः, तदेवं अपः[1] उत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । एवं महदाद्याः सप्त प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्च ।

षोडशकश्च विकारः । पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, एकादशं मनः, पञ्च महाभूतानि—एष षोडशको गणो विकृतिरेव । विकारो विकृतिः ।

न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

एवमेषां व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां त्रयाणां पदार्थानां कैः कियद्भिः प्रमाणैः, केन कस्य वा प्रमाणेन सिद्धिर्भवति । इह लोके प्रमेयवस्तु प्रमाणेन साध्यते, यथा—प्रस्थादिभिर्व्रीहयः, तुलया चन्दनानि । तस्मात् प्रमाणमभिधेयम्—

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

४ अन्वयः ।—सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् प्रमाणं 'दृष्टम् अनुमानम् आप्तवचनञ्च' (इति) त्रिविधम् इष्टम् । हि प्रमाणात् प्रमेयसिद्धिः (भवति) ।

दृष्टं यथा—श्रोत्रं, त्वक्, चक्षुः, जिह्वा, घ्राणमिति पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा एषां पञ्चानां पञ्चैव विषया यथासंख्यम् । शब्दं श्रोत्रं गृह्णाति, त्वक् स्पर्शं, चक्षू रूपं, जिह्वा रसं, घ्राणं गन्धमिति । एतद्दृष्टमित्युच्यते प्रमाणम्[2] ।

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन वा योऽर्थो न गृह्यते स आप्तवचनाद्ग्राह्यः । यथा—इन्द्रो देवराजः, उत्तराः कुरवः, स्वर्गेऽप्सरस इत्यादि । प्रत्यक्षानुमानाग्राह्यं अथाप्तवचनाद्[3] गृह्यते । अपि चोक्तम्—

आगमो ह्याप्तवचनं, आप्तं दोषक्षयाद्विदुः ।
क्षीणदोषोऽनृतं वाक्यं न ब्रूयाद्धेत्वसम्भवात् ॥
स्वकर्मण्यभियुक्तो यः सङ्ग[4]—द्वेषविवर्जितः ।
पूजितस्तद्विधैर्नित्यं[5] आप्तो ज्ञेयः स तादृशः ॥

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१. वि०—आपः ।
२. अत्रानुमानप्रमाणलक्षणं स्खलितमिवाभाति ।
३. ब०—अप्याप्तवचनाद् ।
४. ज०—राग° ।
५. ज०—निर्वैरः पूजितः सद्भिः ।

एतेषु प्रमाणेषु सर्वप्रमाणानि सिद्धानि भवन्ति। षट् प्रमाणानि जैमिनिः। अथ कानि तानि प्रमाणानि[1]। अर्थापत्तिः, सम्भवः, अभावः, प्रतिभा, ऐतिह्यं, उपमानं चेति षट् प्रमाणानि। तत्रार्थापत्तिर्द्विविधा—दृष्टा श्रुता च। तत्र दृष्टा—एकस्मिन्पक्षे आत्मभावो गृहीतश्चेदन्यस्मिन् अप्यात्मभावो गृह्यत एव। श्रुता यथा—दिवा देवदत्तो न भुंक्ते अथ च पीनो दृश्यते, अतोऽवगम्यते रात्रौ भुंक्त इति। सम्भवो यथा–प्रस्थ इत्युक्ते चत्वारः कुडवाः[2] सम्भाव्यन्ते। अभावो नाम प्रागितरेतरात्यन्तसर्वाभावलक्षणः। प्रागभावो यथा—देवदत्तः कौमारयौवनादिषु। इतरेतराभावः—पटे घटाभावः। अत्यन्ताभावः—खर-विषाणवन्ध्यासुतखपुष्पवदिति। सर्वाभावः प्रध्वंसाभावः—दग्धपटवदिति। यथा–शुष्कधान्यदर्शनाद्वृष्टेरभावो गम्यते। एवमभावोऽनेकधा। प्रतिभा यथा–

दक्षिणेन च[3] विन्ध्यस्य सह्यस्य च यदुत्तरम्।
पृथिव्यामासमुद्रायां स प्रदेशो मनोरमः॥

एवमुक्ते तस्मिन् प्रदेशे शोभना गुणाः सन्तीति प्रतिभोत्पद्यते। प्रति-भान्वासंज्ञानमिति[4]। ऐतिह्यं यथा—ब्रवीति लोको यथात्र वटे यक्षिणी प्रव-सतीत्येव ऐतिह्यम्। उपमानं यथा—गौरिव गवयः, समुद्र इव तडागः[5]। एतानि षट् प्रमाणानि त्रिषु दृष्टादिष्वन्तर्भूतानि। तत्रानुमाने तावदर्थापत्ति-रन्तर्भूता। सम्भवाभावप्रतिभैतिह्योपमाश्चाप्तवचने।

तस्मात् त्रिष्वेव **सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं** तदाह। तेन त्रिविधेन प्रमाणेन प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवतीति वाक्यशेषः।

प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि। प्रमेयं—प्रधानं, बुद्धिः, अहङ्कारः, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च महाभूतानि, पुरुष इति। एतानि पञ्च-विंशतिस्तत्त्वानि व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञा इत्युच्यन्ते[6]। तत्र किञ्चित् प्रत्यक्षेण साध्यं, किञ्चिदनुमानेन, किञ्चिदागमेनेति त्रिविधं प्रमाणमुक्तम्॥ ४॥

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१. वि०–अप्रमाणानि।
२. ज०–कुडपाः, कुडुबाः।
३. मा०–तु; 'च' इति वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति।
४. ब०-प्रतिभा च जानतां ज्ञान-मिति।
५. वि०-तडागं।
६. वि०–ज्ञान्युच्यन्ते।

तस्य किं लक्षणमेतदाह—

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकं, आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं च[1] ॥ ५ ॥

५ अन्वयः ।—प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः दृष्टम्, अनुमानं त्रिविधम् आख्यातं, तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, आप्तवचनन्तु आप्तश्रुतिः ।

प्रतिविषयेषु श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादिविषयेषु अध्यवसायो दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः ।

त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् । पूर्ववत् , शेषवत्[2] , सामान्यतो दृष्टं चेति । पूर्वमस्यास्तीति पूर्ववद् यथा—मेघोन्नत्या वृष्टिं साधयति पूर्वदृष्टत्वात्[3] । शेषवद्यथा—समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति । सामान्यतो दृष्टं—देशाद्देशान्तरं प्राप्तं दृष्टं गतिमच्चन्द्रतारकं, चैत्रवत् । यथा चैत्रनामानं देशाद्देशान्तरं प्राप्तमवलोक्य गतिमानयमिति, तद्वच्चन्द्रतारकमिति । तथा पुष्पिताम्रदर्शनादन्यत्र पुष्पिता आम्रा[4] इति सामान्यतो दृष्टेन साधयति । एतत्सामान्यतो दृष्टम्[5] ।

किञ्च **तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकमिति** । तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी अनुमीयते, यथा—दण्डेन यतिः । लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा—दृष्ट्वा यतिं अस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति ।

आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं च । आप्ता आचार्या ब्रह्मादयः । श्रुतिर्वेदः । आप्ताश्च श्रुतिश्च आप्तश्रुतिः[6], तदुक्तमाप्तवचनमिति ॥ ५ ॥

एवं त्रिविधं प्रमाणमुक्तं, तत्र केन प्रमाणेन किं साध्यमुच्यते—

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१. विहाय जयमङ्गलामन्ये सर्वे 'तु' इति पठन्ति ॥ 'च' इतिपाठस्तु भाष्यसंमतः ।

२. वि०- शेषवत् पूर्ववत् ।

३. वि०-पूर्ववृष्टित्वात् ।

४. वि०—पुष्पिताम्रा ।

५. वि०—सामान्यदृष्टम् ।

६. ब०—' आर्षत्वादेकवचनं मध्ये सहितशब्दलोपोवेति ' इति टिप्पणी । वि०—आप्तश्च श्रुतिश्च आप्तश्रुती ।

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात्[1] ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम्[2] ॥ ६ ॥

६ **अन्वयः** ।—अतीन्द्रियाणां तु सामान्यतो दृष्टात् अनुमानात् प्रसिद्धिः । तस्मादपि च असिद्धं परोक्षम् आप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ।

सामान्यतोदृष्टादनुमानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां, इन्द्रियाण्यतीत्य वर्तमानानां सिद्धिः । प्रधानपुरुषावतीन्द्रियौ सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानेन साध्येते यस्मान्महदादि लिङ्गं त्रिगुणम् । यस्येदं त्रिगुणं कार्यं तत्प्रधानमिति । यतश्चाचेतनं चेतनमिवाभाति, अतोऽन्योऽधिष्ठाता पुरुष इति । व्यक्तं प्रत्यक्षसाध्यम् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् । यथा—इन्द्रो देवराजः, उत्तराः कुरवः, स्वर्गेऽप्सरस इति परोक्षमाप्तवचनात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

अत्र कश्चिदाह—प्रधानं[3] पुरुषो वा नोपलभ्यते । यच्च[4] नोपलभ्यते लोके तन्नास्ति । तस्मात्तावपि न स्तः । यथा—द्वितीयं शिरः, तृतीयो बाहुरिति, तदुच्यते—अत्र सतामप्यर्थानामष्टधोपलब्धिर्न भवति । तद्यथा—

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

७ **अन्वयः** ।—अतिदूरात् (अति) सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातात् मनोऽनवस्थानात् सौक्ष्म्यात् व्यवधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च (सतामपि अनुपलब्धिः) ।

इह सतामप्यर्थानां **अतिदूरादनुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा** । यथा—देशान्तरस्थानां चैत्रमैत्रविष्णुमित्राणाम् ।

सामीप्यात् । यथा—चक्षुषोऽञ्जनानुपलब्धिः ।

इन्द्रियाभिघातात् । यथा—बधिरान्धयोः शब्दरूपानुपलब्धिः ।

मनोऽनवस्थानात् । यथा—व्यग्रचित्तः सम्यक्कथितमपि नावधारयति ।

सौक्ष्म्यात् । यथा—धूमोष्मजलनीहारपरमाणवो गगनगता नोपलभ्यन्ते ।

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१. विहाय जयमङ्गलाटिप्पणीं 'प्रतीतिरनुमानात्' इति सर्वसम्मतः पाठः ।
२. मा०-साध्यम् ।
३. वि०-प्रधानः ।
४. वि०-यश्च ।

व्यवधानात्। यथा——कुड्येन पिहितं वस्तु नोपलभ्यते।

अभिभवात्। यथा—सूर्यतेजसाभिभूता ग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादयो नोपलभ्यन्ते।

समानाभिहारात्। यथा——मुद्गराशौ मुद्गः क्षिप्तः, कुवलयामलकमध्ये कुवलयामलके क्षिप्ते, कपोतमध्ये कपोतो नोपलभ्यन्ते, समानद्रव्यमध्याहृतत्वात्। एवमष्टधाऽनुपलब्धिः सतामर्थानामिह दृष्टा ॥ ७ ॥

एवं चास्ति किमभ्युपगम्यते, प्रधानपुरुषयोरप्येतयोर्वा अनुपलब्धिः केन हेतुना, केन चोपलब्धिस्तदुच्यते——

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः[1]।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं, प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च[2] ॥ ८ ॥

८ अन्वयः।——तदनुपलब्धिः सौक्ष्म्यात्, अभावात् न। कार्य्यतः तदुपलब्धिः। तच्च कार्य्यं महदादि प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपञ्च।

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः। प्रधानस्येत्यर्थः। प्रधानं सौक्ष्म्यान्नोपलभ्यते। यथा——आकाशे धूमोष्मजलनीहारपरमाणवः सन्तोऽपि नोपलभ्यन्ते। कथं तर्हि तदुपलब्धिः——

कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धिः। कार्यं दृष्ट्वा कारणमनुमीयते। अस्ति प्रधानं कारणं यस्येदं कार्यम्। बुद्धिरहङ्कारपञ्चतन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च महाभूतान्येव तत्कार्यम्।

तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपम्। प्रकृतिः प्रधानं तस्य विरूपं प्रकृतेरसदृशम्।

सरूपं च। समानरूपं च। यथा——लोकेऽपि पितुस्तुल्य इव पुत्रो भवत्यतुल्यश्च। येन हेतुना तुल्यमतुल्यं तदुपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यामः ॥ ८ ॥

यदिदं महदादि कार्यं तत्किं प्रधाने सत् उताहोस्वित् असत्—आचार्यविप्रतिपत्तेरयं संशयः। यतोऽत्र सांख्यदर्शने सत्कार्यं, बौद्धादीनामसत्कार्यम्। यदि सत्——असन्न भवति, अथासत्——सन्न भवतीति विप्रतिषेधस्तत्राह——

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१. '°लब्धेः' इत्यन्येषां सर्वेषां पाठः।

२. अन्येतु 'प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च' इति पठन्ति।

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्, सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च, सत्कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

९ अन्वयः ।— असदकरणात् उपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात् शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च कार्यं सत् ।

असदकरणात् । न सत् असत् । असतोऽकरणं, तस्मात् सत्कार्यम् । इह लोके असत्करणं नास्ति । यथा—सिकताभ्यस्तैलोत्पत्तिः । तस्मात्सतः करणादस्ति प्रागुत्पत्तेः[1] प्रधाने व्यक्तम् । अतः सत्कार्यम् ।

किं चान्यत्—उपादानग्रहणात् । उपादानं कारणं, तस्य ग्रहणात् । इह लोके यो येनार्थी स तदुपादानग्रहणं करोति—दध्यर्थी क्षीरस्य, न तु जलस्य । तस्मात्सत्कार्यम् ।

इतश्च, सर्वसम्भवाभावात् । सर्वस्य सर्वत्र सम्भवो नास्ति । यथ सुवर्णस्य रजतादौ तृणपांशुसिकतासु । तस्मात्सर्वसम्भवाभावात्सत्कार्यम् ।

इतश्च, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् । इह कुलालः शक्तो मृद्दण्डचक्रचीवररज्जुनीरादिकरणोपकरणं वा शक्यमेव घटं मृत्पिण्डादुत्पादयति । तस्मात्सत्कार्यम् ।

इतश्च, कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् । कारणं यल्लक्षणं तल्लक्षणमेव कार्यमपि[2] । यथा—यवेभ्यो[3] यवाः, व्रीहिभ्यो व्रीहयः । यदाऽसत्कार्यं स्यात्ततः कोद्रवेभ्यः शालयः स्युः । न च सन्तीति तस्मात् सत्कार्यम् । एवं पञ्चभिर्हेतुभिः प्रधाने महदादि लिङ्गमस्ति । तस्मात् सत उत्पत्तिः, नासत इति ॥ ९ ॥

प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च यदुक्तं तत् कथमित्युच्यते·

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

१० अन्वयः ।—व्यक्तं हेतुमत् अनित्यम् अव्यापि सक्रियम् अनेकम् आश्रितं लिङ्गं सावयवं परतन्त्रं (च) । अव्यक्तं विपरीतम् ।

व्यक्तं महदादिकार्यं हेतुमदिति । हेतुरस्यास्तीति हेतुमत् । उपादानं हेतुः, कारणं, निमित्तमिति पर्य्यायाः । व्यक्तस्य प्रधानं हेतुरस्ति, अतो हेतुम-

१. वि०–प्रागुप्तेः ।
२. वि०–कार्यमेव ।
३. वि०–यवेभ्योऽपि ।

व्यक्तं भूतपर्यन्तम् । हेतुमद्बुद्धितत्त्वं प्रधानेन, हेतुमानहङ्कारो बुद्ध्या, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि हेतुमन्त्यहंकारेण, आकाशं शब्दतन्मात्रेण हेतुमत्, वायुः स्पर्शतन्मात्रेण हेतुमान्, तेजो रूपतन्मात्रेण हेतुमत्, आपो रसतन्मात्रेण हेतुमत्यः, पृथिवी गन्धतन्मात्रेण हेतुमती । एवं भूतपर्यन्तं व्यक्तं हेतुमत् ।

किं चान्यत्, **अनित्यम्** । यस्मादन्यस्मादुत्पद्यते, यथा—मृत्पिण्डादुत्पद्यते घटः स चानित्यः ।

किं च, **अव्यापि** । असर्वगमित्यर्थः । यथा प्रधानपुरुषौ सर्वगतौ, नैवं व्यक्तम् ।

किं चान्यत्, **सक्रियम्** । संसारकाले संसरति, त्रयोदशविधेन करणेन संयुक्तं सूक्ष्मं शरीरमाश्रित्य संसरति, तस्मात् सक्रियम् ।

किं चान्यत्, **अनेकम्** । बुद्धिरहङ्कारः पञ्च तन्मात्राण्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि[1] पञ्चमहाभूतानि चेति[2] ।

(किं चान्यत्, **आश्रितम्** । स्वकारणमाश्रयते । प्रधानाश्रिता बुद्धिः, बुद्धिमाश्रितोऽहङ्कारः, अहङ्काराश्रितानि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च तन्मात्राणि, पञ्चतन्मात्राश्रितानि पञ्चमहाभूतानीति ।)[3]

किं च, **लिङ्गम्** । लययुक्तम् । लयकाले पञ्च महाभूतानि तन्मात्रेषु लीयन्ते, तान्येकादशेन्द्रियैः सहाहङ्कारे, स च बुद्धौ, सा च प्रधाने लयं यातीति ।

तथा, **सावयवम्** । अवयवाः शब्दस्पर्शरसरूपगन्धाः, तैः सह ।

किं च, **परतन्त्रम्** । नात्मनः प्रभवति । यथा—प्रधानतन्त्रा बुद्धिः, बुद्धितन्त्रोऽहङ्कारः, अहङ्कारतन्त्राणि तन्मात्राणीन्द्रियाणि च, तन्मात्रतन्त्राणि पञ्चमहाभूतानि च । एवं परतन्त्रं परायत्तं व्याख्यातं व्यक्तम् ।

अथोऽव्यक्तं व्याख्यास्यामः । **विपरीतमव्यक्तम्** । एतैरेव गुणैर्यथोक्तैर्विपरीतमव्यक्तम् । हेतुमद् व्यक्तमुक्तम् । नहि प्रधानात् परं किञ्चिदस्ति, यतः प्रधानस्यानुत्पत्तिः, तस्मादहेतुमदव्यक्तम् ।

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१. वि०—°याणि च ब०-पुस्तके लभ्यते । वि०-पुस्तके तु 'तन्मात्राश्रितानि' इत्येवोपलभ्यते । अक्षरमर्यादया चैष पाठः वि०-पुस्तके स्खलित इति भाति ।

२. 'चेति' इति वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।

३. धनुश्चिह्नाङ्कितः पाठः केवलं

तथा अनित्यं च व्यक्तं, नित्यमव्यक्तं, अनुत्पद्यमानत्वात् । नहि भूतानीव[1] कुतश्चिदुत्पद्यत इति नित्यं प्रधानम्[2] ।

किं च, अव्यापि व्यक्तं, व्यापि प्रधानं, सर्वगतत्वात् ।

सक्रियं व्यक्तं, अक्रियमव्यक्तं, सर्वगतत्वादेव ।

तथा अनेकं व्यक्तं, एकं प्रधानं, कारणत्वात् । त्रयाणां लोकानां प्रधानमेकं कारणं, तस्मादेकं प्रधानम् ।

तथा आश्रितं व्यक्तं, अनाश्रितमव्यक्तं, अकार्यत्वात् । नहि प्रधानादस्ति किञ्चित्परं यस्य प्रधानं कार्यं स्यात् ।

तथा व्यक्तं लिङ्गं, अलिङ्गमव्यक्तं, नित्यत्वात् । महदादि लिङ्गं प्रलयकाले परस्परं प्रलीयते, नैवं प्रधानं, तस्मादलिङ्गं प्रधानम् ।

तथा सावयवं व्यक्तं, निरवयवमव्यक्तं, नहि शब्दस्पर्शरसरूपगन्धाः प्रधाने सन्ति ।

तथा परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तं, प्रभवत्यात्मनः ॥ १० ॥

एवं व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्वैधर्म्यमुक्तं साधर्म्यमुच्यते । यदुक्तं स्वरूपं च—

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

११ अन्वयः । — व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं त्रिगुणम् अविवेकि विषयः सामान्यम् अचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि । पुमान् तद्विपरीतः तथा च ।

त्रिगुणं व्यक्तम् । सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि त्रयो गुणा यस्येति ।

अविवेकि व्यक्तम् । न विवेकोऽस्यास्तीति । इदं व्यक्तमिमे गुणा इति न विवेकं[3] कर्तुं याति, अयं गौरयमश्व इति यथा । ये गुणास्तद्व्यक्तं, यद्व्यक्तं ते च गुणा इति ।

तथा विषयो व्यक्तम् । भोज्यमित्यर्थः । सर्वपुरुषाणां विषयभूतत्वात् ।

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१. वि०-भूतानि ।

२. मदीयः पाठः । वि०-°दुत्पद्यन्तेति प्रधानम् । ब०-°दुत्पद्यत इत्यव्यक्तं प्रधानम् ।

३. ब०-इत्यस्य पाठः । वि०-विवक । 'विवेकः' इति पठनीयम् ?

तथा सामान्यं व्यक्तम् । मूल्यदासीवत्[1] सर्वसाधारणत्वात् ।

अचेतनं व्यक्तम् । सुखदुःखमोहान्न चेतयतीत्यर्थः ।

तथा प्रसवधर्मि व्यक्तम् । तद्यथा—बुद्धेरहङ्कारः प्रसूयते, तस्मात् पञ्च तन्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि च प्रसूयन्ते, तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च महाभूतानि ।

एवमेते व्यक्तधर्माः प्रसवधर्मान्ता उक्ताः, एवमेभिरव्यक्तं सरूपं, यथा व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानमिति । तत्र त्रिगुणं व्यक्तं, अव्यक्तमपि त्रिगुणं, यस्यै-तन्महदादि कार्यं त्रिगुणम् । इह यदात्मकं कारणं तदात्मकं कार्यमिति । यथा कृष्णतन्तुकृतः कृष्ण एव पटो भवति ।

तथा अविवेकि व्यक्तं, प्रधानमपि गुणैर्न भिद्यते । अन्ये गुणा अन्यत् प्रधानमेवं विवेक्तुं[2] न याति, तदविवेकि प्रधानम् ।

तथा विषयो व्यक्तं, प्रधानमपि सर्वपुरुषविषयभूतत्वाद्विषय इति ।

तथा सामान्यं व्यक्तं, प्रधानमपि, सर्वसाधारणत्वात् ।

तथा अचेतनं, व्यक्तं, प्रधानमपि सुखदुःखमोहान्न चेतयति, इति कथ-मनुमीयते—इह ह्यचेतनान्मृत्पिण्डादचेतनो घट उत्पद्यते ।

एवं प्रधानमपि व्याख्यातम् । इदानीं **तद्विपरीतस्तथा च**[3] **पुमान्**नित्येतद्व्याख्यायते । तद्विपरीतस्ताभ्यां व्यक्ताव्यक्ताभ्यां विपरीतः पुमान् । तद्यथा—

त्रिगुणं व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, अगुणः पुरुषः ।

अविवेकि व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, विवेकी पुरुषः ।

तथा विषयो व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, अविषयः पुरुषः ।

तथा सामान्यं व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, असामान्यः पुरुषः ।

अचेतनं व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, चेतनः पुरुषः । सुखदुःखमोहान् चेतयति संजानीते तस्माच्चेतनः पुरुषः ।

प्रसवधर्मि व्यक्तं प्रधानं च, अप्रसवधर्मी पुरुषः । नहि पुरुषात् किञ्चित् प्रसूयते । तस्मादुक्तं तद्विपरीतः पुमानिति ।

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१. जयमङ्गलायां मल्लदासी शब्दो व्यवहृतः ।

२. मदीयः पाठः । ब०-, वि०- विवक्तुं ।

३. 'च' इति वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।

तदुक्तं **तथा च पुमानिति** । तत् पूर्वस्यामार्यायां प्रधानमहेतुमद्यथा व्याख्यातं तथा च पुमान् । तद्यथा हेतुमदनित्यमित्यादि व्यक्तं, तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ।

तत्र--हेतुमद्व्यक्तं, अहेतुमत् प्रधानं, तथा च पुमानहेतुमाननुत्पाद्यत्वात् ।

अनित्यं व्यक्तं, नित्यं प्रधानं, तथा च नित्यः पुमान् ।

(अव्यापि व्यक्तं, व्यापि प्रधानं, तथा च व्यापि पुमान् । सर्वगतत्वात् ।)[1]

(सक्रियं व्यक्तं, अक्रियं प्रधानं, तथा च पुमान्)[2] अक्रियः, सर्वगतत्वादेव ।

अनेकं व्यक्तं, एकमव्यक्तं, तथा पुमानप्येकः ।

आश्रितं व्यक्तं, अनाश्रितमव्यक्तं, तथा च पुमाननाश्रितः ।

लिङ्गं व्यक्तं, अलिङ्गं प्रधानं, तथा च पुमानप्यलिङ्गः । न क्वचिल्लीयत इति ।

सावयवं व्यक्तं, निरवयवं अव्यक्तं, तथा च पुमान् निरवयवः । नहि पुरुषे शब्दादयोऽवयवाः सन्ति ।

किं च परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तं, तथा च पुमानपि स्वतन्त्रः, आत्मनः प्रभवतीत्यर्थः ।

एवमेतदव्यक्तपुरुषयोः साधर्म्यं व्याख्यातं पूर्वस्यामार्यायाम् । व्यक्तप्रधानयोः साधर्म्यं पुरुषस्य वैधर्म्यं च त्रिगुणमविवेकीत्यादि प्रकृतार्यायां व्याख्यातम् ॥ ११ ॥

तत्र यदुक्तं त्रिगुणमिति व्यक्तमव्यक्तं च, तत् के ते गुणा इति तत्स्वरूपप्रतिपादनायेदमाह—

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योऽन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

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१. धनुश्चिह्नाङ्कितं केवलं ब०-पुस्तक उपलभ्यते ।

२. धनुश्चिह्नाङ्कितं केवलं ब०-पुस्तक उपलभ्यते ।

१२ अन्वयः ।——गुणाः प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च ।

प्रीत्यात्मकाः, अप्रीत्यात्मकाः, विषादात्मकाश्च **गुणाः**–सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीत्यर्थः । तत्र प्रीत्यात्मकं सत्त्वं, **प्रीतिः** सुखं तदात्मकमिति । अप्रीत्यात्मकं रजः, **अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्**[1] । विषादात्मकं तमः, **विषादो** मोहः ।

तथा——**प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः** । अर्थशब्दः[2] सामर्थ्यवाची, प्रकाशार्थं सत्त्वं प्रकाशसमर्थमित्यर्थः । प्रवृत्त्यर्थं रजः । नियमार्थं तमः, स्थितौ समर्थमित्यर्थः । प्रकाशक्रियास्थितिशीला गुणा इति ।

तथा——**अन्योऽन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च** । अन्योऽन्याभिभवाः, अन्योऽन्याश्रयाः, अन्योऽन्यजननाः, अन्योऽन्यमिथुनाः, अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयश्च ते तथोक्ताः । अन्योऽन्याभिभवा इति । अन्योऽन्यं परस्परमभिभवन्तीति प्रीत्यप्रीत्यादिभिर्धर्मैराविर्भवन्ति । यथा——यदा सत्त्वमुत्कटं भवति, तदा रजस्तमसी अभिभूय स्वगुणैः, प्रीतिप्रकाशात्मना[3] अवतिष्ठते; यदा रजः, तदा सत्त्वतमसी अप्रीतिप्रवृत्तिधर्मेण; यदा तमः, तदा सत्त्वरजसी विषादस्थित्यात्मकेन इति । तथा अन्योऽन्याश्रयाश्च द्व्यणुकवद् गुणाः । अन्योऽन्यजननाः, यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटं जनयति । तथा अन्योऽन्यमिथुनाश्च । यथा स्त्रीपुंसौ अन्योऽन्यमिथुनौ तथा गुणाः । उक्तं च——

रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ।
उभयोः सत्त्वरजसोर्मिथुनं तम उच्यते ॥

[देवीभागवत——३–८]

परस्परसहाया इत्यर्थः । अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयश्च । परस्परं वर्तन्ते । 'गुणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते' इति वचनात् [भगवद्गीता——३–२८] । यथा सुरूपा सुशीला स्त्री सर्वसुखहेतुः, सपत्नीनां सैव दुःखहेतुः, सैव रागिणां मोहं जनयति, एवं सत्त्वं रजस्तमसोर्वृत्तिहेतुः । यथा राजा सदोद्युक्तः प्रजापालने दुष्टनिग्रहे, शिष्टानां सुखमुत्पादयति दुष्टानां दुःखं मोहं च, एवं रजः सत्त्वतमसोर्वृत्तिं जनयति । तथा तमः स्वरूपेणावरणात्मकेन सत्त्वरजसोर्वृत्तिं जनयति । यथा मेघाः खमावृत्य

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१. एतत् वि०–पुस्तके नास्ति ।
२. वि०–अर्थः शब्दः ।
३. वि०–°प्रकाशात्मकेना° ।

जगतः सुखमुत्पादयन्ति, ते वृष्टया कर्षकाणां कर्षणोद्योगं जनयन्ति, विरहिणां मोहम्। एवं अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयो गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

किं चान्यत्--

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

१३ अन्वयः।--सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकं (च) इष्टम्, रजः उपष्टम्भकं चलञ्च इष्टम्। तमः गुरु वरणकमेव इष्टम्। प्रदीपवत्तच्च अर्थतः वृत्तिः (इष्टा)।

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकं च। यदा सत्त्वमुत्कटं भवति तदा लघून्यङ्गानि बुद्धिप्रकाशश्च प्रसन्नतेन्द्रियाणां भवति।

उपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः। उपष्टभ्नातीत्युपष्टम्भकम्, उद्योतकम्। यथा वृषो वृषदर्शने उत्कटमुपष्टम्भं करोति, एवं[1] रजोवृत्तिः। तथा रजश्च चलं दृष्टं, रजोवृत्तिश्चलचित्तो भवति।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः। यदा तम उत्कटं भवति तदा गुरूण्यङ्गानि आवृतानीन्द्रियाणि भवन्ति स्वार्थासमर्थानि।

अत्राह--यदि गुणाः परस्परं विरुद्धाः स्वमतेनैव कमर्थं[2] निष्पादयन्ति तर्हि कथम्--**प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः**। प्रदीपेन तुल्यं प्रदीपवत्। अर्थतः साधना वृत्तिरिष्टा। यथा प्रदीपः परस्परविरुद्धतैलाग्निवर्तिसंयोगात् अर्थप्रकाशान्[3] जनयति, एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि परस्परविरुद्धानि अर्थं निष्पादयन्ति ॥ १३ ॥

अन्तरप्रश्नो भवति-- 'त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः' इत्यादि[4] प्रधानं व्यक्तं च व्याख्यातम्। तत्र प्रधानं, उपलभ्यमानं महदादि च त्रिगुणमविवेक्यादीति च कथमवगम्यते। तत्राह--

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१. वि०--एव।

२. 'स्वमतेनैव एकमर्थं' इति पठनीयम् ?

३. वि० °प्रकाशां। °प्रकाशं-- इति पठनीयम् ?

४. ब०--इत्यादिना।

अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः[1] त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

१४ अन्वयः ।—— त्रैगुण्यात् अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः । तद्विपर्ययाभावात् कार्यस्य कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् अव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ।

योऽयमविवेक्यादिर्गुणः स त्रैगुण्यान्महदादौ, अव्यक्ते[2] नायं सिद्ध्यति । अत्रोच्यते—— **तद्विपर्ययाभावात्** । तस्य विपर्ययः तद्विपर्ययः, तस्याभावः तद्विपर्ययाभावः, तस्मात् सिद्धमव्यक्तम् । यथा——यत्रैव तन्तवस्तत्रैव पटः । अन्ये तन्तवोऽन्यः पटो न, कुतः——तद्विपर्ययाभावात् । एवं व्यक्ताव्यक्तसंपन्नो[3] भवति । दूरं प्रधानमासन्नं व्यक्तम् । यो व्यक्तं पश्यति, स प्रधानमपि पश्यति, तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

इतश्चाव्यक्तं सिद्धम्——**कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य** । लोके यदात्मकं कारणं तदात्मकं कार्यमपि । तथा——कृष्णेभ्यस्तन्तुभ्यः कृष्ण एव पटो भवति । एवं महदादि लिङ्गं अविवेकि, विषयः, सामान्यं, अचेतनं, प्रसवधर्मि । यदात्मकं लिङ्गं तदात्मकमव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

त्रैगुण्यादविवेक्यादिर्व्यक्ते सिद्धः । तद्विपर्ययाभावात्, एवं कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य, अव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम्——इत्येतन्मिथ्या, लोके यन्नोपलभ्यते तन्नास्ति——(इति न वाच्यम्, सतोऽपि पाषाणगन्धादेरनुपलम्भात्[4] ।) एवं प्रधानमप्यस्ति किन्तु नोपलभ्यते ।

भेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात्, शक्तितः[5] प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागात्, अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

१५ अन्वयः ।—— भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेः कारणकार्यविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यस्य अविभागाच्च (अव्यक्तं कारणं अस्ति) ।

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१. वा०—देः सिद्धिः ।
२. ब०—व्यक्तेः ।
३. मा०— °सम्बन्धो ।
४. धनुश्चिह्नाङ्कितं वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।
५. यत्तु वा०-पुस्तके ' कार्यतः ' इति पाठदर्शनं, तत् ' शक्तितः ' इति वाचस्पत्युद्धृतप्रतीकविरोधाद्भ्रममूलकमिवाभाति ।

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमिति क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धः । **भेदानां परिमाणात्** । लोके यत्र कर्तास्ति तस्य परिमाणं दृष्टम् । यथा—कुलालः परिमितैर्मृत्पिण्डैः परिमितानेव घटान् करोति । एवं महदपि । महदादि लिङ्गं परिमितं भेदतः प्रधानकार्यम् । एका बुद्धिः, एकोऽहङ्कारः, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च महाभूतानि—इत्येवं भेदानां परिमाणादस्ति प्रधानं कारणं यद्व्यक्तं परिमितमुत्पादयति । यदि प्रधानं न स्यात्तदा निष्परिमाणमिदं व्यक्तमपि[1] स्यात् । परिमाणाच्च भेदानामस्ति प्रधानं यस्माद् व्यक्तमुत्पन्नम् ।

तथा **समन्वयात्** । इह लोके प्रसिद्धिर्दृष्टा यथा—व्रतधारिणं बटुं दृष्ट्वा समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्राह्मणाविति । एवमिदं त्रिगुणं महदादिलिङ्गं दृष्ट्वा साधयामोऽस्य यत्कारणं भविष्यतीति । अतः समन्वयादस्ति प्रधानम् ।

तथा **शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च** । इह यो यस्मिन् शक्तः स तस्मिन्नेवार्थे प्रवर्तते । यथा—कुलालो घटस्य करणे समर्थो घटमेव करोति न पटं रथं वा ।

तथा अस्ति प्रधानं कारणं, कुतः—**कारणकार्यविभागात्** । करोतीति कारणम्, क्रियत इति कार्यम् । कारणस्य कार्यस्य च विभागः । यथा घटो दधिमधूदकपयसां धारणे समर्थो, न तथा मृत्पिण्डः । मृत्पिण्डो वा घटं निष्पादयति, न चैवं घटो मृत्पिण्डम् । एवं महदादिलिङ्गं दृष्ट्वानुमीयते—अस्ति विभक्तं तत् कारणं यस्य विभाग इदं व्यक्तमिति ।

इतश्च, **अविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य** । विश्वं जगत्, तस्य रूपं व्यक्तिः विश्वरूपस्य भावो वैश्वरूप्यम् । तस्य अविभागादस्ति प्रधानम्, यस्मात् त्रैलोक्यस्य पञ्चानां पृथिव्यादीनां महाभूतानां परस्परं विभागो नास्ति, महाभूतेष्वन्तर्भूतास्त्रयो लोका इति । पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशमिति एतानि पञ्च महाभूतानि प्रलयकाले सृष्टिक्रमेणैवाविभागं यान्ति तन्मात्रेषु परिणामिषु, तन्मात्राण्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि चाहङ्कारे, अहङ्कारो बुद्धौ, बुद्धिः प्रधाने । एवं त्रयो लोकाः प्रलयकाले प्रकृतावविभागं गच्छन्ति । तस्मादविभागात् क्षीरदधिवद्व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोरस्त्यव्यक्तं[2] कारणम् ॥ १५ ॥

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१. माठरसम्मतः पाठः । व०- पाठः, स च भ्रमात्मक इति स्फुटमेव । वि०-पुस्तकयोस्तु 'न स्यात्' इति २. वि०-°योरव्यक्तं° ।

अतश्च---

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

१६ अन्वयः ।— अव्यक्तं कारणम् अस्ति (यतः) त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् परिणामतः (महदादि) प्रवर्तते ।

अव्यक्तं प्रख्यातं कारणमस्ति यस्मान्महदादि लिङ्गं प्रवर्तते ।

त्रिगुणतः त्रिगुणात् । सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणाः यस्मिंस्तत् त्रिगुणं, तत्किमुक्तं भवति---सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रधानम् ।

तथा **समुदयात्** । यथा गङ्गास्रोतांसि त्रीणि रुद्रमूर्द्धनि पतितानि एकं स्रोतो जनयन्ति एवं त्रिगुणमव्यक्तमेकं व्यक्तं जनयति । यथा[1] वा तन्तवः समुदिताः पटं जनयन्ति, एवमव्यक्तं गुणसमुदयान्महदादि जनयतीति त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च व्यक्तं जगत् प्रवर्तते ।

यस्मादेकस्मात् प्रधानाद्व्यक्तं तस्मादेकरूपेण भवितव्यम्-नैष दोषः **परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्** । एकस्मात् प्रधानात् त्रयो लोकाः समुत्पन्नाः तुल्यभावा न भवन्ति । देवाः सुखेन युक्ताः, मनुष्या दुःखेन, तिर्यञ्चो मोहेन । एकस्मात् प्रधानात् प्रवृत्तं व्यक्तं प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् परिणामतः सलिलवद्भवति । प्रतिप्रतीति वीप्सा । गुणानामाश्रयो गुणाश्रयः, तद्विशेषः, तं गुणाश्रयविशेषं प्रतिनिधाय प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषं परिणामात् प्रवर्तते व्यक्तम् । यथा---आकाशादेकरसं सलिलं पतितं नानारूपात् संश्लेषाद्भिद्यते तत्तद्रसान्तरैः[2], एवमेकस्मात् प्रधानात् प्रवृत्तास्त्रयो लोका नैकस्वभावा भवन्ति । देवेषु सत्त्वमुत्कटं, रजस्तमसी उदासीने, तेन तेऽत्यन्तसुखिनः । मनुष्येषु रज उत्कटं भवति, सत्त्वतमसी उदासीने, तेन तेऽत्यन्तदुःखिनः । तिर्यक्षु तम उत्कटं भवति, सत्त्वरजसी उदासीने, तेन तेऽत्यन्तमूढाः ॥ १६ ॥

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१ वि०— तथा । २ वि०—तद्रसान्तरैः ।

एवमार्याद्वयेन प्रधानस्यास्तित्वमभ्युपगम्यते, इतश्चोत्तरं पुरुषास्तित्व-प्रतिपादनार्थमाह—

संघातपरार्थत्वात्[1] त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं[2] प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

१७ अन्वयः । — संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् अधिष्ठानात् भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च पुरुषोऽस्ति ।

यदुक्तं व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्[3] मोक्षः प्राप्यत इति, तत्र व्यक्तादनन्तरं अव्यक्तं पञ्चभिः कारणैरधिगतम् । अव्यक्तवत् पुरुषोऽपि सूक्ष्मः, तस्याधुनाऽनुमितास्तित्वं प्रतिक्रियते । अस्ति पुरुषः, कस्मात्—**संघातपरार्थत्वात्** । योऽयं महदादिसंघातः स पुरुषार्थः, इत्यनुमीयते, अचेतनत्वात् पर्यङ्कवत् । यथा पर्यङ्कः प्रत्येकं गात्रोत्पलकपादपीठ[4]तूलीप्रच्छादनपटोपधानसंघातः परार्थो नहि स्वार्थः । पर्यङ्कस्य नहि किञ्चिदपि गात्रोत्पलाद्यवयवानां परस्परं कृत्यमस्ति । अतोऽवगम्यते, अस्ति पुरुषो यः पर्यङ्के शेते यस्यार्थं पर्यङ्कः । तत्परार्थमिदं शरीरं पञ्चानां महाभूतानां संघातो वर्तते । अस्ति पुरुषो यस्येदं भोग्यं शरीरं भोग्यमहदादिसंघातरूपं[5] समुत्पन्नमिति ।

इतश्चात्मास्ति— **त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्** । यदुक्तं पूर्वस्यामार्यायां त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषय ' इत्यादि, तस्माद् विपर्ययात् । येनोक्तं ' तद्विपरीतस्तथा च[6] पुमान् ' ।

अधिष्ठानात् । यथेह लंघनप्लवनधावनसमर्थैरश्वैर्युक्तो रथः सारथिनाधिष्ठितः प्रवर्तते तथा आत्माधिष्ठानाच्छरीरमिति । तथा चोक्तं षष्ठितन्त्रे ' पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते ' ।

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१. ' संहतपरार्थत्वात् ' इति वि०— पुस्तकधृतः पाठो भ्रान्त इति स्पष्टमेव ।

२. मा०, वि०— कैवल्यार्थप्रवृत्तेश्च । भाष्योद्धृतटिप्पण्यां तु कैवल्यार्थमिति पाठः ।

३. वि०— व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञानात् ।

४. वि०— °वट° ।

५. वि०— भोग्यशरीरं भोग्यं महदादिसंघातरूपं ।

६. ' च ' इति वि०— पुस्तके नास्ति ।

अतोऽस्त्यात्मा—**भोक्तृत्वात्**[1]। यथा मधुराम्ललवणकटुतिक्तकषाय-षड्रसोपबृंहितस्य संयुक्तस्यान्नस्य[2] साध्यते, एवं महदादिलिङ्गस्य भोक्तृत्वाऽभावादस्ति स आत्मा यस्येदं भोग्यं शरीरमिति।

इतश्च—**कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च**। केवलस्य भावः कैवल्यम्। तन्निमित्तं या च प्रवृत्तिस्तस्याः स्वकैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः सकाशादनुमीयते, अस्त्यात्मेति। यतः सर्वो विद्वानविद्वांश्च संसारक्षयमिच्छति। एवमेभिर्हेतुभिरस्त्यात्मा शरीराद्व्यतिरिक्तः ॥ १७ ॥

अथ स किमेकः सर्वशरीरेऽधिष्ठाता मणिरसनात्मकसूत्रवत्, आहोस्वित् बहव आत्मानः प्रतिशरीरमधिष्ठातार इत्यत्रोच्यते—

जननमरणकरणानां[3] प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

१८ **अन्वयः**।—जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात् अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्।

जन्म च मरणं च करणानि च जन्ममरणकरणानि। तेषां **प्रतिनियमात्**, प्रत्येकनियमादित्यर्थः। यद्येक एवात्मा स्यात्तत एकस्य जन्मनि सर्व एव जायेरन् एकस्य मरणे सर्वेऽपि म्रियेरन्, एकस्य करणवैकल्ये बाधिर्यान्धत्वमूकत्वकुणित्वखंजत्वलक्षणे सर्वेऽपि बधिरान्धकुणिखंजाः स्युः। न चैवं भवति तस्माज्जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात् पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्।

इतश्च—**अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च**। युगपदेककालम्, न युगपदयुगपत् प्रवर्तनम्। यस्मादयुगपद्धर्मादिषु प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते। एके धर्मे प्रवृत्ताः, अन्येऽधर्मे, वैराग्येऽन्ये, ज्ञानेऽन्ये प्रवृत्ताः, तस्मादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च बहव इति सिद्धम्।

किं चान्यत्—**त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव**। त्रिगुणभावविपर्ययाच्च पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्। यथा सामान्ये जन्मनि एकः सात्त्विकः सुखी, अन्यो राजसो दुःखी, अन्यस्तामसो मोहवान्। एवं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाद्बहुत्वं सिद्धमिति ॥ १८ ॥

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१. कारिकामूलपाठानुरोधात् 'भोक्तृभावात्' इति पठनीयम्।
२. अत्र 'भोक्ता' इत्यपेक्षितम्।
३. भाष्यानुरोधेन तु 'जन्ममरण' इत्यादि पठनीयम्।

अकर्ता पुरुष इत्येतदुच्यते —

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

१९ **अन्वय:** ।—तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् अस्य पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वं सिद्धं (तथा) कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वम् अकर्तृभावश्च (सिद्धानि) ।

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् । तस्माच्च यथोक्तत्रैगुण्यविपर्यासात्, विपर्ययात् । निर्गुण: पुरुषो विवेकी भोक्तेत्यादिगुणानां पुरुषस्य यो विपर्यास उक्त: तस्मात्—

सत्त्वरजस्तमःसु कर्तृभूतेषु **साक्षित्वं सिद्धं पुरुषस्येति** । योऽयमधिकृतो बहुत्वं प्रति । गुणा एव कर्तार: प्रवर्त्तन्ते, साक्षी नापि प्रवर्तते नापि निवर्तत एव ।

किं चान्यत्, **कैवल्यम्** । केवलभाव: कैवल्यमन्यत्वमित्यर्थ: । त्रिगुणेभ्य: केवल: अन्य:[1] ।

माध्यस्थ्यम् मध्यस्थभाव: । परिव्राजकवत् मध्यस्थ: पुरुष: । यथा कश्चित् परिव्राजको ग्रामीणेषु कर्षणार्थेषु प्रवृत्तेषु केवलो मध्यस्थ:, पुरुषोऽप्येषु गुणेषु वर्तमानेषु न प्रवर्तते ।

तस्मात्, **द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च** । यस्मान्मध्यस्थस्तस्मात् द्रष्टा तस्मादकर्ता पुरुषस्तेषां कर्मणामिति । सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि त्रयो गुणा: कर्मकर्तृभावेन प्रवर्तन्ते न पुरुष:, एवं पुरुषस्यास्तित्वं च सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

यस्मादकर्ता[2] पुरुषस्तत्कथमध्यवसायं करोति धर्मं करिष्याम्यधर्मं न करिष्यामीति । अत:, कर्ता भवति — न च कर्ता पुरुष: —, एवमुभयथा[3] दोष: स्यादिति । अत उच्यते—

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च[4] तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीन: ॥ २० ॥

२० **अन्वय:** ।—तस्मात् तत् संयोगात् अचेतनं लिङ्गं चेतनावदिव (भवति) तथा उदासीन: गुणकर्तृत्वे च कर्तेव भवति ।

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१. वि०–अन्यत् ।
२. वि०–यस्मात्कर्ता ।
३. वि०–°मुभयात्र ।
४. ज०–°कर्तृत्वेऽपि ।

इह पुरुषश्चेतनावान्[1] । तेन चेतनावभाससंयुक्तं[2] महदादि लिङ्गं **चेतनावदिव** भवति । यथा लोके घट: शीतसंयुक्त: शीत:, उष्णसंयुक्त उष्ण:, एवं महदादि लिङ्गं तस्य **संयोगात्** पुरुषसंयोगाच्चेतनावदिव भवति । तस्माद्गुणा अध्यवसायं कुर्वन्ति न पुरुष: ।

यद्यपि लोके पुरुष: कर्ता गन्तेत्यादि प्रयुज्यते तथाऽप्यकर्ता पुरुष: । कथम्—**गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीन:** । गुणानां कर्तृत्वे सति उदासीनोऽपि पुरुष: कर्तेव भवति, न कर्ता । अत्र दृष्टान्तो भवति—यथा अचौरश्चौरै: सह गृहीतश्चौर इत्यवगम्यते, एवं त्रयो गुणा: कर्तारस्तै: संयुक्त: पुरुषोऽकर्ताऽपि कर्ता भवति, कर्तृसंयोगात् । एवं व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां विभागो विख्यात:, यद्विभागान्मोक्षप्राप्तिरिति ॥ २० ॥

अथैतयो: प्रधानपुरुषयो: किंहेतु: संघात:—उच्यते—

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृत: सर्ग: ॥ २१ ॥

२१ **अन्वय:** ।—पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य कैवल्यार्थं पङ्ग्वन्धवत् उभयोरपि संयोग:, तत्कृत: सर्ग: ।

पुरुषस्य प्रधानेन सह **संयोगो दर्शनार्थम्** । प्रकृतिं महदादिकार्यं भूतादिपर्यन्तं[3] पुरुष: पश्यति ।

एतदर्थं **प्रधानस्यापि** पुरुषेण संयोग: **कैवल्यार्थम्** ।

स च संयोग: **पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि** द्रष्टव्य: । यथा—एक: पङ्गुरेकश्चान्ध:, एतौ द्वावपि गच्छन्तौ, महता सामर्थ्येनाटव्यां सार्थस्य स्तेनकृतादुपप्लवात्, स्वबन्धुपरित्यक्तौ दैवादितश्चेतश्च चेरतु:[4] । स्वगत्या च तौ संयोगमुपयातौ । पुनस्तयो: स्ववचसोर्विश्वस्तत्वेन संयोगो गमनार्थं दर्शनार्थं च भवति । अन्धेन पङ्गु: स्वस्कन्धमारोपित: एवं शरीरारूढपङ्गुदर्शितेन मार्गेणान्धो याति, पङ्गुश्चान्धस्कन्धारूढ: । एवं पुरुषे दर्शनशक्तिरस्ति पङ्गुवत्, न क्रिया ।

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१. वि०- °श्चेतनाकृत् ।
२. वि०- °भासं युक्तं ।
३. वि०- महदादिकार्यभूतपर्यन्तं ।
४ वि०- दैवादितश्चेरुश्च ।

प्रधाने क्रियाशक्तिरस्त्यन्धवत्, न दर्शनशक्तिः। यथा वा अनयोः पङ्ग्वन्धयोः कृतार्थयोर्विभागो भविष्यतीप्सितस्थानप्राप्तयोः, एवं प्रधानमपि पुरुषस्य मोक्षं कृत्वा निवर्तते, पुरुषोऽपि प्रधानं दृष्ट्वा कैवल्यं गच्छति। तयोः कृतार्थयोर्विभागो भविष्यति।

किं चान्यत्, **तत्कृतः सर्गः**। तेन संयोगेन कृतस्तत्कृतः सर्गः, सृष्टिः। यथा स्त्रीपुरुषसंयोगात् सुतोत्पत्तिस्तथा प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगात् सर्गस्योत्पत्तिः।२१॥

इदानीं सर्वविभागदर्शनार्थमाह—

प्रकृतेर्महान्, ततोऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि॥ २२॥

२२ अन्वयः।–प्रकृतेः महान् ततः अहङ्कारः तस्माच्च षोडशकः गणः तस्मात् षोडशकादपि पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि (जायन्ते)।

प्रकृतिः, प्रधानं, ब्रह्म, अव्यक्तं, बहुधात्मकं[1] मायेति पर्यायाः। अलिङ्गस्य[2] प्रकृतेः सकाशान्महानुत्पद्यते। महान्, बुद्धिः, आसुरी, मतिः, ख्यातिः, ज्ञानं, इति[3] प्रज्ञापर्यायैरुत्पद्यते।

तस्माच्च महतोऽहङ्कार उत्पद्यते। अहङ्कारः, भूतादिः, वैकृतः, तैजसः, अभिमान इति पर्यायाः।

तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः। तस्मादहङ्कारात् षोडशकः षोडशस्वरूपो गण उत्पद्यते। स यथा–पञ्चतन्मात्राणि। शब्दतन्मात्रं, स्पर्शतन्मात्रं, रूपतन्मात्रं, रसतन्मात्रं, गन्धतन्मात्रमिति। तत एकादशेन्द्रियाणि। श्रोत्रं, त्वक्, चक्षुषी, जिह्वा, घ्राणमिति पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि। वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः[4] पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि। उभयात्मकमेकादशं मनः। एष षोडशको गणोऽहङ्कारादुत्पद्यते।

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१. वि०–, ब०–; बहुधानकं। बहुधात्मकमिति पाठो माठरवृत्तिसम्मतः।
२. वि०–' अलिङ्गस्याः '। मूलपाठस्तु ब०–पुस्तके दृश्यते ' अलिङ्गायाः '
इति पठनीयम् ?
३. ब ' इति ' शब्दो वि०–पुस्तके नास्ति, ब०–पुस्तक उपलभ्यते।
४. ब०– °पस्थानि

किं च, **पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि** । **तस्मात् षोडशकात्** गणात् पञ्च-भ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः सकाशात् पञ्च वै महाभूतान्युत्पद्यन्ते । यदुक्तं—शब्दतन्मात्रा-दाकाशम्, स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः, रूपतन्मात्रात्तेजः, रसतन्मात्रादापः, गन्धतन्मा-त्रात् पृथिवी । एवं पञ्चभ्यः परमाणुभ्यः पञ्च महाभूतान्युत्पद्यन्ते ॥ २२ ॥

यदुक्तं—व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति, तत्र महदादिभूतान्तं त्रयो-विंशतिभेदं[1] व्याख्यातम् । अव्यक्तमपि 'भेदानां परिमाणात्' इत्यादिना व्याख्यातम् । पुरुषोऽपि 'संघातपरार्थत्वात्' इत्यादिभिर्हेतुभिर्व्याख्यातः । एवमेतानि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि । यस्तैस्त्रैलोक्यं[2] व्याप्तं जानाति[3] । तस्य भावोऽस्तित्वं, तत्त्वम् । यथोक्तम्—

पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः ।
जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥

तानि यथा—प्रकृतिः, पुरुषः, बुद्धिः, अहङ्कारः, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि, एका-दशेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च महाभूतानि । इत्येतानि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि । तत्रोक्तं, प्रकृतेर्महानुत्पद्यते । तस्य किं लक्षणमेतदाह—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

२३ अन्वयः ।—अध्यवसायः बुद्धिः धर्मः ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् एतत् सात्त्विकं रूपम् । अस्मात् विपर्यस्तं तामसं (रूपम्) ।

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिलक्षणम् । अध्यवसानमध्यवसायः । यथा बीजे भविष्यद्वृत्तिकोऽङ्कुरस्तद्वदध्यवसायः । अयं घटः, अयं पटः, इत्येवं सति[4] या सा बुद्धिरिति लक्ष्यते ।

१.–अत्र 'व्यक्तं' इत्यपेक्षितम् ।
२. ब०–पुस्तके पाठः । वि०–यस्त्रैलोक्यं ।
३. 'स मुच्यते' इत्यधिकमत्रापेक्षितम्, इति माठरवृत्तिटिप्पण्याम्, पृ. ३५ ।
४. वि०–स्यति ।

उभयमिति एकादशो गणः, तन्मात्रः पञ्चकः । योऽयं सात्त्विकोऽहङ्कारो वैकृतिको वैकृतो भूत्वा एकादशेन्द्रियाण्युत्पादयति स तैजसमहङ्कारं सहायं गृह्णाति । सात्त्विको निष्क्रियः, स तैजसयुक्त इन्द्रियोत्पत्तौ समर्थः । तथा तामसोऽहङ्कारो भूतादिसंज्ञितो निष्क्रियत्वात् तैजसेनाहङ्कारेण क्रियावता युक्तस्तन्मात्राण्युत्पादयति । तेनोक्तं—तैजसादुभयमिति । एवं तैजसेनाहङ्कारेणेन्द्रियाण्येकादश पञ्चतन्मात्राणि कृतानि भवन्ति ॥ २५ ॥

सात्त्विक एकादशक इत्युक्तः, यो वैकृतात्[1] सात्त्विकादहङ्कारादुत्पद्यते तस्य का संज्ञेत्याह—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनकानि[2] ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान्[3] कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

२६ अन्वयः ।—चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनकानि बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् (च) कर्मेन्द्रियाणि आहुः ।

चक्षुरादीनि स्पर्शनपर्यन्तानि **बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्युच्यन्ते** । स्पृश्यतेऽनेन इति स्पर्शनं, त्वगिन्द्रियम् । तद्वाची सिद्धः स्पर्शनशब्दोऽस्ति, तेनेदं पठ्यते **स्पर्शनकानीति** । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धान् पञ्च विषयान् बुध्यन्ते अवगच्छन्तीति पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाणि ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थान् कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः । कर्म कुर्वन्तीति कर्मेन्द्रियाणि । तत्र वाक् वदति, हस्तौ नानाव्यापारं कुरुतः, पादौ गमनागमनम्, पायुरुत्सर्गं करोति, उपस्थ आनन्दं प्रजोत्पत्त्या ॥ २६ ॥

एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियभेदेन दश इन्द्रियाणि व्याख्यातानि । मन एकादशं किमात्मकं किंस्वरूपं चेति तदुच्यते—

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च[4] ॥ २७ ॥

१.—यत्तु एतदनन्तरं ब०— पुस्तके 'सात्त्विक एकादशकः' इत्यधिकमुपलभ्यते तद्भ्रममूलकमेवेति भाति ।
२. वा०— °रसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
३. वा— °पस्थानि ।
४. मा०— ग्राह्यभेदाच्च ।

२७ अन्वयः ।—अत्र मनः उभयात्मकम् । संकल्पकं साधर्म्यात् इन्द्रियं च । गुणपरिणामविशेषात् नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ।

अत्रेन्द्रियवर्गे **मन उभयात्मकं** । बुद्धीन्द्रियेषु बुद्धीन्द्रियवत्, कर्मेन्द्रियेषु कर्मेन्द्रियवत् । कस्मात्, बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति कर्मेन्द्रियाणां च । तस्मादुभयात्मकं मनः । संकल्पयतीति **संकल्पकम्** ।

किं चान्यत्, **इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्** । समानधर्मभावात् । सात्त्विकाहङ्काराद् बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि मनसा सहोत्पद्यमानानि मनसः साधर्म्यं प्रति (पादयन्ति)[1] । तस्मात् साधर्म्यान्मनोऽपीन्द्रियम् । एवमेतान्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि सात्त्विकाद्वैकृतादहङ्कारादुत्पन्नानि । तत्र मनसः का वृत्तिरिति—संकल्पो वृत्तिः । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दादयो वृत्तयः, कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादयः ।

अथैतानीन्द्रियाणि भिन्नानि भिन्नार्थग्राहकाणि किमीश्वरेण उत स्वभावेन कृतानि, यतः प्रधानबुद्ध्यहङ्कारा अचेतनाः, पुरुषोऽप्यकर्ता, इत्यत्राह—इह सांख्यानां स्वभावो नाम कश्चित्कारणमस्ति । अत्रोच्यते—गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च । इमान्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि[2] शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः पञ्चानाम्, वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम्, संकल्पश्च मनसः । एवमेते भिन्नानामेवेन्द्रियाणां अर्थाः, **गुणपरिणामविशेषात्**—गुणानां परिणामो गुणपरिणामः । तस्य विशेषात् इन्द्रियाणां **नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च** । अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण, नाहङ्कारेण, न बुद्ध्या, न प्रधानेन, न पुरुषेण, स्वभावात् कृतगुणपरिणामेनेति । गुणानामचेतनत्वान्न प्रवर्तते; प्रवर्तत एव । कथं—वक्ष्यतीहैव—

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥

एवमचेतना गुणाः एकादशेन्द्रियभावेन प्रवर्तन्ते । विशेषा अपि तत्कृता एव[3] । येनोच्चैः प्रदेशे चक्षुरवलोकनार्थं[4] स्थितं, तथा घ्राणं,

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१. धनुश्चिह्नाङ्कितः पाठो मदीयः, मूलस्थितस्य 'प्रति' इति शब्दस्य अत्रार्थप्रतिपादकत्वाभावात् ।

२. 'भिन्नार्थानि' इत्यधिकमत्रापेक्षितमिव भाति, माठरवृत्तिरत्र द्रष्टव्या ।

३. ब.०—विशेषोऽपि तत्कृत एव ।

४. ब.०—पुस्तकपाठः । वि०-चक्षुः०-खलोकनाय ।

तथा श्रोत्रं, तथा जिह्वा, स्वदेशे स्वार्थग्रहणाय । एवं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्यपि यथायथं स्वार्थसमर्थानि स्वदेशावस्थितानि स्वभावतो गुणपरिणामविशेषादेव, न तदर्था अपि । यत उक्तं शास्त्रान्तरे, "गुणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते" । गुणानां या वृत्तिः सा गुणविषया एवेति बाह्यार्था विज्ञेया गुणकृता एवेत्यर्थः प्रधानं यस्य कारणमिति ॥ २७ ॥

अथेन्द्रियस्य कस्य का वृत्तिरित्युच्यते—

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

२८ अन्वयः ।—पञ्चानां रूपादिषु आलोचनमात्रं वृत्तिः इष्यते । पञ्चानाञ्च वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः (वृत्तयः इष्यन्ते) ।

मात्रशब्दो विशेषार्थः, अविशेषव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । यथा भिक्षामात्रं लभ्यते नान्यो विशेष इति, तथा चक्षू रूपमात्रे न रसादिषु । एवं शेषाण्यपि । तद्यथा चक्षुषो रूपं, जिह्वाया रसः, घ्राणस्य गन्धः, श्रोत्रस्य शब्दः, त्वचः स्पर्शः । एवमेषां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां वृत्तिः कथिता ।

कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तिः कथ्यते—**वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम्** । कर्मेन्द्रियाणामित्यर्थः । वाचो वचनं, हस्तयोरादानं, पादयोर्विहरणं, पायोर्भुक्तस्याहारस्य परिणतमलोत्सर्गः, उपस्थस्यानन्दः सुतोत्पत्तिः, विषयाः[1] वृत्तिरिति सम्बन्धः ॥ २८ ॥

अधुना बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनसामुच्यते—

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तित्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

२९ अन्वयः ।— त्रयस्य स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिः, सा एषा (वृत्तिः) असामान्या भवति । प्राणाद्याः पञ्च वायवः सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः ।

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१. ब०-विषयः ।

स्वलक्षणस्वभावा **स्वालक्षण्या** । अध्यवसायो[1] बुद्धिरिति लक्षण-मुक्तं, सैव बुद्धिवृत्तिः । तथा अभिमानोऽहङ्कार इत्यभिमानलक्षणो[2]ऽभि-मानवृत्तिश्च । संकल्पकं मन इति लक्षणमुक्तं, तेन संकल्प एव मनसो वृत्तिः । त्रयस्य बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनसां स्वालक्षण्या वृत्तिः ।

असामान्या । या प्रागभिहिता बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां च वृत्तिः साऽप्यसा-मान्यैवेति ।

इदानीं सामान्या वृत्तिराख्यायते । **सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः**, सामान्येन करणानां वृत्तिः । **प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च** । प्राणापानसमानोदानव्याना इति पञ्च वायवः सर्वेन्द्रियाणां सामान्या वृत्तिः । यतः प्राणो नाम वायुः मुख-नासिकान्तर्गोचरः, तस्य यत् स्पन्दनं कर्म तत् त्रयोदशविधस्यापि सामान्या वृत्तिः । सति प्राणे यस्मात् करणानामात्मलाभ इति । प्राणोऽपि पञ्जरशकुनि-वत् सर्वस्य चलनं करोतीति । प्राणनात् प्राण इत्युच्यते । तथा अपनयनाद-पानः, तत्र यत्स्पन्दनं तदपि सामान्यवृत्तिरिन्द्रियस्य । तथा समानो मध्य-देशवर्ती य आहारादीनां[3] समं नयनात् समानो वायुः, तत्र यत्स्पन्दनं तत् सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः । तथा ऊर्ध्वारोहणादुत्कर्षात् उन्नयनाद्वा उदानो नाभि-देशमस्तकान्तर्गोचरः, तत्रोदाने यत्स्पन्दनं तत् सर्वेन्द्रियाणां सामान्या वृत्तिः । किं च, शरीरव्याप्तिरभ्यन्तरविभागश्च येन क्रियतेऽसौ शरीरव्याप्त्या आका-शवद्व्यानः, तत्र यत् स्पन्दनं तत् करणजालस्य सामान्या वृत्तिरिति । एवमेते पञ्च वायवः सामान्यकरणवृत्तिरिति व्याख्याताः, त्रयोदशविधस्यापि करण-सामान्या[4] वृत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥ २९ ॥

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।
दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

३० **अन्वयः** ।— दृष्टे चतुष्टयस्य तु तस्य युगपत् क्रमशश्च वृत्तिः निर्दिष्टा । तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका (युगपत् क्रमशश्च) वृत्तिः ।

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१. 'यो' इत्यधिकं वि०- पुस्तके ।
२. °लक्षणं- इति पठनीयम् ।
३. वि०- आहारादिनयनात् ।
४. 'करणस्य सामान्या' इति पठनीयम् ।

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य । बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनसामेकैकेन्द्रियसम्बन्धे सति चतुष्टयं भवति । चतुष्टयस्य **दृष्टे** प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाये युगपद्वृत्तिः । बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनश्चक्षूंषि युगपदेककालं रूपं पश्यन्ति, स्थाणुरयमिति । बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनोजिह्वा युगपद्रसं गृह्णन्ति बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनोघ्राणानि युगपद्गन्धं गृह्णन्ति । तथा त्वक्श्रोत्रे अपि ।

किं च **क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा** । तस्येति चतुष्टयस्य क्रमशश्च वृत्तिर्भवति । यथा कश्चित् पथि गच्छन् दूरादेव दृष्ट्वा स्थाणुरयं पुरुषो वेति संशये सति तत्रोपरूढं[1] तल्लिङ्गं पश्यति शकुनिं वा, ततस्तस्य मनसा संकल्पिते संशये व्यवच्छेदभूता बुद्धिर्भवति स्थाणुरयमिति । अतः अहङ्कारश्च निश्चयार्थः स्थाणुरेवेति । एवं बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनश्चक्षुषां क्रमशो वृत्तिर्दृष्टा । यथा रूपे तथा शब्दादिष्वपि बोद्धव्या । दृष्टे, दृष्टविषये ।

किं चान्यत्, **तथाऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः** । अदृष्टेऽनागतेऽतीते च काले बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनसां रूपे चक्षुःपूर्विका त्रयस्य वृत्तिः, स्पर्शे त्वक्पूर्विका, गन्धे घ्राणपूर्विका, रसे रसनपूर्विका, शब्दे श्रवणपूर्विका बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनसामनागते भविष्यति काले अतीते च तत्पूर्विका क्रमशो वृत्तिः, वर्तमाने युगपत् क्रमशश्चेति ॥ ३० ॥

किं च—

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां[2] वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

३१ अन्वयः ।—(करणानि) परस्पराकूतहेतुकां स्वां स्वां वृत्तिं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, केनचित् करणं न कार्यते ।

स्वां स्वामिति वीप्सा । बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनांसि **स्वां स्वां वृत्तिं परस्पराकूतहेतुकां**, 'आकूतादरसम्भ्रम' इति । **प्रतिपद्यन्ते** पुरुषार्थकरणाय बुद्धेरहङ्कारादयः[3] । बुद्धिरहङ्काराकूतं ज्ञात्वा स्वस्वविषयं[4] प्रतिपद्यते ।

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१. वि०– तत्रोपरूढां वल्लिं ।
२. ज०– °हैतुकीं ।
३. ब०– बुद्ध्यहङ्कारादयः ।
४. ब०– स्वविषयं ।

किमर्थमिति चेत्——**पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः**। पुरुषार्थः कर्तव्य इत्येवमर्थं गुणानां प्रवृत्तिः। तस्मादेतानि करणानि पुरुषार्थं प्रकाशयन्ति। (यद्यचेतनानीति)[1] कथं स्वयं प्रवर्तन्ते——**न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्**। पुरुषार्थ एवैकः कारयतीति वाक्यार्थः। न केनचित् ईश्वरेण पुरुषेण कार्यते प्रबोध्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

बुद्ध्यादि कतिविधं तदित्युच्यते——

करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्।
कार्यं च तस्य दशधाऽऽहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

३२ अन्वयः।–करणं त्रयोदशविधं, तत् आहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्। तस्य कार्यं दशधा आहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च।

करणं महदादि **त्रयोदशविधं** बोद्धव्यम्। पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुरादीनि, पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीनि[2] इति त्रयोदशविधं करणम्।

तत्किं करोतीत्येतदाह—— **तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्**। तत्राहरणं धारणं च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि कुर्वन्ति, प्रकाशं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि।

कतिविधं कार्यं तस्येति तदुच्यते। **कार्यं च तस्य दशधा**। तस्य करणस्य कार्यं कर्तव्यं दशधा दशप्रकारम्। शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाख्यं, वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाख्यमेतद्दशविधं कार्यं, बुद्धीन्द्रियैः प्रकाशितं कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहरन्ति धारयन्ति चेति ॥ ३२ ॥

किं च[3] ——

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम्।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

३३ अन्वयः।—— अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं, बाह्यं दशधा। (तत्) विषयाख्यम्। बाह्यं साम्प्रतकालम् आभ्यन्तरं करणं त्रिकालम्।

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१. धनुश्चिह्नांकितं केवलं ब०— पुस्तके लभ्यते। इत्यधिकमपेक्षितम्। एतच्च माठरवृत्तावुपलभ्यते।

२. अत्र— ' बुद्ध्यहङ्कारौ मनः '. ३. केवलं ब०— पुस्तके लभ्यते।

अन्तःकरणमिति बुद्धयहङ्कारमनांसि त्रिविधं, महदादिभेदात् ।

दशधा बाह्यं च । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च, दशविधमेतत्करणं बाह्यम् ।

तत् त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् । बुद्धयहङ्कारमनसां भोग्यम् ।

साम्प्रतकालम् । श्रोत्रं वर्तमानमेव शब्दं शृणोति नातीतं न च भविष्यन्तम्, चक्षुरपि वर्तमानं रूपं पश्यति नातीतं नाऽनागतम्, त्वग् वर्तमानं स्पर्शम्, जिह्वा वर्तमानं रसम्, नासिका वर्तमानं गन्धं नातीतानागतं चेति एवं कर्मेन्द्रियाणि-वाग् वर्तमानं शब्दमुच्चारयति नातीतं नाऽनागतं च, पाणी वर्तमानं घटमाददाते नातीतमनागतं च, पादौ वर्तमानं पन्थानं विहरतो नातीतं नाप्यनागतम्, पायूपस्थौ च वर्तमानावुत्सर्गानन्दौ कुरुतो नातीतौ नाऽनागतौ । एवं बाह्यं करणं साम्प्रतकालमुक्तम् ।

त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् । बुद्धयहङ्कारमनांसि त्रिकालविषयाणि बुद्धिर्वर्तमानं घटं बुध्यते अतीतमनागतं चेति । अहङ्कारो वर्तमानेऽभिमानं करोति अतीतेऽनागते च । तथा मनो वर्तमाने संकल्पं कुरुते अतीतेऽनागते च । एवं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणमिति ॥ ३३ ॥

इदानीमिन्द्रियाणि कति सविशेषं विषयं गृह्णन्ति, कानि निर्विशेषमिति तदुच्यते—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि[1] ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि[2] ॥ ३४ ॥

३४ अन्वयः ।— तेषां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि । वाक् शब्दविषया भवति । शेषाणि तु (इन्द्रियाणि) पञ्चविषयाणि (भवन्ति) ।

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि । तानि सविशेषं विषयं गृह्णन्ति । सविशेषविषयं मानुषाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धान् सुखदुःखमोहयुक्तान् बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति । देवानां निर्विशेषान् विषयान् प्रकाशयन्ति ।

तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाणां मध्ये **वाग्भवति शब्दविषया** । देवानां मानुषाणां च वाग्वदति श्लोकादीनुच्चारयति । तस्माद् देवानां मानुषाणां च वागिन्द्रियं तुल्यम् ।

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१. ज०-विषयीणि । २. ज०-विषयीणि ।

शेषाण्यपि वाग्व्यतिरिक्तानि पाणिपादपायूपस्थसंज्ञितानि **पञ्चविषयाणि** । पञ्च विषयाः शब्दादयो येषां तानि पञ्चविषयाणि । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः पाणौ सन्ति । पञ्चशब्दादिलक्षणायां भुवि पादो विहरति । पाय्विन्द्रियं पञ्चक्लृप्तं[1] उत्सर्गं करोति । तथोपस्थेन्द्रियं पञ्चलक्षणं शुक्रमानन्दयति ॥ ३४ ॥

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

३५ अन्वयः ।—यस्मात् सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयम् अवगाहते तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि शेषाणि द्वाराणि ।

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः । अहङ्कारमनःसहितेत्यर्थः । **यस्मात् सर्वं विषयमवगाहते** गृह्णाति, त्रिष्वपि कालेषु शब्दादीन् गृह्णाति, **तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि** । **द्वाराणि शेषाणि** । करणानीति वाक्यशेषः ॥ ३५ ॥

किं चान्यत् —

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

३६ अन्वयः ।— प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणाः एते गुणविशेषाः पुरुषस्य कृत्स्नम् अर्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ।

यानि करणान्युक्तानि । **एते गुणविशेषाः** किंविशिष्टाः **प्रदीपकल्पाः** प्रदीपवद्विषयप्रकाशकाः ।

परस्परविलक्षणाः । असदृशाः, भिन्नविषया इत्यर्थः । (गुणविषया इत्यर्थः)[2] ।

गुणविशेषाः । गुणेभ्यो जाताः ।

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1. ब०– ‘ पञ्चलक्षणं ’ इत्यपि पाठः ।

2. धनुश्चिन्हांकितः पाठो– ब०–पुस्तके नोपलभ्यते ।

कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थम् । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि, अहङ्कारः, मनश्चैतानि स्वं स्वमर्थं पुरुषस्य प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, बुद्धिस्थं कुर्वन्तीत्यर्थः । यतो बुद्धिस्थं सर्वं विषयसुखादिकं[1] पुरुष उपलभ्यते ॥ ३६ ॥

इदं चान्यत्—

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

३७ **अन्वयः**।—यस्मात् बुद्धिः पुरुषस्य सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं साधयति। सैव च पुनः सूक्ष्मं प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं विशिनष्टि ।

सर्वेन्द्रियगतं त्रिष्वपि कालेषु, **सर्वम्** । **प्रत्युपभोगं**, उपभोगं प्रति । देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियद्वारेण सान्तःकरणा **बुद्धिः साधयति** सम्पादयति **यस्मात्**, तस्मात् **सैव च विशिनष्टि** प्रधानपुरुषयोर्विषय-विभागं करोति । **प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं** नानात्वमित्यर्थः ।

सूक्ष्ममित्यनधिकृततपश्चरणैरप्राप्यम् । इयं प्रकृतिः सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था, इयं बुद्धिः, अयमहङ्कारः, एतानि पञ्चतन्मात्राणि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि, पञ्च महाभूतानि, अयमन्यः पुरुष एभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तः, इत्येवं[2] बोधयति बुद्धिर्यस्यावायात्[3] अपवर्गो भवति ॥ ३७ ॥

पूर्वमुक्तं विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि, तत् के विषयाः तान्[4] दर्शयति—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

३८ **अन्वयः** ।—तन्मात्राणि अविशेषाः । तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि (जायन्ते) । एते शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च विशेषाः स्मृताः ।

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१. वि०— विषयं सुखादिकं ।
२. वि०— इत्येव ।
३. ब०— °वापात् ।
४. वि०— तच्च ।

यानि पञ्च **तन्मात्राणि** अहङ्कारादुत्पद्यन्ते तानि[1]– शब्दतन्मात्रं, स्पर्शतन्मात्रं, रूपतन्मात्रं, रसतन्मात्रं, गन्धतन्मात्रं—एतानि **अविशेषा** उच्यन्ते। देवानामेते सुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिताः।

तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यः तन्मात्रेभ्यः **पञ्च** महाभूतानि, पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशसंज्ञानि, यान्युत्पद्यन्ते, **एते स्मृता विशेषाः**। गन्धतन्मात्रात् पृथिवी, रसतन्मात्रादापः, स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः, शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशम्, इत्येवमुत्पन्नानि एतानि महाभूतानि।

एते विशेषा मानुषाणां विषयाः, **शान्ताः** सुखलक्षणाः, **घोरा** दुःखलक्षणाः, **मूढा** मोहजनकाः। यथाकाशं कस्यचिदनवकाशादन्तर्गृहादेर्निर्गतस्य सुखात्मकं शान्तं भवति, तदेव पन्थानं गच्छतो वनमार्गाद् भ्रष्टस्य दिङ्मोहान्मूढं भवति। एवं वायुर्घर्मार्त्तस्य शान्तो भवति, शीतार्त्तस्य घोरः, धूलीशर्कराविमिश्रोऽतिवान् मूढ इति। एवं तेजःप्रभृतिषु द्रष्टव्यम्॥ ३८॥

अथाऽन्ये विशेषाः—

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते॥ ३९॥

३९ **अन्वयः**।—सूक्ष्माः मातापितृजाः प्रभूतैः सह त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः। तेषां सूक्ष्माः नियताः, मातापितृजाः निवर्तन्ते।

सूक्ष्माः तन्मात्राणि। यत्संगृहीतं सूक्ष्मशरीरं महदादिलिङ्गं सदा तिष्ठति संसरति च ते सूक्ष्माः।

तथा **मातापितृजाः** स्थूलशरीरोपचायका ऋतुकाले मातापितृसंयोगे शोणितशुक्रमिश्रीभावेन उदरान्तः सूक्ष्मशरीरस्योपचयं कुर्वन्ति[2]। तत् सूक्ष्मशरीरं पुनर्मातुरशितपीतनानाविधरसेन नाभीनिबन्धेनाप्यायते।

तथा प्रारब्धं[3] शरीरं सूक्ष्मैर्मातापितृजैश्च सह महाभूतैः **त्रिधा** विशेषैः पृष्ठोदरजंघाकट्युरःशिरः प्रभृति षाट्कौशिकं पाञ्चभौतिकं[4], रुधिर-

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१. मदीयः पाठः। वि०– पुस्तके 'ते'। ब०– पुस्तके किमपि नास्ति।
२. वि०– कुर्वीत।
३. ब०–तथाप्यारब्धं।
४. वि०– पञ्चभौतिकं।

मांसस्नायुशुक्रास्थिमज्जासंभृतं—आकाशोऽवकाशदानात्, वायुर्वर्धनात्, तेजः पाकात्, आपः संग्रहात्, पृथिवी धारणात्—समस्तावयवोपेतं मातुरुदराद्बहिर्भवति। एवमेते **त्रिविधा विशेषाः स्युः** ।

अत्राह—के नित्याः के वाऽनित्याः— **सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियताः** । सूक्ष्मास्तन्मात्रसंज्ञकास्तेषां मध्ये नियता नित्याः । तैरारब्धं शरीरं, कर्मवशात् पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरजातिषु संसरति, धर्मवशादिन्द्रादिलोकेषु । एवमेतत् नियतं सूक्ष्मशरीरं संसरति न[1] यावत् ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । उत्पन्ने ज्ञाने विद्वान् शरीरं त्यक्त्वा मोक्षं गच्छति। तस्मादेते विशेषाः सूक्ष्मा नित्या इति।

मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते । तत् सूक्ष्मशरीरं परित्यज्य इहैव प्राणत्यागवेलायां मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते । मरणकाले मातापितृजं शरीरमिहैव निवृत्त्य[2] भूम्यादिषु प्रलीयते यथातत्त्वम् ॥ ३९ ॥

सूक्ष्मं च कथं संसरति तदाह—

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

४० अन्वयः ।— लिङ्गं पूर्वोत्पन्नं असक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् निरुपभोगं भावैः अधिवासितं संसरति ।

यदा लोका अनुत्पन्नाः[3] प्रधानादिसर्गे तदा सूक्ष्मशरीरमुत्पन्नमिति ।

किं चान्यत्, **असक्तम्**। न संयुक्तं तिर्यग्योनिदेवमानुषस्थानेषु, सूक्ष्मत्वात् कुत्रचिदसक्तं, पर्वतादिष्वप्रतिहतप्रसरं **संसरति**[4] गच्छति ।

नियतं, नित्यम्[5] । यावन्न ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तावत्संसरति ।

तच्च **महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्**। महानादौ यस्य तन्महदादि, बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन इति पञ्च तन्मात्राणि । सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं तन्मात्रपर्यन्तं संसरति शूलग्रहपिपीलिकावत् त्रीनपि लोकान् ।

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१. वि०-सरति । ब०-पुस्तकपाठः ।
२. ब०- पुस्तकपाठः । वि०- निवर्त्त्य ।
३. वि०-लोकानुपपन्नः ।
४. वि०- सरति ।
५. वि०- पुस्तके केवलं 'नित्यं' इति । ब०- पुस्तके केवलं 'नियतं' इति ।

निरुपभोगम् । भोगरहितम् । तत् सूक्ष्मशरीरं पितृमातृजेन[1] बाह्येनोपचयेन क्रियाधर्मग्रहणात् भोगेषु समर्थं भवतीत्यर्थः ।

भावैरधिवासितम् । पुरस्ताद्भावान् धर्मादीन् वक्ष्यामः, तैरधिवासितमुपरञ्जितम् ।

लिङ्गमिति । प्रलयकाले महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं करणोपेतं प्रधाने लीयते । असंसरणयुक्तं सत् आसर्गकालमत्र वर्तते, प्रकृतिमोहबन्धनबद्धं सत् संसरणादिक्रियास्वसमर्थमिति । पुनः सर्गकाले संसरति तस्मात् लिङ्गं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ४० ॥

किंप्रयोजनेन त्रयोदशविधं करणं संसरतीत्येवं चोदिते सत्याह--

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो यथा विना छाया ।
तद्वद्विनाऽविशेषैः[2] न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

४१ अन्वयः ।--यथा आश्रयं ऋते चित्रं न (तिष्ठति), यथा स्थाण्वादिभ्यः विना छाया (न तिष्ठति), तद्वत् अविशेषैः विना निराश्रयं लिङ्गं न तिष्ठति ।

चित्रं यथा कुड्याश्रय**मृते न तिष्ठति, स्थाण्वादिभ्यः** कीलकादिभ्यो **विना छाया** न तिष्ठति, तैर्विना न भवति । आदिग्रहणाद्यथा शैत्यं विना नापो भवन्ति शैत्यं वाऽद्भिर्विना, अग्निरुष्णं विना, वायुः स्पर्शं विना, आकाशमवकाशं विना, पृथिवी गन्धं विना, **तद्वत्** । एतेन दृष्टान्तेन न्यायेन **विनाऽविशेषैः** अविशेषैस्तन्मात्रैर्विना न तिष्ठति । अथ विशेषभूतानि[3] उच्यन्ते, शरीरं पञ्चभूतमयं वैशेषिणा शरीरेण विना क्व लिङ्गस्थानं चेति, क्व एकदेहमुज्झति तदेवान्यमाश्रयति ।

निराश्रयम् । आश्रयरहितं लिङ्गं, त्रयोदशविधं करणमित्यर्थः ॥ ४१ ॥

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१. ब०-पितामातृजेन ।

२. भाष्यमाठरजयमङ्गलासंमतः पाठः । मूले, वाचस्पतेश्च विशेषैः इति पाठः ।

३. ' विशेषा भूतानि ' इति पठनीयम् ?

किमर्थं तदुच्यते—

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात् नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

४२ अन्वयः ।—पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं लिङ्गं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन प्रकृतेः विभुत्वयोगात् नटवत् व्यवतिष्ठते ।

पुरुषार्थः कर्तव्य इति प्रधानं प्रवर्तते । स च द्विविधः—शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणो गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणश्च । शब्दाद्युपलब्धिर्ब्रह्मादिलोकेषु गन्धादिभोगावाप्तिः, गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिर्मोक्ष इति । तस्मादुक्तं **पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं** सूक्ष्मशरीरं प्रवर्तत इति ।

निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन । निमित्तं धर्मादि, नैमित्तिकं, ऊर्ध्वगमनादि पुरस्तादेव वक्ष्यामः । प्रसङ्गेन, प्रसक्त्या ।

प्रकृतेः प्रधानस्य **विभुत्वयोगात्** । यथा राजा स्वराष्ट्रे विभुत्वात् यद्यदिच्छति तत्तत् करोतीति, तथा प्रकृतेः[१] सर्वत्र विभुत्वयोगात् निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन **व्यवतिष्ठते**, पृथक् पृथग्देहधारणे लिङ्गस्य व्यवस्थां करोति ।

लिङ्गं, सूक्ष्मैः परमाणुभिस्तन्मात्रैरुपचितं शरीरं त्रयोदशविधकरणोपेतं मानुषदेवतिर्यग्योनिषु व्यवतिष्ठते । कथं—**नटवत्** । यथा नटः पटान्तरेण प्रविश्य देवो भूत्वा निर्गच्छति, पुनर्मानुषः, पुनर्विदूषकः, एवं लिङ्गं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेनोदरान्तः प्रविश्य हस्ती, स्त्री, पुमान् भवति ॥ ४२ ॥

भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गं संसरतीत्युक्तं, तत् के भावा इत्याह—

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च[२] धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

४३ अन्वयः ।—सांसिद्धिकाश्च प्राकृतिकाः (च) वैकृतिकाश्च भावा धर्माद्याः करणाश्रयिणः दृष्टाः । कललाद्याश्च कार्याश्रयिणः (दृष्टाः) ।

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१. 'प्रकृतिः' इति पठनीयम् ?

२. भाष्यानुरोधेन 'प्राकृता वैकृताश्च' इति पठनीयम् । ज०—वैकृताश्च ।

भावास्त्रिविधाश्चिन्त्यन्ते—सांसिद्धिकाः प्राकृता वैकृताश्च । तत्र सांसिद्धिका यथा भगवतः कपिलस्यादिसर्गे उत्पद्यमानस्य चत्वारो भावाः सहोत्पन्नाः– धर्मः, ज्ञानं, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यमिति । प्राकृताः कथ्यन्ते–ब्रह्मणश्चत्वारः पुत्राः सनकसनन्दनसनातनसनत्कुमारा बभूवुः । तेषामुत्पन्नकार्यकारणानां शरीरिणां षोडशवर्षाणां एते भावाश्चत्वारः समुत्पन्नाः, तस्मादेते प्राकृताः । तथा वैकृता यथा–आचार्यमूर्त्तिं निमित्तं कृत्वा अस्मदादीनां ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, ज्ञानाद्वैराग्यं, वैराग्याद्धर्मः, धर्मादैश्वर्यमिति । आचार्यमूर्तिरपि विकृतिरिति तस्माद्वैकृता एते भावा उच्यन्ते, यैरधिवासितं लिङ्गं संसरति । एते चत्वारो भावाः सात्त्विकाः । तामसाः विपरीताः, 'सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम्' इत्यत्र व्याख्याताः । एवमष्टौ-धर्मः, ज्ञानं, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यं, अधर्मः, अज्ञानं, अवैराग्यं, अनैश्वर्यमिति ।

अष्टौ भावाः क वर्तन्ते– **दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः** । बुद्धिः करणं तदाश्रयिणः । एतदुक्तं—'अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानम्' इति ।

कार्यं देहस्तदाश्रयाः कललाद्याः, ये मातृजा इत्युक्ताः । शुक्रशोणितसंयोगे विवृद्धिहेतुकाः कललाद्या बुद्बुदमांसपेशीप्रभृतयः, तथा कौमारयौवनस्थविरत्वादयो भावाः, अन्नपानरसनिमित्ताः निष्पद्यन्ते । अतः कार्याश्रयिण उच्यन्ते अन्नादिविषयभोगनिमित्ता जायन्ते ॥ ४३ ॥

निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेनेति यदुक्तमत्रोच्यते—

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद् भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

४४ **अन्वयः** ।—धर्मेण ऊर्ध्वं गमनम् अधर्मेण अधस्तात् गमनं भवति । ज्ञानेन अपवर्गः विपर्ययात् बन्धश्च इष्यते ।

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम् । धर्मं निमित्तं कृत्वा ऊर्ध्वं उपयाति[1] । ऊर्ध्वमित्यष्टौ स्थानानि गृह्यन्ते । तद्यथा—ब्राह्मं, प्राजापत्यं, सौम्यं, ऐन्द्रं, गान्धर्वं, राक्षसं, पैशाचमिति । तत् सूक्ष्मशरीरं गच्छति । पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरान्तेष्वधर्मो निमित्तम् ।

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१. वि०–उपनयति ।

किं च, **ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः**। अपवर्गः[1] च पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानम्। तेन निमित्तेनापवर्गो मोक्षः। ततः सूक्ष्मशरीरं निवर्तते, परमात्मा उच्यते।

विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः। अज्ञानं निमित्तम्। स चैव नैमित्तिकः प्राकृतो वैकारिको दाक्षिणिकश्च बन्धः इति वक्ष्यति पुरस्तात्। यदिदमुक्तम्--

प्राकृतेन च बन्धेन तथा वैकारिकेण च।
दाक्षिणेन[2] तृतीयेन बद्धो नान्येन मुच्यते॥ ४४॥

तथाऽन्यदपि निमित्तम्--

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्यासः॥ ४५॥

४५ **अन्वयः**।--वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः (भवति)। राजसात् रागात् संसारः भवति। ऐश्वर्यात् अभिघातः (भवति) विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्यासः (च भवति)।

यथा कस्यचिद्वैराग्यमस्ति न तत्त्वज्ञानम्। तस्मात् अज्ञानपूर्वाद् **वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः**, मृतोऽष्टासु प्रकृतिषु प्रधानबुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्रेषु लीयते न मोक्षः। ततो भूयोऽपि संसरति।

तथा योऽयं[3] राजसो रागः--यजामि, दक्षिणां ददामि, येनामुष्मिंल्लोकेऽत्र यद्दिव्यं मानुषं सुखमनुभवामि--एतस्मात् **राजसात् रागात् संसारो भवति**।

तथा **ऐश्वर्यादविघातः**। एतदैश्वर्यं, अष्टगुणमणिमादियुक्तम्। तस्मादैश्वर्यनिमित्तात् अविघातो नैमित्तिको भवति, ब्राह्मादिषु स्थानेष्वैश्वर्यं न विहन्यते।

किं चान्यत्, **विपर्ययात्** विपर्यासः। तस्याविघातस्य **विपर्यासो** विघातः भवति। अनैश्वर्यात् सर्वत्र विहन्यते॥ ४५॥

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१. ब०-पुस्तक उपलब्धम्। वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति।

२. वि०-दक्षिणाभिः।

३. 'अपि संसरति। तथा यः' इयान् पाठो ब०-पुस्तके नास्ति।

एष निमित्तैः सह नैमित्तिकः षोडशविधो व्याख्यातः, स किमात्मक इत्याह--

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः[1] ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्द्देन[2] **तस्य**[3] **भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्** ॥ ४६ ॥

४६ **अन्वयः** ।—विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः एष प्रत्ययसर्गः । तस्य च गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् भवन्ति ।

यथा एष षोडशविधो निमित्तनैमित्तिकभेदः[4] व्याख्यातः, **एष प्रत्ययसर्ग** उच्यते । प्रत्ययो बुद्धिरित्युक्ता, 'अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानम्' इत्यादि।

स च प्रत्ययसर्गश्चतुर्धा भिद्यते--**विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्य**-भेदात् । तत्र संशयोऽज्ञानं विपर्ययः[5] । यथा कस्यचित् स्थाणुदर्शने स्थाणुरयं पुरुषो वेति संशयः । अशक्तिर्यथा—तमेव स्थाणुं सम्यग्दृष्ट्वा संशयं छेत्तुं न शक्नोतीत्यशक्तिः । एवं तृतीयस्तुष्ट्याख्यो यथा—तमेव स्थाणुं ज्ञातुं संशयितुं वा नेच्छति, किमनेनास्माकमित्येषा तुष्टिः । चतुर्थः सिद्ध्याख्यो यथा--आनन्दितेन्द्रियः स्थाणुमारूढां वल्लिं पश्यति शकुनिं वा, तस्य सिद्धिर्भवति स्थाणुरयमिति ।

एवमस्य चतुर्विधस्य प्रत्ययसर्गस्य **गुणवैषम्यविमर्द्देन**[6] **तस्य भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्** । योऽयं सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणानां वैषम्यो विमर्द्दः, तेन तस्य प्रत्ययसर्गस्य पंचाशद्भेदा भवन्ति । तथा क्वापि सत्त्वमुत्कटं भवति रजस्तमसी उदासीने, क्वापि रजः, क्वापि तम इति ॥ ४६ ॥

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१. वि० -पुस्तकमूले भाष्ये च '°सिद्धाख्यः' । ब०-पुस्तके तु 'सिद्ध्याख्यः' इति भाष्य उपलभ्यते। अयमेव पाठो माठरवाचस्पत्योः संमतः ।

२. वि०-पुस्तकमूले '°मर्द्दात्' । जयमङ्गलायां, माठरवृत्तौ, भाष्ये च '°मर्द्देन' ।

३. विहाय वि०-पुस्तकमूलं, वाचस्पतिमूलं च, सर्वत्रान्यत्र 'तस्य' इत्येतदनन्तरं 'च' इत्यधिकमुपलभ्यते ।

४. वि०-°नैमित्तभेदः ।

५. 'विपर्ययः' इति वि० -पुस्तके नास्ति ।

६-मम पाठः । वि०-पुस्तके तु-'°मर्द्दे'।

भेदाः कथ्यन्ते—

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

४७ **अन्वयः** ।— विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च भवन्ति, करणवैकल्यात् अशक्तिस्तु अष्टाविंशतिभेदा । तुष्टिः नवधा । सिद्धिः अष्टधा (भवति) ।

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदाः । ते यथा—तमः, मोहः, महामोहः, तामिस्रः, अन्धतामिस्र इति । एषां भेदानां नानात्वं वक्ष्यतेऽनन्तरमेवेति ।

अशक्तेस्त्वष्टाविंशतिः भेदा भवन्ति, **करणवैकल्यात्** । तानपि वक्ष्यामः ।

तथा च **तुष्टिर्नवधा** । ऊर्ध्वस्रोतसि राजसानि ज्ञानानि ।

तथा **अष्टविधा सिद्धिः** । सात्त्विकानि ज्ञानानि तत्रैवोर्ध्वस्रोतसि । एतत् क्रमेणैव वक्ष्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

तत्र विपर्ययभेदा उच्यन्ते—

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

४८ **अन्वयः** ।— तमसः भेदः अष्टविधः मोहस्य च (अष्टविधः भेदः) महामोहः दशविधः । तामिस्रः अष्टादशधा (भवति) । तथा अन्धतामिस्रः (अष्टादशधा भवति) ।

तमसस्तावदष्टधा भेदः । प्रलयः[1] अज्ञानात् विभज्यते । सोऽष्टासु प्रकृतिषु लीयते, प्रधानबुद्ध्यहङ्कारपञ्चतन्मात्राष्टासु । तत्र लीनमात्मानं मन्यते मुक्तोऽहमिति, तमोभेद एषः ।

अष्टविधस्य मोहस्य भेदोऽष्टविध एवेत्यर्थः । यत्राष्टगुणमैश्वर्यं तत्र सङ्गादिन्द्रादयो देवा न मोक्षं प्राप्नुवन्ति । पुनश्च तत्क्षये संसरन्त्येषोऽष्टविधो मोह इति ।

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१. 'मलः' इति पठनीयम् ? । अत्र माठरवृत्तिर्द्रष्टव्या । तमसः पर्यायवाची मलशब्दः ।

दशविधो महामोहः । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा देवानामेते पञ्च विषयाः सुखलक्षणाः मानुषाणामप्येत एव शब्दादयः पञ्च विषयाः । एवमेतेषु दशसु महामोह इति ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा[1] । अष्टविधमैश्वर्यं, दृष्टानुश्रविका विषया दश, एतेषामष्टादशानां सम्पदमनुनन्दन्ति विपदं नानुमोदन्त्येषोऽष्टादशविधो विकल्पस्तामिस्रः ।

तथा तामिस्रमष्टगुणमैश्वर्यं, दृष्टानुश्रविका दश विषयाः, **तथाऽन्धतामिस्रोऽ**प्यष्टादशभेद एव । किन्तु विषयसम्पत्तौ सम्भोगकाले य एव म्रियते, अष्टगुणैश्वर्याद्वा भ्रश्यते, ततस्तस्य महद्दुःखमुत्पद्यते, सोऽन्धतामिस्र इति । एवं विपर्ययभेदास्तमःप्रभृतयः पञ्च प्रत्येकं भिद्यमानाः द्विषष्टिभेदाः संवृत्ता इति ॥ ४९ ॥

अशक्तिभेदाः कथ्यन्ते—

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

४९ **अन्वयः** ।—बुद्धिवधैः सह एकादश इन्द्रियवधाः अशक्तिः उद्दिष्टा । तुष्टिसिद्धीनां विपर्ययात् बुद्धेः सप्तदश वधाः (भवन्ति) ।

'भवन्त्यशक्तेश्च करणवैकल्यादष्टाविंशतिभेदाः'[2] इत्युद्दिष्टम् । तत्र **एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः**—बाधिर्यम्, अन्धता, प्रसुतिः, उपजिह्विका[3], घ्राणपाकः, मूकता, कुणित्वं, खाञ्ज्यं, गुदावर्तः, क्लैब्यं, उन्माद इति ।

सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा । ये बुद्धिवधास्तैः सह अशक्तेरष्टाविंशतिभेदा भवन्ति ।

सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेः । सप्तदश वधास्ते तुष्टिभेदासिद्धिभेदवैपरीत्येन ।

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१. 'अष्टादशधा' इति ब०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।

२. ब०—टिप्पणी— 'पूर्वकारिकायामशक्तेरिति षष्ठ्यन्तोऽष्टाविंशतिभेदाः इति प्रथमाबहुवचनान्तश्च पाठ एतद्व्याख्यात्रभिप्रेतः, पूर्वत्रापि तथैव व्याख्यातत्वात्' ।

३. वि०—उपजिह्विका ।

तुष्टिभेदा नव, सिद्धिभेदा अष्टौ ये ते, विपरीतैः सह एकादश वधाः[1], एवमष्टाविंशतिविकल्पा अशक्तिरिति ॥ ४९ ॥

विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनामेव[2] भेदक्रमो द्रष्टव्यः। तत्र तुष्टिर्नवधा कथ्यते।

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च, नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः[3] ॥ ५० ॥

५० अन्वयः ।--आध्यात्मिक्यः (तुष्टयः) प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः चतस्रः। विषयोपरमात् बाह्याः पञ्च (इति) नव तुष्टयः अभिहिताः।

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः तुष्टयः। अध्यात्मनि भवा आध्यात्मिकाः, ताश्च **प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः**। तत्र प्रकृत्याख्या--यथा कश्चित् प्रकृतिं वेत्ति तस्याः सगुणत्वनिर्गुणत्वं च, तेन तत्त्वं तत्कार्यं विज्ञायैव केवलं तुष्टस्तस्य नास्ति मोक्षः,--एषा प्रकृत्याख्या। उपादानाख्या--यथा कश्चिदविज्ञायैव तत्त्वान्युपादानग्रहणं करोति, त्रिदण्डकमण्डलुविविदिकाभ्यः[4] मोक्ष इति, तस्यापि नास्ति मोक्ष इति[5] एषा उपादानाख्या। तथा कालाख्या--कालेन मोक्षो भविष्यतीति किं तत्त्वाभ्यासेन, इत्येषा कालाख्या तुष्टिः, तस्य नास्ति मोक्ष इति। तथा भाग्याख्या--भाग्येनैव मोक्षो भविष्यतीति भाग्याख्या। चतुर्धा तुष्टिरिति।

बाह्या विषयोपरमाच्च पञ्च। बाह्यास्तुष्टयः पञ्च विषयोपरमात्। शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धेभ्य उपरतोऽर्जनरक्षणक्षयसंगहिंसादर्शनात्। वृद्धिनिमित्तं पाशुपाल्यवाणिज्यप्रतिग्रहसेवाः कार्याः, एतदर्जनं दुःखम्। अर्जितानां रक्षणे दुःखम्। उपभोगात् क्षीयत इति क्षयदुःखम्। तथा विषयोपभोगसंगे कृते नास्तीन्द्रियाणामुपशम इति सङ्गदोषः। तथा नाऽनुपहत्य भूतान्युपभोग इति हिंसादोषः। एवमर्जनादिदोषदर्शनात् पञ्चविषयोपरमात् पञ्च तुष्टयः।

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१. वि०-°दशविधाः।
२. वि०-सिद्धितुष्टीनामेव।
३. वा०-°भिमताः।
४. ब-°विविदिषाभ्यः। संशयितोऽत्र पाठः।
५. 'मोक्ष इति' इति वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति।

एवमाध्यात्मिकबाह्यभेदात् **नव तुष्टयः** । तासां नामानि शास्त्रान्तरे प्रोक्तानि—अंभः, सलिलम्, ओघः. वृष्टिः, सुतमः, पारम्, सुनेत्रम्, नारीकम्, अनुत्तमाम्भसिकमिति । आसां तुष्टीनां विपरीता अशक्तिभेदाद् बुद्धिवधा भवन्ति । तद्यथा—अनम्भः, असलिलम्, अनोघ इत्यादिवैपरीत्याद् बुद्धिवधा इति ॥ ५० ॥

सिद्धिरुच्यते—

ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

५१ अन्वयः ।—ऊहः शब्दः अध्ययनं त्रयः दुःखविघाताः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः दानं च (इति) अष्टौ सिद्धयः । सिद्धेः पूर्वः त्रिविधः अङ्कुशः ।

ऊहो यथा कश्चिन्नित्यमूहते—किमिह सत्यं, किं परं, किं नैःश्रेयसं, किं कृत्वा[१] कृतार्थः स्याम्—इति चिन्तयतो ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते प्रधानादन्य एव पुरुष इति, अन्या बुद्धिः, अन्योऽहङ्कारः, अन्यानि तन्मात्राणीन्द्रियाणि पञ्च महाभूतानीत्येवं तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते येन मोक्षो भवति । एषा ऊहाख्या प्रथमा सिद्धिः ।

तथा शब्दज्ञानात् प्रधानपुरुषबुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियपञ्चमहाभूतविषयं ज्ञानं भवति, ततो मोक्ष इत्येषा शब्दाख्या सिद्धिः ।

अध्ययनाद् वेदादिशास्त्राध्ययनात् पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानं प्राप्य मोक्षं याति[२], इत्येषा तृतीया सिद्धिः ।

दुःखविघातत्रयम्[३] । आध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधिदैविकदुःखत्रयविघाताय गुरुं समुपगम्य तत उपदेशान्मोक्षं याति । एषा चतुर्थी सिद्धिः । एषैव दुःखत्रयभेदात् त्रिधा कल्पनीया । इति षट् सिद्धयः ।

तथा **सुहृत्प्राप्तिः** । यथा कश्चित् सुहृज्ज्ञानमधिगम्य मोक्षं गच्छति । एषा सप्तमी सिद्धिः ।

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१. 'कृत्वा' इति वि०- पुस्तके नास्ति ।

२. ब०-प्राप्यते । 'मोक्षं याति' इति ब०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।

३. एष एव भाष्यसम्मतः पाठ इति प्रतिभाति ।

दानम् । यथा कश्चिद्भगवतां प्रत्याश्रयौषधित्रिदण्डकुण्डिकादीनां ग्रासाच्छादनादीनां च दानेनोपकृत्य, तेभ्यो ज्ञानमवाप्य मोक्षं याति । एषा अष्टमी सिद्धिः ।

आसामष्टानां सिद्धीनां शास्त्रान्तरे संज्ञाः कृताः—तारम्, सुतारम्, तारतारम्, प्रमोदम्, प्रमुदितम्, प्रमोदमानम्, रम्यकम्, सदाप्रमुदितमिति । आसां विपर्ययात् बुद्धेर्वधा ये विपरीतास्त अशक्तौ निक्षिप्ताः । यथा—अतारम्, असुतारम्, अतारतारम्—इत्यादि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

अशक्तिभेदा अष्टाविंशतिरिरुक्ताः । ते–सहबुद्धिवधैरेकादशेन्द्रियवधा इति । तत्र तुष्टिविपर्यया नव, सिद्धीनां विपर्यया अष्टौ—एवमेते सप्तदश बुद्धिवधाः । एतैः सहेन्द्रियवधाः, अष्टाविंशतिरशक्तिभेदाः पश्चात् कथिता इति विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धीनामेवोद्देशो निर्देशश्च कृत इति ।

किं चान्यत्, **सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः** । सिद्धेः पूर्वा या विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयस्ता एव सिद्धेरङ्कुशः, तद्भेदादेव त्रिविधः । यथा हस्ती गृहीताङ्कुशेन वशो भवति, एवं विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिभिर्गृहीतो लोकोऽज्ञानं प्राप्नोति । तस्मादेताः परित्यज्य सिद्धिः सेव्या । ससिद्धेस्तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । तस्मात्[1] मोक्ष इति ॥ ५१ ॥

अथ यदुक्तं " भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् " तत्र भावा धर्मादयोऽष्टावुक्ता बुद्धिपरिणामाः, विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धिपरिणताः । स भावाख्यः प्रत्ययसर्गः । लिङ्गं च तन्मात्रसर्गश्चतुर्दशभूतपर्यन्त उक्तः । तत्रैकेनैव सर्गेण पुरुषार्थसिद्धौ किमुभयविधसर्गेणेत्यत आह—

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

५२ अन्वयः ।—भावैः विना लिङ्गं न, लिङ्गेन विना भावनिर्वृत्तिः न (भवति) । तस्मात् लिङ्गाख्यः भावाख्यः (च) द्विविधः सर्गः प्रवर्तते ।

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१. वि०-तत् ।

भावैः प्रत्ययसर्गैर्विना लिङ्गं न, तन्मात्रसर्गो न, पूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारादृष्टकारितत्वादुत्तरोत्तरदेहलम्भस्य ।

लिङ्गेन तन्मात्रसर्गेण च विना भावनिर्वृत्तिर्न, स्थूलसूक्ष्मदेहसाध्यत्वाद्धर्मादेः । अनादित्वाच्च सर्गस्य बीजाङ्कुरवदन्योन्याश्रयो[1] न दोषाय, तत्तज्जातीयापेक्षित्वेऽपि[2] तत्तद्व्यक्तीनां परस्परानपेक्षितत्वात् । तस्मात् भावाख्यो लिङ्गाख्यश्च द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्ग इति ॥ ५२ ॥

किं चान्यत्—

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
मानुषश्चैकविधः समासतोऽयं त्रिधा सर्गः[3] ॥ ५३ ॥

५३ अन्वयः ।—दैवः (सर्गः) अष्टविकल्पः । तैर्यग्योनश्च (सर्गः) पञ्चधा भवति । मानुषः सर्गश्च एकविधः (इति) अयं समासतः भौतिकः सर्गः ।

तत्र दैवमष्टप्रकारम्—ब्राह्मं, प्राजापत्यं, सौम्यं, ऐन्द्रं, गान्धर्वं, याक्षं, राक्षसं, पैशाचमिति । पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावराणि भूतानि, एवं पञ्चविधस्तैरश्चः । मानुषयोनिरेकैव । इति चतुर्दश भूतानि ॥ ५३ ॥

त्रिष्वपि लोकेषु गुणत्रयमस्ति, तत्र कस्मिन् किमधिकमित्युच्यते[4]—

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः[5] ॥ ५४ ॥

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१. वि०–बीजाङ्कुरवदन्योन्याश्रयौ ।   २. वि०–°पेक्षितत्वेऽपि ।

३. पाठोऽयं जयमङ्गलामाठरवृत्तिवाचस्पतिमिश्रसंमतः । वि०–पुस्तके तु—
अष्टं विकल्पं दैवं तैर्यग्योनं पंचधा भवति ।
मानुष्यं त्वेकविधं समासतोऽयं त्रिधा सर्गः ॥

४. ' वि०–°धिकमुच्यते ।

५. ' °पर्यन्तम् ' इति वि०–पुस्तकमूलधृतः पाठस्तु प्रामादिकः, भाष्यविरोधात् ।

५४ अन्वयः ।—ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालः सर्गः, मूलतश्च तमोविशालः (सर्गः), मध्ये रजोविशालः (सर्गः) (इति) ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः (सर्गः) ।

ऊर्ध्वमिति । अष्टसु देवस्थानेषु सत्त्वविशालः, सत्त्वविस्तारः, सत्त्वोत्कट ऊर्ध्वंसत्त्व इति । तत्रापि रजस्तमसी स्तः ।

तमोविशालो मूलतः । पश्वादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु सर्वः सर्गस्तमसाधिक्येन व्याप्तः । तत्रापि सत्त्वरजसी स्तः ।

मध्ये, मानुषे[1] रज उत्कटम् । तत्रापि सत्त्वतमसी विद्येते । तस्माद् दुःखप्राया मनुष्याः ।

एवं ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः, ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्त इत्यर्थः । एवं अभौतिकः सर्गः, लिङ्गसर्गः, भावसर्गः, भूतसर्गः, दैवमानुषतैर्यग्योनाः[2], इत्येष प्रधानकृतः षोडशविधः[3] सर्गः ॥ ५४ ॥

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः, तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

५५ अन्वयः ।—तत्र चेतनः पुरुषः लिङ्गस्य अविनिवृत्तेः जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति । तस्मात् दुःखं स्वभावेन ।

तत्रेति । तेषु देवमानुषतिर्यग्योनिषु जराकृतं मरणकृतं चैव दुःखं चेतनः चैतन्यवान् पुरुषः प्राप्नोति, न प्रधानं, न बुद्धिः, नाहङ्कारः, न तन्मात्राणीन्द्रियाणि महाभूतानि च ।

कियन्तं कालं पुरुषो दुःखं प्राप्नोतीति तद्विविनक्ति—लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः । यत्तन्महदादि लिङ्गशरीरेणाविश्य तत्र व्यक्तीभवति तद्यावन्न[4] निवर्तते संसारशरीरमिति तावत्[5] संक्षेपेण त्रिषु स्थानेषु पुरुषो जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः, लिङ्गस्य विनिवृत्तिं यावत् । लिङ्गनिवृत्तौ मोक्षः, मोक्षप्राप्तौ नास्ति दुःखमिति । तत्पुनः केन निवर्तते, यदा पञ्चविंशति-

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१. वि०—मानुष्ये ।
२. वि०—°तैर्यग्योनयः ।
३. वि०—षोडशः ।
४. वि०—तद्यावत् ।
५. एतद् वि०–पुस्तके नास्ति ।

तत्त्वज्ञानं स्यात् सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिलक्षणं– इदं प्रधानं, इयं बुद्धिः, अयमहङ्कारः, इमानि पञ्च महाभूतानि, येभ्योऽन्यः पुरुषो विसदृश इति। एवं ज्ञानाल्लिङ्गनिवृत्तिस्ततो मोक्ष इति ॥ ५५ ॥

प्रकृतेः किंनिमित्त आरम्भः[1] इत्युच्यते—

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ[2] महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

५६ अन्वयः ।–महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः इत्येषः प्रकृतिकृतौ आरंभः स्वार्थ इव परार्थः प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् ।

'इत्येषः' परिसमाप्तौ निर्देशे च। **प्रकृतिकृतौ**[3] प्रकृतिकरणे, प्रकृतिक्रियायां य आरम्भो **महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः**—प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहङ्कारः, तस्मात्तन्मात्राण्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि, तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च महाभूतानि—इत्येषः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् । पुरुषं पुरुषं[4] प्रति । देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्भावं गतानां विमोक्षार्थमारम्भः ।

कथं—**स्वार्थ इव परार्थः**[5] **आरम्भः**। यथा कश्चित् स्वार्थं त्यक्त्वा मित्रकार्याणि करोति एवं प्रधानम् । पुरुषोऽत्र प्रधानस्य न किञ्चित् प्रत्युपकारं करोति । स्वार्थ इव न च स्वार्थः, परार्थ एव । अर्थः शब्दादिविषयोपलब्धिर्गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिश्च । त्रिषु लोकेषु शब्दादिविषयैः पुरुषा योजयितव्याः, अन्ते मोक्षेण—इति प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः । तथा चोक्तम्—'कुम्भवत् प्रधानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते' इति ॥ ५६ ॥

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१. वि०–प्रवृत्तेः किंनिमित्तमारम्भः।

२. भाष्यसंमतः पाठः वि०–पुस्तकमूले तु 'प्रकृतिकृतो'।

३. ब०–प्रकृतौ । तत्र टिप्पणी च–'एतन्मते प्रकृतिकृताविति सप्तम्यन्तः पाठः।'

४. वि०– पुस्तके तु 'पुरुषं' इति शब्दो न द्विरुक्तः ।

५. वि०–परार्थम् ।

अत्रोच्यते—अचेतनं प्रधानं चेतनः पुरुष इति । "मया त्रिषु लोकेषु शब्दादिभिर्विषयैः पुरुषो योज्योऽन्ते मोक्षः कर्तव्यः" इति कथं चेतनवत् प्रवृत्तिः । सत्यम्, किन्त्वचेतनानामपि प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा निवृत्तिश्च यस्मादित्याह—

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

५७ अन्वयः ।—यथा अज्ञस्य क्षीरस्य वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं प्रवृत्तिः तथा प्रधानस्य पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं प्रवृत्तिः (भवति) ।

यथा तृणादिकं[1] गवा भक्षितं क्षीरभावेन परिणम्य वत्सविवृद्धिं करोति, पुष्टे च वत्से निवर्तते, एवं **पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं** प्रधानमित्यज्ञस्य[2] **प्रवृत्तिरिति** ॥ ५७ ॥

किं च—

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

५८ अन्वयः ।—यथा लोकः औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं क्रियासु प्रवर्तते तद्वत् अव्यक्तं पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते ।

यथा लोकः[3] इष्टौत्सुक्ये सति तस्य **निवृत्त्यर्थं क्रियासु प्रवर्तते** गमनागमनक्रियासु, कृतकार्यो निवर्तते, तथा **पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं** शब्दादिविषयोपभोगलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं च द्विविधमपि पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा प्रधानं निवर्तते ॥ ५८ ॥

किं चान्यत्—

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात्[4] ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते[5] प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

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१. ब०–तृणोदकं ।
२. वि०–प्रधानं । अज्ञस्य ।
३. ब०–लोके ।
४. ज०–नृत्तात् ।
५. वा०–पुस्तकपाठः । वि० पुस्तकमूले तु 'निवर्त्तते' ।

५९ अन्वयः ।––यथा नर्तकी रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा नृत्यात् निवर्तते तथा प्रकृतिः पुरुषस्य आत्मानं प्रकाश्य निवर्तते ।

यथा नर्तकी शृङ्गारादिरसैः इतिहासादिभावैश्च[1] निबद्धगीतवादित्रवृत्तानि रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा कृतकार्या नृत्यान्निवर्तते तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषस्यात्मानं प्रकाश्य बुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियमहाभूतभेदेन निवर्तते ॥५९॥

कथं को वा अस्या निवर्तको हेतुस्तदाह––

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ॥ ६० ॥

६० अन्वयः ।––नानाविधैः उपायैः उपकारिणी गुणवती (प्रकृतिः) अनुपकारिणः अगुणस्य सतः तस्य पुंसः अर्थम् अपार्थकं चरति ।

नानाविधैरुपायैः प्रकृतिः पुरुषस्योपकारिणी, अनुपकारिणः पुंसः । कथम्–देवमानुषतिर्यग्भावेन, सुखदुःखमोहात्मकभावेन शब्दादिविषयभावेन ।

एवं नानाविधैरुपायैरात्मानं प्रकाश्य, अहमन्या त्वमन्य इति, निवर्तते । अतो नित्यस्य तस्यार्थं अपार्थं चरति कुरुते[2] । यथा कश्चित् परोपकारी सर्वस्योपकुरुते, नात्मनः प्रत्युपकारमीहते, एवं प्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थं चरति[3] करोत्यपार्थकम् ॥ ६० ॥

पश्चादुक्तम्––आत्मानं प्रकाश्य निवर्तते। निवृत्ता च किं करोतीत्याह––

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

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१. पाठोऽयं भ्रान्त इवाभाति । 'विलासादिभावैश्च' इति पठनीयम् ? विल्सनमहोदयानुवादस्तु in situations drawn from history or tradition नातिमनोरमः । विलासलक्षणं च भावप्रकाशने पृष्ठे, ६–७ पङ्क्त्योः––

प्रियसङ्गमकाले तु नेत्रभ्रूवक्त्रकर्मणाम् ।
विशेषो यः स विज्ञेयो विलासोऽङ्गक्रियादिषु ॥

२. वि०–कुरुते चरति च । ३. वि०–कुरुते ।

६१ अन्वयः ।—प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं किञ्चित् न अस्ति इति मे मतिर्भवति । या दृष्टा अस्मीति पुनः पुरुषस्य दर्शनं न उपैति ।

लोके **प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं** न **किञ्चिद्**स्तीत्येवं **मे मतिर्भवति** येन परार्थ एवं मतिरुत्पन्ना । कस्मात्—अहमनेन पुरुषेण **दृष्टास्मी**त्यस्य पुंसः **पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति**, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयातीत्यर्थः । तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति । केचित्[1] ईश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते—

अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः[2] सुखदुःखयोः ।
ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं नरकमेव वा ॥

महाभारत—३, ३०, ८८.

अपरे स्वभावकारणका[3] ब्रुवते—

" केन शुक्लीकृता हंसा मयूराः केन चित्रिताः[4] । "

स्वभावेनैव इति । अत्र सांख्याचार्या आहुः, निर्गुणत्वादीश्वरस्य कथं सगुणाः प्रजाः[5] जायेरन् । कथं वा पुरुषान्निर्गुणादेव । तस्मात् प्रकृतेर्युज्यते । यथा शुक्लेभ्यस्तन्तुभ्यः शुक्ल एव पटो भवति, कृष्णेभ्यः कृष्ण एवेति । एवं त्रिगुणात् प्रधानात् त्रयो लोकास्त्रिगुणाः समुत्पन्ना इति गम्यते । निर्गुण ईश्वरः, सगुणानां लोकानां तस्मादुत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति । अनेन पुरुषो व्याख्यातः । तथा केषांचित् कालः कारणमिति, उक्तं च—

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१. ' केचित् ' इति वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।

२. ब०-पुस्तकसंमतः पाठः । वि०-पुस्तके तु—

अजो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मा नः ।
श्लोकस्यास्योत्तरार्द्धं जयमङ्गलायाम्—
' ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा । '

३. वि०- स्वाभावकारणिकां । ' स्वभावकारणतां ' इति पठनीयम् ?

४. श्लोकोऽयं सम्पूर्णो माठरवृत्तावुपलभ्यते—

" येन शुक्लीकृता हंसाः शुकाश्च हरितीकृताः ।
मयूराश्चित्रिता येन स नो वृत्तिं विधास्यति ॥ "

५. माठरवृत्तिसंमतः पाठः । वि०—सगुणतः प्रजः । ब०-सगुणतः प्रजाः ।

'कालः पचति[1] भूतानि कालः संहरते जगत्[2] ।
कालः सुप्तेषु जागर्ति कालो हि दुरतिक्रमः[3] ॥'

व्यक्ताव्यक्तपुरुषाः[4] त्रयः पदार्थाः, तेन कालोऽन्तर्भूतोऽस्ति । स हि[5] व्यक्तः । सर्वकर्तृत्वात् कालस्यापि प्रधानमेव कारणम् । स्वभावोऽप्यत्रैव लीनः । तस्मात् कालो न कारणं, नापि स्वभाव इति । तस्मात् प्रकृतिरेव कारणम्, न प्रकृतेः कारणान्तरमस्तीति ।

न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य । अतः प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ॥ ६१ ॥—[6]

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१. वि०–पच्चास्ति । मा०–सृजति ।
२. मा०–प्रजाः ।
३. मा०–तस्मात्कालस्तु कारणम् ।
४. वि०–व्यक्तमव्यक्तपुरुषाः ।
५. 'हि' इति वि०–पुस्तके नास्ति ।

६. —अस्याः कारिकाया अनन्तरमेवान्ययैकया कारिकया भवितव्यमिति स्वर्गतस्य तिलकान्वयजस्य बालगङ्गाधरपण्डितस्य सिद्धान्तः । तत्संक्षेपस्तु—

" 'सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थाः' इतीश्वरकृष्णवचनानुरोधेनार्याणां सप्तत्या भाव्यम् । किन्तु गौडपादभाष्ये त्वेकोनसप्ततिरेवोपलभ्यते । भाष्यं चैकषष्टितमाया उपरि नैकस्या अपि तु कारिकयोः । अत एकषष्टितमाया अनन्तरमेवानया लुप्तया कारिकया भाव्यम् । भाष्यगतप्रतीकानुरोधेन चैषा कारिकैवं निर्मातुं शक्यते—

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

अस्ति चास्याः कारिकायाः पूर्वापरसन्दर्भसङ्गतिः । निरीश्वरत्वप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च केनचिदसहिष्णुना च्यावितेयम् । किन्तु भाष्यच्यावनमसौ विस्मृतवान् । पूर्वेषां मते स्वभावस्य, कालस्य, ईश्वरस्य वा जगन्मूलत्वमिति श्वेताश्वतरमन्त्रेण द्योत्यते—

स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः ।
देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रम् ॥" इति ।

अस्या नष्टायाः कारिकायाः पूर्वार्द्धमस्मन्मतानुसारेण त्वेवं पठनीयम्—

'कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरुषं कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।'

यत्तु सूर्यनारायणशास्त्रिणाऽनन्तरोक्तः पाठस्तिलकपण्डितस्येत्युक्तं तद्भ्रममूलकमेव । पाठश्चायमस्माभिः सोपपत्ति स्वलेखे प्रतिपादितस्तत्रैव सविस्तरो द्रष्टव्यः ।

('Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṅkhya-saptati of Īśvarakṛṣṇa'—Proceedings of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference, Vol. II., P. 1030, Note 1.)

सूर्यनारायणशास्त्रिणा च कृतमेतत्कारिकाखण्डनं न सयुक्तिकम्। तन्मतानुरोधेनैकषष्टितमकारिकाया भाष्यस्यान्तिमे कृतः, वृत्तौ च माठरेण कृतः सुकुमारतरमितिशब्दस्य परामर्शः, प्रकृतकारिकां विहायान्यस्याः कारिकाया भाष्यवृत्त्योः सम्भावनां निराकरोति। एतदत्र विचारणीयम्—

भाष्यस्यादिमे भाग एवं पठ्यते—'अहमनेन पुरुषेण दृष्टाऽस्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयातीत्यर्थः। तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति—'एतदनन्तरं भाष्यचरमभागः—'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य' इति पठनीयः। 'सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति' इत्यनन्तरं 'केचिदीश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते' इत्यादिपाठस्तु नितरामसङ्गत एव। नहीश्वरादीनां कारणत्वं प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरत्ववर्णनम्। अतो ध्रुवं केनचिदीश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुना कारिकेयं लोपिता। अन्येन च केनचिद्वराकेण भाष्यमेतन्मूलकारिकाविहीनमिति मत्वा तथैकषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्यान्तर्निवेशितं यथा स्थूलदर्शनैरपि विभाव्यते। अत एव 'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य ' इत्येतदनन्तरं तेन 'अतः प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ' इति सङ्गत्यर्थं प्रक्षिप्तम्। यथा च नैतत्सङ्गच्छते तथा स्फुटमेव। परं च, ईश्वरादीनां सुभोग्यत्वादिकथनमपि भृशमनर्थकम्। एवं माठरवृत्तावपि यथाकथञ्चित् संग्रन्थनमेव। अतो वाचस्पत्यादीनां पुरत एव लुप्तेयं कारिका।

यस्तु 'ननु ईश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुत्वं कारिकाविलोपे प्रयोजकं चेत्, कथं नाम तद्भाष्यविलोपे प्रयोजकं न स्यात्' इति सूर्यनारायणशास्त्र्यभिप्रायस्तत्र ब्रूमः—यस्य खलु कुटिलमतेः स्वानभिमतेयं कारिका दृष्टिपथं याता, न तस्य भाष्यं दृग्गोचरीभूतमिति सम्भाव्यते। न खलु भाष्यकारिकयोरव्यभिचारि सहावस्थानं, येन कारिकां निस्सारयन् भाष्यमपि बहिः कुर्यात्। भाष्यं चास्मद्भाग्यवशान्न तद्धस्ते पतितम्। अतस्तादृशकुटिलमत्यनन्तरभाविभिर्लेखकैर्लेखकेन वा मूलकारिकाविहीनं भाष्यमेतद्विलोक्य यथाकथञ्चिदेकषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्ये नियोजितमिति राद्धान्तः॥

अधुनापि प्राचीनहस्तलिखितपुस्तकेषु मूलग्रंथः टीकाग्रंथश्च पृथक् पृथक् लेखनावस्थितित्वेन दृश्येते। तेन मूलग्रंथस्थिता कारिका च्याविततैव। भाष्यग्रंथस्य तत्समये अप्राप्तत्वात् भाष्यस्य अद्यापि स्थितिरस्ति।

तथा च लोके[1] रूढं पुरुषो मुक्तः पुरुषः संसरतीति चोदिते आह[2]—

तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि[3] मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

६२ **अन्वयः** ।—तस्मात् कश्चित् (पुरुषः) न बध्यते, नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति । प्रकृतिः संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च ।

तस्मात् कारणात् पुरुषो **न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति** यस्मात् कारणात् प्रकृतिरेव **नानाश्रया** दैवमानुषतिर्यग्योन्याश्रया बुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियभूतस्वरूपेण **बध्यते मुच्यते संसरति** चेति ।

अथ मुक्त एव स्वभावात् स[4] सर्वगतश्च कथं संसरति—अप्राप्तप्रापणार्थं संसरणमिति । तेन पुरुषो बध्यते पुरुषो मुच्यते पुरुषः संसरतीति[5] व्यपदिश्यते येन संसारित्वं न[6] विद्यते । सत्त्वपुरुषान्तरज्ञानात् तत्त्वं पुरुषस्याभिव्यज्यते, तदभिव्यक्तौ केवलः शुद्धो मुक्तः स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठः पुरुष इति ।

अत्र यदि पुरुषस्य बन्धो नास्ति ततो मोक्षोऽपि नास्ति । अत्रोच्यते—प्रकृतिरेवात्मानं बध्नाति मोचयति च । यत्र सूक्ष्मशरीरं तन्मात्रकं त्रिविधकरणोपेतं तत् त्रिविधेन बन्धेन बध्यते । उक्तं च—

प्राकृतेन च बन्धेन तथा वैकारिकेण च ।
दाक्षिणेन तृतीयेन बद्धो नान्येन मुच्यते ॥

तत् सूक्ष्मं शरीरं धर्माधर्मसंयुक्तम् ॥ ६२ ॥

प्रकृतिश्च बध्यते प्रकृतिश्च मुच्यते संसरतीति कथं तत्—उच्यते—

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु[7] बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं[8] प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

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१. मदीयः पाठः । ब०-वि०-पुस्तकयोस्तु 'श्लोके' ।
२. वि०-चोदितेत्याह ।
३. वा०-अद्धा न ।
४. 'पुरुषः' इति वि०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।
५. वि०-संसरति ।
६. 'न' इति ब० पुस्तके नास्ति ।
७. वा०-ज०-चन्द्रिकाधृतः पाठः । वि०-पुस्तके 'तु' इति नास्ति । मा०-रेवं ।
८. मा०-पुरुषस्यार्थं ।

६३ अन्वयः ।—प्रकृतिरेव तु पुरुषार्थं प्रति सप्तभिः रूपैः आत्मना आत्मानं बध्नाति । सैव च एकरूपेण विमोचयति (आत्मानं) ।

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव । एतानि सप्त प्रोच्यन्ते—धर्मः, ज्ञानं, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यं, अधर्मः, अज्ञानं, अवैराग्यं, अनैश्वर्यं—एतानि प्रकृतेः सप्त रूपाणि । तैरात्मानं स्वं बध्नाति प्रकृतिः आत्मना स्वेनैव[1] । सैव प्रकृतिः पुरुषस्यार्थः पुरुषार्थः कर्तव्य इति विमोचयत्यात्मानमेकरूपेण ज्ञानेन ॥ ६३ ॥

कथं तज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते—

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि[2] न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

६४ अन्वयः ।—एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासात् नास्मि नाहम् न मे (इति) अपरिशेषम् अविपर्ययात् विशुद्धं केवलं ज्ञानं उत्पद्यते ।

एवमुक्तक्रमेण पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वालोचनाभ्यासात्, इयं प्रकृतिः, अयं पुरुषः, एतानि पञ्चतन्मात्रेन्द्रियमहाभूतानीति पुरुषस्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते—नास्मि[3] नाहमेव भवामि, न मे मम शरीरं तत्, यतोऽहमन्यः शरीरमन्यत् । नाहमित्यपरिशेषं, अहङ्काररहितमपरिशेषम्[4] ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धम् । विपर्ययः संशयः, अविपर्ययादसंशयात्, विशुद्धं केवलं, तदेव नान्यदस्तीति मोक्षकारणमुत्पद्यतेऽभिव्यज्यते ज्ञानं पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानं पुरुषस्येति ॥ ६४ ॥

ज्ञाने पुरुषः किं करोति—

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।
प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः[5] ॥ ६५ ॥

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१. वि०— आत्मानं स्वमेव ।

२. ब०— पुस्तकधृतभाष्यसंमतः पाठः । ज०—वा०—न्नास्मि । वि०—न्नास्ति ।

३. वि०—नास्ति ।

४. ‘ अहङ्काररहितमपरिशेषम् ’ इति ब०— पुस्तके नास्ति ।

५. भाष्यसंमतः, ज०—मा०—संमतश्च पाठः । वि०—सुस्थः । वा०—स्वच्छः ।

६५ अन्वयः ।— तेन निवृत्तप्रसवां अर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्तां प्रकृतिं स्वस्थः पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवत् अवस्थितः पश्यति ।

तेन विशुद्धेन केवलज्ञानेन **पुरुषः प्रकृतिं पश्यति** । प्रेक्षकवत् प्रेक्षकेण तुल्यम् । अवस्थितः स्वस्थः । यथा रङ्गप्रेक्षकोऽवस्थितो नर्तकीं पश्यति । स्वस्थः, स्वस्मिंस्तिष्ठति स्वस्थः, स्वस्थानस्थितः ।

कथम्भूतां प्रकृतिं— **निवृत्तप्रसवाम्** । निवृत्तबुद्ध्यहङ्कारकार्याम्[1] । **अर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम्** । निवर्तितोभयपुरुषप्रयोजनवशात्[2], यैः सप्तभी रूपैर्धर्मादिभिरात्मानं बध्नाति तेभ्यः सप्तभ्यो रूपेभ्यो विनिवृत्तां[3] **प्रकृतिं पश्यति** ॥ ६५ ॥

रङ्गस्थ[4] इत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्येका[5] ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

६६ अन्वयः ।— एकः रङ्गस्थ इति उपेक्षकः । एका 'अहं दृष्टा' इति उपरमति । तयोः संयोगे सति अपि सर्गस्य प्रयोजनं नास्ति ।

रङ्गस्थ इति । यथा रङ्गस्थ इत्येवमुपेक्षक **एकः** केवलः शुद्धः पुरुषः । तेनाहं दृष्टेति कृत्वा उपरता निवृत्ता, एका एकैव प्रकृतिः त्रैलोक्यस्यापि प्रधानकारणभूता । न द्वितीया प्रकृतिरस्ति, मूर्तिभेदे[6] जातिभेदात् ।

एवं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्निवृत्तावपि व्यापकत्वात् संयोगोऽस्ति, न तु संयोगकृतः सर्गः । **सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः** । प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः सर्वगतत्वात् सत्यपि संयोगे **प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य**, सृष्टेश्चरितार्थत्वात् । प्रकृतेर्द्विविधं प्रयोजनम्—शब्दविषयोपलब्धिर्गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिश्च । उभयत्रापि चरितार्थत्वात् सर्गस्य नास्ति प्रयोजनं, यः पुनः सर्ग इति । यथा दानग्रहणनिमित्त

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१. वि०–निवृत्तः बुद्ध्यहङ्कारकार्या ।
२. ब०–निवर्तितपुरुषोभयप्रयोजनवशात् ।
३. वि०–विनिवृत्तिं ।
४. भाष्यसंमतः पाठः । सर्वैरन्यैष्टीकाकृद्भिः, वि०–पुस्तकेन च 'दृष्टा मया' इति पाठो धृतः ।
५. भाष्यसंमतः पाठः । वि०–°रमत्यन्या ।
६. ब०–मूर्तिवधे ।

उत्तमर्णाधमर्णयोर्द्रव्यविशुद्धौ सत्यपि संयोगे न कश्चिदर्थसम्बन्धो भवति, एवं प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरपि नास्ति प्रयोजनमिति ॥ ६६ ॥

यदि पुरुषस्योत्पन्ने ज्ञाने मोक्षो भवति ततो मम कस्मान्न भवति—इत्यत उच्यते—

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद्धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमवद्धृतशरीरः[1] ॥ ६७ ॥

६७ अन्वयः ।— सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनाम् अकारणप्राप्तौ संस्कारवशात् चक्रभ्रमवत् धृतशरीरः तिष्ठति ।

यद्यपि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानं सम्यक् ज्ञानं भवति, तथापि **संस्कारवशात् धृतशरीरो** योगी **तिष्ठति** कथम्—**चक्रभ्रमवत्**, चक्रभ्रमेण तुल्यम् । यथा कुलालश्चक्रं भ्रमयित्वा घटं करोति मृत्पिण्डं चक्रमारोप्य, पुनः कृत्वा घटं पर्यामुञ्चति, चक्रं भ्रमत्येव संस्कारवशात् ।

एवं **सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात्**, उत्पन्नसम्यग्ज्ञानस्य **धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ** । एतानि सप्तरूपाणि बन्धनभूतानि सम्यग्ज्ञानेन दग्धानि, यथा नाग्निना दग्धानि बीजानि प्ररोहणसमर्थानि, एवमेतानि धर्मादीनि बन्धनानि न समर्थानि । धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ संस्कारवशात् धृतशरीरस्तिष्ठति । ज्ञानाद्वर्त्तमानधर्माधर्मक्षयः कस्मान्न भवति वर्तमानत्वादेव, क्षणान्तरे क्षयमप्येति । ज्ञानं त्वनागतकर्म दहति, वर्तमानशरीरेण च यत्करोति तदपीति, विहितानुष्ठानकरणादिति । संस्कारक्षयाच्छरीरपाते मोक्षः ॥ ६७ ॥

स किंविशिष्टो भवतीत्युच्यते—

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

६८ अन्वयः ।— शरीरभेदे प्राप्ते चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ (सत्याम्) ऐकान्तिकम् आत्यन्तिकम् उभयं कैवल्यम् आप्नोति ।

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1. पा०–°भ्रमिवद्धृतशरीरः ।

धर्माधर्मजनितसंस्कारक्षयात् प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात्[1] प्रधानस्य निवृत्तौ, ऐकान्तिकमवश्यं, आत्यन्तिकमनन्तर्हितं कैवल्यं, केवलभावान्मोक्षः, उभयमैकान्तिकात्यन्तिकमित्येवंविशिष्टं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

६९ अन्वयः ।—इदं गुह्यं पुरुषार्थज्ञानम् परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् यत्र भूतानाम् स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाः चिन्त्यन्ते ।

पुरुषार्थो मोक्षः, तदर्थमिदं गुह्यं रहस्यं परमर्षिणा श्रीकपिलर्षिणा समाख्यातं, सम्यगुक्तम् । यत्र ज्ञाने भूतानाम् वैकारिकाणां स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलया अवस्थानाविर्भावतिरोभावाश्चिन्त्यन्ते विचार्यन्ते । येषां विचारात् सम्यक् पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वविवेचनात्मिका सम्पद्यते संवित्तिरिति ॥ ६९ ॥

सांख्यं कपिलमुनिना प्रोक्तं संसारविमुक्तिकारणं हि ।
यत्रैताः सप्ततिरार्या भाष्यं चात्र गौडपादकृतम् ॥

एतत्पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥ अ ॥
शिष्यपरम्परयाऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ आ ॥
सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ इ ॥

अ । अन्वयः ।—मुनिः एतत् अग्र्यं पवित्रं अनुकम्पया आसुरये प्रददौ । आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय (प्रददौ) तेन च बहुधा तन्त्रं कृतम् ।

आ । अन्वयः ।—शिष्यपरम्परया आगतम् एतत् आर्यमतिना ईश्वरकृष्णेन सिद्धान्तं सम्यग् विज्ञाय आर्याभिः संक्षिप्तम् ।

इ । अन्वयः ।—सप्तत्यां ये अर्थाः किल ते कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितंत्रस्य अर्थाः आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ।

समाप्ता इमाः सगौडपादभाष्याः सांख्यकारिकाः ॥

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१. ' प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् ' इति ब०-पुस्तके नास्ति ।

An English Translation of

ĪŚVARA KṚṢṆA'S SĀṀKHYA KĀRIKĀS

WITH

THE GAUḌAPĀDA-BHĀṢYA

(SĀṀKHYA)

Salutations to that Kapila who, feeling compassion on the world sinking in the ocean of ignorance, constructed a boat in the shape of Sāṁkhya for crossing (that ocean).

For the good of the pupils, I shall compendiously explain this science briefly and clearly, giving proofs, conclusions and reasons.

Kārikā I

On account of affliction from threefold misery, inquiry (should be instituted) into the means for its removal. If (it be said that) it is useless because of the (existence of) evident means, (then we reply—) no, because of the absence of certainty and finality.

The threefold misery, etc. This *āryā* is introduced:— The exalted sage, Kapila by name, was the son of Brahman. As it is said:

"Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana the third, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha——, these seven sages are said to be the sons of Brahman."

Virtue, knowledge, renunciation and power were born with Kapila. Thus born, seeing this world sinking in the blinding gloom and the succession of *saṁsāra* (birth and death), he became filled with compassion and taught this knowledge of twenty-five principles to the brahmin Āsuri, born in his own family,—the knowledge by which misery comes to an end.

"One endowed with the knowledge of the twenty-five principles will undoubtedly get salvation, no matter in what stage of life he is—, whether he has matted hair, or is shaved or has top-knot."

So it is said:—*On account of affliction from three-fold misery inquiry (should be instituted).* The three kinds of misery are, internal, external and divine. The internal is two-fold: bodily and mental. The bodily misery,—fever, dysentry and the rest,—is due to the disorder of wind, bile or phlegm; mental is separation from what is liked, and union with what is not liked and the rest. The external misery, due to four-fold living beings, *viz.*, viviparous, oviparous, born of sweat and born of soil, arises from men, beasts, deer, birds, serpents, gnats, mosquitos, lice, bugs, alligators, sharks, unmoving objects and the rest. The divine misery—, *i. e.*, *daiva*, because it belongs to gods or comes from heaven, that which arises with reference to these,—is cold, heat, storm, rain, thunder-bolt: and the rest. Thus, on account of affliction from three-fold misery, inquiry should be instituted. Into what?—

Into the means for its removal. Therein which is the means for ths removal of that three-fold misery.

If (it be said that) it is useless because of the (existence of) evident means; if (it be said that when) the evident means for removing the three-fold misery are known, this inquiry is useless. For removing the two-fold internal misery, the internal means in the shape of treatment according to medical science, union with the liked ones, preclusion of undesirable, the pungent, bitter and astringent decoctions and the like, are quite evident. In (the case of affliction from) external misery, the evident means for its removal are seen in the shape of protection and the like. If you think that it (*i. e.*, inquiry) is useless in the presence of evident means, (then we reply), no.

Because of the absence of certainty and finality. Because the evident means do not certainly (*ekāntataḥ*) and finally (*atyantataḥ*) remove it. Therefore, inquiry should be elsewhere instituted into (finding out) the means which certainly and finally remove (the misery).

If inquiry is to be instituted into other than the evident means, still no. Because the revealed means (are known) to remove the three-fold misery. *Anus'rava* is that which is revealed; (the means) arising from it are (called) *ānus'ravika.* That is proved by the Veda; as it is said:

"We have drunk Soma, become immortal, reached the Heaven and become acquainted with gods. Therefore, indeed, O Immortal One, what can an enemy do against us, how can the old age of a mortal affect us."

Once upon a time there was a discussion among the gods, *viz.*, Indra and others: How did we become immortal? Having pondered, (they concluded)—Because we—*apāma somam*—have drunk soma, we have become immortal. Moreover, *aganma jyotiḥ,*—we have gone, *i. e.*, achieved *jyotis, i. e.*, Heaven. *Avidāma devān,*—(we) have become acquainted with the divine beings. And so,—*kim nūnam asmān kṛṇavad arātiḥ;*— *nūnam, i. e.*, certainly, what can *arāti, i. e.*, enemy, *kṛṇavad, i. e.*, do to us. *kimu dhūrtir amṛta martyasya*: O Immortal One (*he amṛta*), what can *dhūrtiḥ, i. e.*, old age or injury of mortal (*martyasya*) do to us? Moreover, it is said in the Vedas that final goal (is achieved) by killing animals (in sacrifice): "He who performs the *as'vamedha* sacrifice conquers all the regions, transgresses death, transgresses sin, and also transgresses (the sin arising from) the murder of a brahmin." Thus, when certain and final means are revealed in the Vedas, the inquiry is useless,—No. It is said:

Kārikā II

The revealed is like the evident one. It is linked with impurity, destruction and inequality. Other than that is better,—proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifest, Unmanifest and the Knower.

The revealed is like the evident one: *dṛṣṭavat, i. e.,* like the evident, namely, that what is revealed. Why is it like the evident one? Because—,

Linked with impurity, destruction and inequality: Linked with impurity, because of the slaughter of animals. As it is said:

"According to the injunction in the *as'vamedha,* six hundred animals, minus three, are employed (*i. e.*, slaughtered) at midday."

Although, *dharma* is prescribed by the *S'rutis* and the *Smṛtis,* still, on account of the mixture (of items), it is full of impurity. Again, "In every *yuga* thousands of Indras and gods have been surpassed by the time. Time is (therefore) unsurpassable."

Thus, it is linked with destruction, on account of the destruction of Indra and others. Again, it is endowed with *atis'aya, i. e.,* inequality (due to superiority). By seeing superiority in one, the other feels pain. Thus the revealed means are like the evident ones. If it be asked which is better, then it is replied—

Other than that is better: Other than the revealed and the evident ones is better. Because, it is free from impurity, destruction and inequality. How is it (acquired)? (The author) replies,

From the right cognition of the Manifest, Unmanifest, and Knower: The Manifest are *mahat* and the rest; that is, intellect, ego the five subtle elements, the eleven

organs and the five gross elements. The Unmanifest is the *Pradhāna.* The Knower is the *Puruṣa.* Thus, these twenty-five principles are called the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. In their right cognition lies the preference (over the other means). It has also been said—"One endowed with the knowledge of the twenty-five principles." etc.

Now, what are the special characteristics of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower? We reply—

Kārikā III

Primal Nature is not an evolute; Mahat, etc., the seven, are evolvents and evolutes; the group of sixteen is evolute; the Spirit is neither an evolute nor an evolvent.

Primal Nature, i. e. pradhāna. (is so called), because it is the origin of the seven evolvents and the evolutes; Primal Nature, because it is the origin and a non-product, is an evolvent. As it is not produced from anything, therefore, Nature cannot be an evolute of anything.

Mahat, etc., the seven are evolvents and evolutes. Mahat, i. e., intellect. Intellect and the rest are seven, *viz.,* intellect, ego and the five subtle elements. They are seven evolvents and evolutes. That is, intellect is produced from the Nature, therefore, it is a product of the Nature,—an evolute. The same (intellect) produces ego and is, therefore, an evolvent. Ego also, being produced from intellect is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces the five subtle elements. The subtle element of sound, being produced from ego is an evolute; and it is an evolvent, as it produces ether. Similarly, the subtle element of touch. being produced from ego, is an evolute;

and it is an evolvent as it produces wind. The subtle element of smell, being produced from ego is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces earth. The subtle element of fire, being produced from ego is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces light. The subtle element of taste, being produced from ego, is an evolute; and it is an evolvent as it produces water. Thus, *mahat*, etc., the seven, are evolvents and evolutes.*

The group of sixteen is evolute. The five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the eleventh mind and the five gross elements—, this group of sixteen is only evolute. It is but a product.

The Spirit is neither an evolvent nor an evolute.

By what and how many means of cognition are these three categories, namely, the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower known ?—Which (category) by which (means of cognition) ? In this world, the knowables are proved by means of proof, as rice by the (weight) seer and sandal by balance. Therefore, the means of cognition should be defined.

Kārikā IV

The means of right cognition are recognised to be of three kinds,—perception, inference and valid testimony; as all the means of right cognition are proved (to be included in these three). Verily, a provable is proved by means of right cognition.

Perception. The ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose are the five organs of sense. Sound, touch,

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*According to the original of Paramārtha, the five subtle elements not only produce the five gross elements, but also the organs *indriyas*, which, however, are the products of *Sattvika—ahaṁkāra* according to Kārikā. See JRAS, p. 625, July 1931; Tak. S. K., pp. 5-6.

sight, taste and smell are respectively the five objects of these. The ear comprehends sound; the skin, touch; the tongue, taste; the nose, smell. This means of right cognition is called perception.

An object which cannot be apprehended by perception or inference is apprehended by valid testimony. For example, (the existence of) Indra, the king of gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs in the Heaven and so on. That which is not apprehended by perception or inference is apprehended by valid testimony. Moreover, it is said :

" Scripture is valid testimony. A person is called valid because he is free from blemishes. He who is free from blemishes will not tell a lie, because there is no occasion for that."

" He who is engaged in his duties is free from attachment and aversion, and is always respected by persons like himself,—such a person is known to be valid. "

All the other means of cognition are included in these three. Jaimini (says): there are six means of right cognition. Well, what are these means of right cognition?—Presumption (*arthāpatti*), Probability (*sambhava*), Negation (*abhāva*), Imagination (*pratibhā*), Tradition (*aitihya*) and Analogy (*upamāna*),—are the six means of right cognition. The Presumption is of two kinds—"*seen* or *heard*." "*Seen*", *e. g.*, if the existence of soul is admitted in one case then it is admitted in other cases as well. "*Heard*", *e. g.*, Devadatta does not eat during the day, and yet he looks stout. Therefore, it is presumed that he eats at night. The Probability, *e. g.*, when one says a *prastha*, the probability of four *kuḍavas* in it, is established. Negation is of the nature of *antecedent*, *mutual*, *total* and *consequent*. *Antecedent* Negation, as of Devadatta in boyhood and youth. *Mutual* Negation, as of jar in cloth. *Total* Nega-

tion, as of horns in a man, or the son of a barren woman, or a flower in the sky. *Consequent* Negation is the negation due to destruction, as of a piece of burnt cloth. As a consequence of seeing dry grain, negation of rains is understood. Thus, Negation is of various kinds. Imagination, as—

"The country lying to the south of the Vindhyas and the north of the Sahya and extending upto the seas, is lovely"; hearing this, imagination arises that there are lovely qualities in that country. Imagination is a cognition which follows (an utterance). Tradition,—as people say that a *yakṣiṇī* resides on this bunyan tree; this is tradition. Analogy,—as a *gavaya* is like a cow; a tank is like sea. These six means of right cognition are comprehended by Perception and the rest. The Presumption is comprehended by Inference; Probability, Negation, Imagination, Tradition and Analogy are comprehended by Valid Testimony.

Therefore, *all the other means of right cognition being proved* to be included in these three, *only three kinds of means of right cognition are recognised,* means that by these three means of right cognition, other means of right cognition are established.

Because, the provables are proved by means of right cognition. The things to be proved are—Primal Nature, intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs, the five gross elements and the Spirit. These twenty-five categories are called the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. Out of these, some are to be proved by means of Perception, some by Inference and some by Valid Testimony. These are the three means of right cognition.

Now the definitions of each are given—

Kārikā V

Perception is the application (of senses) to (their special) objects; Inference is said to be of three kinds: it is preceded by the (knowledge of) *liṅga* (the Middle term) and the *liṅgin* (the Major term). And Valid Testimony consists of holy teachers and revelation.

Dṛṣṭa or Perception is the application of the senses—ear and the rest—, to their special objects, *viz.*, sound and the rest.

Inference is said to be of three kinds: *Pūrvavat* (*a priori*), *S'eṣavat* (*a posteriori*) and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (*commonly seen* or *analogous*). That which has got (*i. e.*, which is inferred from) an antecedent (*i. e.*, cause) is called *Pūrvavat*: for example, one infers rain, seeing the rising cloud, as seen before. *S'eṣavat*, for example, after finding a *pala* of water from the sea to be saltish, one infers that the rest (of water) is also saltish. *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, for example· when the moon and the stars are observed to move from one place to another, one infers their locomotion, as in the case of *Caitra*. Just as when one observes *Caitra*, leaving one place and reaching another, one infers that *Caitra* has locomotion, so (have) the moon and the stars (locomotion). Similarly, observing a mango tree in blossom (at a particular place), one infers that the mango trees are in blossom at other places (also). This is *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

Moreover, *it is preceded by the* (*knowledge of*) *liṅga* (*the Middle term*) *and the liṅgin* (*the Major term*). That inference is preceded by the knowledge of the Middle term, where a Major term is inferred by means of a Middle term; *e.g.*, by (perceiving) a staff, (the possessor) is inferred to be a mendicant. That preceded by a Major term is—where a Middle term is inferred from the observation of a Major term; *e. g.*, seeing a mendicant, one infers that this triple-staff belongs to him.

And Valid Testimony consists of the holy teachers and revelation; *Āpta, i. e.*, holy teachers, like Brahman and the rest. *S'ruti* is the Veda. The holy teachers and the Veda are called *Āpta-s'ruti.* They are called Valid Testimony.

Thus three kinds of Means of Right Cognition have been defined. Now, it is explained what is to be proved by which Means of Right Cognition:—

Kārikā VI

By means of Inference based on Analogy, the objects beyond senses are proved ; that which is not proved by this (Inference) and cannot be directly perceived, is proved, by Valid Testimony.

By means of Inference based on Analogy, the objects beyond senses, i. e., the objects which cannot be directly perceived by the senses, *are proved.* Nature and the Spirit, which are beyond sense-perception, are proved by inference based on analogy. For, the Middle term, *Mahat* and the rest, has three Attributes. Nature is that which has *Mahat* and the rest, possessing three Attributes, as its effect. Again, because, this Unconscious (Nature) appears to be conscious, therefore, (it must have) another, *i. e.*, the conscious Spirit, to superintend it (*i. e.*, Nature). Manifest is proved by Perception.

That which is not proved by this (Inference) and cannot be directly perceived, is proved by Valid Testimony. For example:—Indra, the king of gods; the northern *Kurus*; the nymphs in the Heaven;—all these imperceptibles are proved by Valid Testimony.

Here, somebody says:—Nature and the Spirit are not perceived; that what is not perceived in this world, does

not exist; so Nature and the Spirit also do not exist; for example, the second head or the third arm (of a man do not exist). It is replied :—In this world, the non-perception of objects is caused by eight causes. They are—

Kārikā VII

On account of excessive distance, (excessive) proximity, injury to senses, inattention, minuteness, obstruction, suppression and mixture with what is similar, (even the existent objects are not perceived).

Here, even existent objects are not perceived *on account of excessive distance*, for example, of *Caitra*, *Maitra* and *Viṣṇumitra* living in another country.

On account of excessive proximity; *e. g.*, an eye cannot perceive collyrium in itself.

On account of injury to senses: *e. g.*, deaf and blind men do not apprehend sound and colour.

On account of inattention; *e. g.*, a man who is distracted does not hear anything, however well-said.

On account of minuteness; *e. g.*, the atoms of smoke, heat, water and frost are not visible in the sky.

On account of obstruction; *e. g.*, an object obstructed by a wall is invisible.

On account of suppression; *e. g.*, the planets, asterisms and stars are invisible on account of the suppression (of their light) by the sun.

On account of mixture with what is similar; *e. g.*, a grain of bean in a heap of beans, or a lotus and a myrabolan in a heap lotuses and myrabolans, and a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, are invisible, because, mixed with what is similar. Thus, existent objects are not perceived in this world on account of these eight causes.

Thus, what is ascertained does exist. Now, it is explained why there is no apprehension of Nature and the Spirit, and how can they be apprehended:—

Kārika VIII

The non-apprehension of Nature is due to its minuteness and not to non-existence. It is ascertained from its effects. Those effects are *Mahat* and the rest, and they are similar and dissimilar to Nature.

Its non-apprehension is due to minuteness. (Non-apprehension) of Nature. Nature is not apprehended on account of minuteness. As even the existent atoms of smoke, heat, water and frost are invisible in the sky. Then, how is it to be ascertained?—

It is to be ascertained from its effects. A cause is inferred from the observation of an effect. Nature, as the cause, does exist, whose effects are these;—intellect, ego. the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements they are the effects of that (Nature).

Those effects are dissimilar to Nature.—*Prakṛti* is Nature; dissimilar to it, *i. e.*, dissimilar to Nature.

And similar;—and similar in form. Even in this world, a son is similar as well as dissimilar to his father. The causes of similarity and dissimilarity, we shall explain later on.

On account of disagreement among teachers, a doubt arises—. Are all these effects, *viz.*, Mahat and the rest, existent or non-existent in their cause, *i. e.* Nature?—For in this school of Sāṁkya philosophy, the effect is existent; with the Buddhists and the rest, it is non-existent. If it is existent, it cannot be non-existent; if, however, it is non-existent, then it cannot be existent. This is a contradiction. Therefore, it is said :—

Kārikā IX

The effect is existent (in its cause), since, non-existent cannot be produced, since the material (cause) is selected, since everything cannot be produced (from anything), since a potent (cause) produces that of which it is capable and since (effect is) of the same nature as the cause.

Since non-existent cannot be produced; non-existent is that which does not exist. Since there can be no production of non-existent thing, so an effect does exist (in its cause). In this world we do not see the production of a non-existent object, as oil cannot be produced from sand (wherein oil is non-existent). So, since only an existent object can be produced, the Manifest does exist before its production in Nature. Therefore, the effect is existent.

Morever, *since the material (cause) is selected Upādāna* is the material cause; on account of selecting it. In this world, a man selects the material cause of that thing which he wants. One who wants curds selects milk and not water. Therefore, the effect exists.

Again, *since everything cannot be produced.* Everything cannot be produced from anywhere. For example, gold cannot be produced from silver, grass, dust and sand. So the effect is existent, because everything cannot be produced from anywhere.

And again, *since a potent thing can produce that of which it is capable.* Here we see that only a potent thing, like the potter or the means like earth, wheel, a thread of rags, water etc., can produce, from the earth a pot, which is capable of being produced. Therefore, the effect is existent.

And also, *since (the effect is) of the same nature as the cause.* The effect is of the same nature of which the

cause is; *e. g.*, barley (is produced) from barley and rice from rice. If the effect were not existent, then rice could be produced from *kodravas*; and as it is not so, therefore, the effect is existent. Thus, there are five causes (proving) the existence of the mergent, *viz.*, Mahat and the rest, in Nature. Therefore, it is proved that only existent is produced and not non-existent.

Now he explains the similarity and dissimilarity (of Mahat and the rest) with Nature:—

Kārikā X

The Manifest is caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, active, manifold, dependent, mergent, conjunct and subordinate. The Unmanifest is just the reverse.

The Manifest, *viz.*, the effect like Mahat and the rest, *is caused*. *Hetumat* is that which has got a cause. *Upādāna*, *Hetu*, *Kāraṇa* and *Nimitta* are synonyms. The Manifest has Nature for its cause: therefore, the entire Manifest upto the five gross elements, is caused. The principle of intellect is caused by Nature; the principle of ego is caused by intellect; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are caused by the ego; sky is caused by the subtle element of sound; wind is caused by the subtle element of touch; glow is caused by the subtle element of colour; water is caused by the subtle element of taste; earth is caused by the subtle element of smell. Thus, the entire Manifest upto the five gross elements is caused.

Again, it is *non-eternal*; because it is produced from another. For example, a jar is non-eternal, because it is produced from a lump of clay.

Again, it is *non-pervading*; that is, it is not all-pervading. The Manifest is not all-pervading as the Nature and the Spirit are.

Again, it is *active*; it migrates at the time of creation. Because, it migrates along with the subtle body endowed with thirteen instruments, it is active.

Again, it is *manifold*; *viz.*, intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements.

Again, it is *dependent*, *i. e.*, dependent on its cause; intellect depends upon Nature, ego depends upon intellect, the eleven organs and the five subtle elements depend upon ego; and the five gross elements depend upon the five subtle elements.

Again, it is *mergent*. It is endowed with (the characteristic of) merging. At the period of dissolution, the five gross elements merge in five subtle elements; the latter along with the eleven organs (merge) in ego; ego (merges) in the intellect; and the intellect (merges) in the Nature.

Again, it is *conjunct* (*i. e.*, made up of parts); sound, touch, taste, colour and smell are the parts;—endowed with them.

Again, it is *subordinate*, *i. e.*, it is not independent. As intellect is subordinate to Nature; ego is subordinate to intellect; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are subordinate to ego; and the five gross elements are subordinate to the five subtle elements. Thus, the Manifest which is subordinate, dependent on another, is explained.

Now, we shall describe the Unmanifest. *The Unmanifest is just the reverse, i. e.,* just the reverse of these characteristics belong to the Unmanifest. The Manifest has been described as caused. There is nothing higher than the Nature. And as the Nature is not produced, so the Unmanifest is uncaused.

Similarly, the Manifest is non-eternal; the Unmanifest is eternal, because not produced. It is not produced from anything like the gross elements. So, it is eternal.

Moreover, the Manifest is non-pervading; the Unmanifest is all-pervading, being omnipresent.

The Manifest is active; the Unmanifest is inactive, also because of omnipresence.

The Manifest is manifold; the Unmanifest is one, because it is the cause. The Unmanifest is the only cause of all the three worlds; therefore, the Nature is one.

Again, the Manifest is dependent; the Unmanifest is independent, being a non-effect. There is nothing higher than the Nature of which the Nature could be an effect.

Again, the Manifest is mergent; the Unmanifest is non-mergent, because it is eternal. The mergent, Mahat, etc., merge in one another at the time of dissolution. (But) the Nature is not such. Therefore, the Nature is non-mergent.

Again, the Manifest is conjunct; the Unmanifest is without parts. Sound, touch, taste, colour and smell do not exist in the Nature.

Again, the Manifest is subordinate; the Unmanifest is independent, is its own master.

Thus, the dissimilarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest has been described; now, the similarity (between the two) is explained, as it was said that it (*i. e.* the product of the Nature) is also similar (to the Nature).

Kārikā XI

The Manifest is composed of the three Attributes, non-discriminated, objective, general, non-intelligent and productive. So also is the Nature. The Spirit is the reverse of that, as well as similar.

The Manifest is composed of the three Attributes. It has the three Attributes, *viz.*, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

The Manifest is *non-discriminated*; that is, it is devoid of discrimination. It is not possible to discriminate (between the two) that this is the Manifest and these are the Attributes, as we can do (in the case of a bull and a horse) that this is a bull and this is a horse.

Again, the Manifest is *objective*; that is, it is an object of enjoyment; because, it is an object (of enjoyment) for all the Spirits.

Again, the Manifest is *general*; because, it is common to all (the Spirits) like a harlot.

The Manifest is *non-intelligent*; that is, it is not conscious of pleasure, pain and delusion.

Again, the Manifest is *productive*. For example, from intellect, ego is produced; from ego, the five subtle elements and the eleven organs are produced; from the five subtle elements, the five gross elements (are produced).

Thus, these characteristics of the Manifest ending with productiveness have been described. The Unmanifest is similar in these (characteristics).—As the manifest is, *so also is the Nature.* The Manifest is composed of the three Attributes ; the Unmanifest, whose products, *viz.*, Mahat and the rest, are composed of the three Attributes, is also composed of the three Attributes. In this world, the effect has the same essence as the cause has; *e. g.*, a piece of cloth woven out of black yarn will be black.

Again, the Manifest is non-discriminated; the Nature also cannot be discriminated from the three Attributes. It is not possible to discriminate that the Nature is other than the three Attributes; so the Nature is non-discriminated.

Again, the Manifest is objective; the Nature also is objective, because it is an object of enjoyment for all the Spirits.

Again, the Manifest is general; so also is the Nature, being common to all.

Again, the Manifest is non-intelligent; the Nature also is not conscious of pleasure, pain and delusion. How do you infer this ?—We see that from a non-intelligent lump of clay, a non-intelligent jar is produced.

Thus, the Nature also has been described. Now, we are going to explain—"*the Spirit is the reverse of that as well as similar.*" The reverse of that, *i. e*, the Spirit is the reverse of the Manifest and the Unmanifest. For example.—

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are composed of the three Attributes, the Spirit is Attribute-less.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are non-discriminated, the Spirit is discriminating.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are objective, the Spirit is non-objective.

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are general, the Spirit is non-general (*i. e.,* individual).

The Manifest and the Unmanifest are non-intelligent, the Spirit is conscious of pleasure, pain and delusion; it knows them; therefore, it is intelligent.

The Manifest and the Nature are productive ; the Spirit is non-productive. Nothing is produced from the Spirit. Therefore, it is said that the Spirit is the reverse of that.

As to the remark that the Spirit is similar to that, it has been explained in the previous verse, *viz.,* as the Nature is uncaused, so is the Spirit. It was said there

that the Manifest is caused, non-eternal and so on, the Unmanifest is the reverse of that.

Here, the Manifest is caused; the Unmanifest is uncaused; so is the Spirit uncaused, because it is not produced.

The Manifest is non-eternal; the Unmanifest is eternal; so also is the Spirit eternal.

The Manifest is non-pervading; the Unmanifest is pervading: so also is the Spirit pervading, being omnipresent.

The Manifest is active; the Unmanifest is inactive; so also is the Spirit inactive, again because, it is omnipresent.

The Manifest is manifold; the Unmanifest is one; so also is the Spirit one.*

The Manifest is dependent; the Unmanifest is independent; so also is the Spirit independent.

The Manifest is mergent; the Unmanifest is non-mergent; so also is the Spirit non-mergent, because it does not merge anywhere.

The Manifest is conjunct; the Unmanifest is non-conjunct; so also is the Spirit non-conjunct. There are no parts (in the shape) of sound and the rest in the Spirit.

And again, the Manifest is subordinate: the Unmanifest is non-subordinate; so also is the Spirit non-subordinate, *i. e.*, is its own master.

Thus, the similarity of the Unmanifest with the Spirit was explained in the previous verse. In the present verse, *viz.*, "Composed of the Attributes, non-discriminated, etc.," the similarity of the Manifest with the Nature and the dissimilarity with the Spirit have been explained.

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* Paramārtha's original here reads—"Spirit differs from Nature in this point alone, that it is multiple." Tak. S. K. p. 16; also see the footnote; JRAS. p. 628 (d), July 1931.

It has been said that the Manifest and the Unmanifest are composed of three Attributes. Now, what are those three Attributes?—The following is stated to explain their nature:—

Kārikā XII

The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they are adapted to illuminate, to activate and to restrain. They mutually suppress, support, produce, consort and exist.

The *Attributes, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion.* The *Sattva* is of the nature of *prīti*; *prīti* is pleasure: it is of this nature. The *Rajas* is of the nature of *aprīti*; *aprīti* is pain. The *Tamas* is of the nature of *viṣāda*; *viṣāda* is delusion.

Again, *they are adapted to illuminate, to activate and to restrain.* The word *artha* stands for 'competency'. *Prakās'ārtham Sattvam* means 'competent to illuminate'. *Rajas* is adapted to activate. *Tamas* is adapted to restrain, *i. e.*, is competent to fix a thing. That is, the Attributes are of the nature of illumination, activity and fixture.

Again,—*and they mutually suppress, support, produce, consort and exist.* That is, they are mutually suppressive, mutually supporting, mutually productive, mutually consorting and mutually existing. Mutually suppressive; they mutually, *i. e.*, one another, suppress, *i. e.*, manifest themselves with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, etc. That means,—when *Sattva* is predominent, then it is so by suppressing the *Rajas* and *Tamas* with its characteristics: and it exhibits itself as pleasure and illumination. When *Rajas* is (predominent), then it is so (by suppressing) the *Sattva* and *Tamas* with its characteristics of pain and activity. When *Tamas* is (predominent), then it is so (by

suppressing) the *Sattva* and *Rajas* with its characteristics of delusion and fixture. And the Attributes are mutually supporting like a binary. They are mutually productive, as a lump of clay produces jar. And they are mutually consorting: as husband and wife are mutually consorting, so are the Attributes. And it is said:—

"The consort of *Rajas* is *Sattva*, the consort of *Sattva* is *Rajas*; the consort of *Sattva* and *Rajas*, is said to be *Tamas*." (*Devībhāgavata*, III, 8). That is, they are the help-mates of one another. And, they mutually exist, *i. e.*, they co-exist, according to the text, "The Attributes exist in the Attributes," (*Bhagavadgītā*, III, 28). Just as a beautiful and virtuous woman is a source of pleasure to all; but the same woman is a source of pain to her co-wives; and the same woman produces delusion in the passionate (people); similarly, *Sattva* is the source of the existence of *Rajas* and *Tamas*. Just as a king ever assiduous in protecting his subjects and punishing the wicked, produces pleasure in the good (people) and pain and delusion in the wicked, similarly, *Rajas* brings about the existence of *Sattva* and *Tamas*. In the same way, *Tamas* brings about the existence of *Sattva* and *Rajas* by its own nature of covering (things). For example, the clouds, covering the sky, produce pleasure in the world;—they urge the farmer to activity by their rain, and produce delusion in the separated (lovers). Thus, the Attributes are mutually existent.

Moreover:—

Kārikā XIII

Sattva is considered to be light and bright, Rajas exciting and mobile, and Tamas is only heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, their function is to gain an end.

Sattva is light and bright. When *Sattva* predominates, then the limbs become light, the intellect becomes bright and the organs become clear (*i. e.* acute).

Rajas is exciting and mobile. Upaṣṭambhaka is that which excites or stimulates. Just as a bull is very much excited at the sight of another bull, so is the nature of *Rajas.* And *Rajas* is observed to be mobile. A man of the nature of *Rajas* is fickle-minded.

Tamas is only heavy and enveloping. When *Tamas* predominates, then the limbs become heavy and the organs become enveloped (*i. e.*, dull)—incapable of apprehending their objects.

Here, one may ask—How do the mutually opposed Attributes produce one common effect, although acting according to their own individual intentions?—(Reply), *like a Lamp, their function is to gain an end. Pradīpavat* means like a Lamp. Their function is considered to be aiming to achieve a common end. Just as a lamp composed of oil, fire and the wick, which are opposed to one another—, illuminates objects, so *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas,* although opposed to one another, produce an effect.

Another question arises here,—you have explained that the Nature and the Manifest are "composed of the three Attributes, non-discriminated and objective." How do you know that the Nature, and the manifested Mahat, etc., are composed of the three Attributes, etc.? This is answered—

Kārikā XIV

The qualities of non-discriminatedness and the rest (of the characteristics of the Manifest) are proved (to exist in the Manifest) by the possession of the three

Attributes and by the absence of its (*i. e.* of the Manifest) reverse. The Unmanifest is also proved by the effect being of the same nature as its cause.

The characteristics of non-discriminatedness and the rest exist in *Mahat* and the rest, because they are of the nature of the three Attributes; but they (*i. e.*, the characteristics) are not proved (to exist) in the Unmanifest.—Therefore, it is said—*By the absence of its reverse*; the reverse of it, the absence thereof, *i. e.*, the absence of the reverse; thus the Unmanifest is proved. For example, wherever there is yarn, there is cloth; the yarn and the cloth are not different things;—Why? Because, there is absence of the reverse. Thus, there is a relationship (*sambandha*) established between the Manifest and the Unmanifest. Far away is the Unmanifest, but the Manifest is at hand. So, one who sees the Manifest, sees also the Unmanifest; because, there is the absence of its reverse.

Hence also the Unmanifest is proved—*Because of an effect being of the same nature as its cause.* We see in this world that whatever the essence of a cause, the same is that of the effect. As—from black yarn, only black cloth is produced. Thus, the mergent Mahat and the rest are non-discriminated, objective, general, non-intelligent and productive. So, whatever the essence of the mergent, the Unmanifest is also proved to possess the same essence.

"On account of the possession of the three Attributes, non-discriminatedness and the rest are proved to exist in the Manifest: By the absence of the reverse and by the effect being of the same nature as its cause, the Unmanifest is also proved"—, this is false. Because, all what we do not apprehend in this world, does not exist. (To

this it is replied)—, do not say so; because one cannot apprehend smell in stones, etc., although it is there. Similarly, the Nature also does exist, but is not apprehended.

Kārikā XV

(The Unmanifest cause does exist), because of the finiteness of the specific objects, because of natural sequence, because of activity depending upon efficiency, because of distinction between cause and effect and because of the merging of this diverse (evolved).

The Unmanifest cause exists—this is the relation of government of subject and predicate in the sentence. *Because of the finiteness of the specific objects.* In this world, wherever, we find an agent, we see a finiteness of his. For example, a potter makes only finite jars from finite lumps of clay; so does Mahat also. The mergent Mahat and the rest are finite and are the specific effects of the Nature. Intellect is one, ego is one, the subtle elements are five, the organs are eleven and the gross elements are five.–Thus, on account of the finiteness of the specific objects, there is Nature as the cause which produces the finite Manifest. If there were no Nature, then even this Manifest would have been infinite. And so, on account of the finiteness of the specific objects, there is Nature, wherefrom this Manifest has sprung up.

Again, *because of natural sequence.* This is quite well known in this world that when one sees a boy engaged in performing sacred rites, one infers that his parents are naturally brahmins. Similarly, seeing this mergent (*i. e.* the evolved), we arrive at a thing which must be its cause. Thus, by natural sequence there is Nature.

Again, *because of activity depending upon efficiency.* Here, a man does that for which he is efficient. For example, a potter who is efficient to produce a jar, produces only a jar and not cloth or chariot.

Again, there is Nature as the cause. How?—*Because of distinction between cause and effect. Kāraṇa* is that which produces: *kārya* is that which is produced. (There is) a distinction (of functions) of cause and effect. For example, as a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water and milk, so is not a lump of clay (competent). Or, a lump of clay produces a jar, but a jar does not produce lump of clay. Thus, seeing the mergent Mahat and the rest, it is inferred that there is a separate cause from which this Manifest has separated (*i. e.*, evolved) itself.

And again, *because of the merging of the diverse (evolved)*. *Vis'va* means universe; its *rūpa* is manifestation. The abstraction of *vis'varūpa* is *vais'varūpya* (*i. e.*, manifested or evolved); on account of its merging there is Nature; because there is no mutual distinction between the three worlds and the five gross elements,—*i. e.*, the three worlds are included in the five gross elements. At the time of dissolution, the five gross elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air and ether, merge into the modified five subtle elements in the order of creation; the five subtle elements and the eleven organs (merge) into ego; ego (merges) into intellect; intellect (merges) into Nature. Thus, the three worlds merge into Nature at the time of dissolution. From such merging of the Manifest and the Unmanifest, like that of milk and curds, there does exist the Unmanifest as the cause.

And for this reason:—

Kārikā XVI

The Unmanifest as the cause does exist. It functions through the three Attributes by combining and by modification, like water, due to the particular characteristics of the abode of each of the Attributes.

The well-known Unmanifest as the cause does exist from which proceed the mergent Mahat and the rest.

Triguṇataḥ,—i. e., from (the Nature) possessed of the three Attributes. *Triguṇa* is that which has the three Attributes, *viz.*, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. Then, what is the sense?—(It is)— that the Nature is the equilibrium of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again, *by combining*. As the three streams of the Ganges falling on the head of Rudra, (combine to) produce one stream, so the Unmanifest endowed with the three Attributes produces one Manifest. Or, as the combined threads produce cloth, so the Unmanifest creates Mahat and the rest, on account of the combination of the three Attributes. So, the manifested universe proceeds from the three Attributes and their combination.

Well, as the entire Manifest proceeds from one Nature, so the former must be uniform.—This objection (does) not (arise). *Because by modification, like water, due to the particular characteristics of abode of each of the Attributes.* The three worlds born of one Nature are not of uniform nature. Gods are happy, men are unhappy and the animals are deluded. The Manifest, proceeding from one Unmanifest, becomes like water on account of modification based on the particular characteristics abiding in each of the three Attributes. The repetition of *prati* denotes "succession." *Guṇāśraya* means the abode of the Attributes;—its particular characteristic.—Taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the abode of the three Attri-

butes, the Manifest is created from the modification based upon the particular characteristics of the abode of the three Attributes. For example, water falling from the sky is of uniform nature; but coming into contact with different forms, that water becomes of different forms, due to different tastes. Similarly, the three worlds proceeding from one Nature, are not of uniform nature. Among the gods, the *Sattva* is predominent, and *Rajas* and *Tamas* are indifferent; so they are very happy. Among men, the *Rajas* is predominent, and *Sattva* and *Tamas* are indifferent; therefore, they are very unhappy. Among animals, the *Tamas* is predominent, and *Sattva* and *Rajas* are indifferent; so they are very insensible.

Thus, by these two verses, the existence of the Nature is known. Now, after this, the author proceeds to prove the existence of the Spirit :—

Kārikā XVII

The Spirit exists, since composite (objects) are meant for another; since it is the reverse of that which has the three Attributes and the rest; since there must be control; since there must be someone who enjoys; and since there is activity for release.

It had been pointed out that the release is obtained by the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. So, after (the knowledge of) the Manifest, the Unmanifest has been known (to exist) by five reasons (verse 15). Like the Unmanifest the Spirit also is subtle. Now, its existence is proved by inference. The Spirit exists. How?'—*Since composite objects are meant for another*. It is inferred that the composition of Mahat and the rest is meant for the Spirit, because, it (*i. e*,, composition) is unconscious lik a bed. For example, a bed

is composed of *gātrotpalaka*(?), a foot-stool, a covering cloth of cotton and a pillow; it serves another person's purpose and not its own. The different parts, *viz.*, *gātrotpalaka*, etc., of the bed cannot serve any mutual purpose. So, it is inferred that there is a man who sleeps on the bed,—for whom this bed is meant. So, this body, a composite of five gross elements, is meant for another. There exists the Spirit for whom this enjoyable body is born;—the body which is a composite of Mahat and the rest.

Hence also, the Spirit exists:—*since it is the reverse of that which has the three Attributes, viz.*, " possessed of the three Attributes, non-discriminated, objective, etc., " mentioned in the previous verse,—the reverse of this. Because, it was said : " the Spirit is similar and dissimilar to that. "

Since there must be control. As here, a chariot, united to horses capable of leaping, galloping and running, functions only when controlled by a charioteer, so does the body function on account of the control of the Spirit. As it is said in the Ṣaṣṭitantra—" The Nature functions when controlled by the Spirit."*

Hence, the Spirit exists,—*Since there must be someone who enjoys.* For example, we infer that there must be an enjoyer of mixed food flavoured with the six flavours, *viz.*, sweet, sour, salt, pungent, bitter and astringent; similarly, because the mergent Mahat and the rest are not enjoyers, (we infer) that the Spirit exists,—for whose enjoyment this body is.

Hence, also (the Spirit exists), *since there is activity for release. Kaivalya* is the abstraction of *kevala* (alone);

* Paramārtha's original also quotes from Ṣaṣṭitantra; " Nature, it is that in which Spirit resides, and it is because of that that she can produce actions. " Tak. S. K., p. 25.

the activity for this purpose; from this activity for its own release, it is inferred that the Spirit exists. For, everybody, learned or otherwise, desires for the cessation of the cycle of his births and deaths. For these reasons there exists the Spirit apart from the body.*

" Is that Spirit one, controlling all the bodies like a string passing through a chain of jewels, or are there many Spirits controlling each body?"—To this is replied:—

Kārikā XVIII

The plurality of the Spirits is established, because birth, death and organs are allotted separately; because there is no activity at one time, and because there are different modifications of the three Attributes.

Janmamaraṇakaraṇāni, means birth, death and the organs; because of their *pratiniyama i. e.,* separate allotment of each. If there were one Spirit, then when one (Spirit) were to be born, all would be born;§ or when one were to die all would die; or when one were to have any organic defect in the shape of deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation or lameness, then all would be deaf, blind, mutilated or lame. But it does not happen so. Therefore, because birth, death and the organs are allotted separately, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

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* Paramārtha's original comments : " If there were only our body, we should not have the need of the final Deliverance taught by the sages..... If there were no distinct Spirit by the side of the body, religious practices like cremation or the throwing into water of the remains of dead parents or masters would not have any merit, but might drag in demerit. " Tak. S. K., p. 25.

§ Paramārtha : " The women of different countries would become pregnant at the same time; they would be brought to bed at the same time; they would have all boys or all girls. " Tak. S. K., p. 26.

Again, *because there is no activity at one time. Yugapat* means at one time;—*ayugapat i. e.*, not at one time, *pravartanam i. e.* activity. Because we see that all people are not engaged in virtue and the rest at one and the same time. Some are engaged in virtue, others in vice, some in renunciation and some in knowledge. Therefore, by there being no activity at one time, 'there are many Spirits' is proved.

And moreover, *because there are different modifications of the three Attributes*. Also, by the different modifications of the three Attributes, plurality of the Spirits is proved. For example, in ordinary life, a *Sāttvika* person is happy, a *Rājasa* person is unhappy and a *Tāmasa* person is under delusion. Thus, by the various vicissitudes, plurality of the Spirits is established.

Now it is stated that the Spirit is inactive :—

Kārikā XIX

And from that contrast it follows that the Spirit is endowed with the characteristics of witnessing, isolation, indifference, perception and inactivity.

And from that contrast:—from that afore-said *viparyāsa, i. e.*, contrast of the possession of the three Attributes. The Spirit is devoid of the Attributes, is discriminative and enjoyer. The contrast is of these qualities in the Spirit, as said before.

Therefore, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* being agents (active), *it follows that the Spirit is endowed with the characteristics of witnessing*;—that (Spirit) which is the subject of plurality. Only the Attributes which are agents are active; the witness neither acts nor desists from acting.

Moreover, (the Spirit is endowed with) *isolation*; *kaivalya* is the property of being isolated or different. That is, isolated or different from that which is possessed of the three Attributes.

Indifference is the property of being indifferent. The Spirit is indifferent like a *saṁnyāsin*. Just as a *saṁnyāsin* is indifferent towards the villagers engaged in tilling, so the Spirit also remains indifferent (*i. e.*, inactive) while the (three) Attributes are active.

Therefore, (the Spirit is endowed with) *perception and inactivity*. Because the Spirit is indifferent, therefore, it is the perceiver and not-agent of those actions. The Attributes, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* function as agents and action, and not the Spirit. Thus also the existence of the Spirit is proved.

(*Objection*)—"If the Spirit is a non-agent, then how does it exercise volition (in the shape of),—'I shall practise virtue, I will not practise vice'. Therefore, it is an agent. But you say that the Spirit is non-agent; in this way there will be fault both ways." (*Answer*)—So, it is replied:

Kārikā XX

Therefore, the non-intelligent *liṅga* becomes as if intelligent on account of its contact with that (Spirit). And although the activity belongs to the Attributes, yet the indifferent (Spirit) seems as if it were an agent.

Here, the intelligence (really) belongs to the Spirit; therefore, the *liṅga*, *viz.*, Mahat and the rest, coming into contact with the reflection of the intelligent (Spirit), becomes as if intelligent. As here, a jar becomes cold when it comes into contact with coolness, and becomes hot when it comes into contact with heat, so the *liṅga*, *viz.*,

Mahat and the rest, by *coming into contact with that i. e.*, by coming into contact with the Spirit, becomes as if intelligent. Therefore, the volition is exercised by the Attributes and not by the Spirit.

Although, people use (such phrases), 'a man acts or walks', still the Spirit is non-agent. How ?—(*Reply*)—*And though the activity belongs to the Attributes, yet the indifferent* (*Spirit*) *seems as if it were an agent.* Though the activity resides in the Attributes, yet, even the indifferent Spirit becomes *as if it were* an agent, not an (actual) agent. There is an illustration of this :—As a person, who is not a thief, when arrested along with thieves becomes a thief, so the (real) agents are the Attributes but the Spirit, although indifferent, yet by coming into contact with them (the Attributes), becomes active,—by coming into contact with the agents. Thus, the distinction of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Spirit has been explained; from discrimination of which release is obtained.

Well, for what purpose is the union of the Nature and the Spirit brought about ? It is replied :—

Kārikā XXI

(The union) of the Spirit (with the Nature) is for contemplation (of the Nature); (the union) of the Nature (with the Spirit) is for liberation. The union of both (*i. e.*, the Spirit and the Nature) is like that of a lame man with a blind man. The creation is brought about by that (union).

The union of the Spirit with the Nature is for contemplation. The Spirit contemplates the Nature, *i. e.*, its effects beginning from Mahat and ending with the gross elements.

For this reason, the union of *the Nature* with the Spirit is *for liberation.*

That union of both should be considered to be *like that of a lame man with a blind man.* For example, one man is lame, the other is blind. These two men were travelling with difficulty; the caravan was attacked by the robbers in the forest; these two were deserted by their friends and wandered haphazardly; in course of their wandering they encountered each other. This reunion of theirs, on account of each relying on the words of the other, serves the purpose of walking and seeing. The blind man mounted the lame man on his shoulders. Thus, the blind man walks by the road shown by the lame man mounted on the former's body, and the lame man (walks) mounted on the blind man's body. Similarly, the Spirit like the lame man has the power of contemplation, but not of action. The Nature like the blind man has the power of action, but not of contemplation. And just as there will be separation of the blind man from the lame man, after their mutual object of reaching the desired for spot is achieved, so the Nature also ceases to act after bringing about the release of the Spirit; and the Spirit becomes isolated after contemplating the Nature. After their mutual object is gained, separation will come about.

And moreover, *the creation is brought about by that. Tatkṛtāt, i. e.,* brought about by that union; *sargaḥ, i. e.,* creation. Just as a son is born by the union of man and woman, similarly, the creation is brought about by the union of the Spirit and Nature.

Now the author proceeds to explain all the products:—

Kārikā XXII

From the Nature proceeds the intellect; thence ego, thence the group of sixteen, and from five out of this group of sixteen, the five gross elements.

Prakṛti (Nature), *pradhāna, brahman, avyakta, bahudhātmaka* and *māyā* are synonyms. From the *Nature*, devoid of characteristics, the Intellect is born. *Mahat* is born with *buddhi, āsurī, mati, khyāti, jñāna* and *prajñā* as synonyms.

From that Mahat, *the ego* is born. *Ahaṁkāra, bhūtādi, vaikṛta, taijasa* and *abhimāna* are synonyms.

From that the group of sixteen. From that ego the group of sixteen, the group having sixteen forms, is produced. That is, the five subtle elements, *viz.*, the subtle element of sound, the subtle element of touch, the subtle element of colour, the subtle element of taste and the subtle element of smell; then the eleven organs—the five organs of sense, *viz.*, ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose, the five organs of action, *viz.*, tongue, hands, feet, anus and the organs of procreation, and the eleventh mind having the characteristics of both (organs of sense and action). This group of sixteen is produced from the ego.

And, from five, the five gross elements; out of that group of sixteen, from the five subtle elements, the five gross elements are born. As it is said:—ether from the subtle element of sound, wind from the subtle element of touch, fire from the subtle element of light, water from the subtle element of taste and earth from the subtle element of smell. Thus from five atoms (*i. e.*, atom-like subtle elements), the five gross elements are born.

It has been said before that the liberation results from the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the

Unmanifest and the Knower. In this connection, (the Manifest) of twenty-three kinds, beginning with Mahat and ending with the gross elements, has been described. The Unmanifest is also explained by "Because of the finiteness of the specific objects" (verse 15). The Spirit also has been explained by the reasons (mentioned in) " Because the composite objects are meant for another " (verse 17). Thus, they make up the twenty-five principles. He who knows all the three worlds pervaded by these (becomes liberated). *Tattva* is the abstraction of *Tad*, *i. e.*, existence. As it is said—

" He who knows the twenty-five principles, becomes liberated, no matter in what stage of life he is,—whether he has clotted hair or is shaved or has a tuft of hair; there is no doubt about it."

They (*i. e.*, the twenty-five principles) are:—The Nature, the Spirit, the Intellect, the Ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements. It has been said that the intellect is born of Nature; what is the nature of that intellect ?—It is described:—

Kārikā XXIII

The intellect is determination.—Virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and power constitute its Sāttvika form. The Tāmasa form is its reverse.

Determination is the definition of intellect. *Adhyavasāya* is ascertainment, and it is (present in the intellect) like the future germination of sprout in a seed. That is, it is the definite cognition which arises when one determines that " this is jar," "this is cloth".

That intellect has eight parts, according as it is *Sāttvika* or *Tāmasa*. The *Sāttvika* form of intellect is of four kinds, *viz., virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and power.*

The virtue is of the nature of mercy, charity, the (five) *yamas* (restraints) and the (five) *niyamas* (obligations). The *yamas* and the *niyamas* are described in the treatise of Patañjali. "Non-injury, truth, non-stealing, celibacy and non-acceptance of gifts are the *yamas*." (Yogasūtra, II, 30). "Purity, contentment, austerity, study of the Vedas and the meditation of God are the *niyamas*" (*Ibid*, II, 32).* Light (*prakāś'a*), understanding (*avagama*) and manifestation (*bhāna*) are the synonyms of knowledge. The external knowledge comprises of the *Vedas* along with the six branches of pronunciation, ritual, grammar, etymology, prosody and astronomy, the *Purāṇas*, the *Nyāya*, the *Mīmāṁsā* and the *Dharmas'āstras*. The internal knowledge is the (discriminative) knowledge of the Nature and the Spirit. This Nature is the equilibrium of *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*. This Spirit is accomplished, free from the Attributes, pervading and intelligent. The result of the external knowledge is celebrity and admiration among the people. The result of the internal knowledge is liberation. The non-attachment also is of two kinds;—external and internal. The external (non-attachment) is freedom from attachment towards the objects (of senses), arising from disgust due to the observation of the defects of earning,

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* Paramārtha's original has different *yamas* and *niyamas*. "*Yama* has five sub-divisions: (1) not to put oneself in anger; (2) to respect one's spiritual masters; (3) to possess internal and external purity; (4) to be moderate in eating and drinking; (5) not to become addicted to license. *Niyama* too is divided into five: (1) not to kill; (2) not to steal; (3) to speak the truth; (4) to practise continence (brahmacaryā); (5) not to flatter." On this Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks in the footnote that the Chinese enumeration "has greater chances of being the original than that of Gauḍapāda. Above all, the adoration of God is very improbable for the atheistic system of the Sāṁkhya. It may be that Gauḍpāda has adopted the ordinary enumeration of the Yoga School." Tak. S. K., P. 31.

protecting, decreasing, attachment and injury (in those objects). The internal: the internal non-attachment arises in the mind of that person who desires to get liberation, *i. e.*, who becomes dispassionate by observing that even the Nature is like a magic or dream. Power is lordliness. It is of eight kinds:—*animā, mahimā, garimā. laghimā, prāpti, prākāmya, īs'itva, vas'itva and yatrakāmāvasāyitva. Aṇimā* is the state of an atom. That is, a person (possessed of this power) wanders over the world in an atomlike minute form. *Mahimā*; (possessed of this power) a man wanders in large form. *Laghimā*; on account of becoming as light as the fibre of a lotus-stalk, (a person possessed of this power) can stay on the tips of the filaments of flowers. *Prāpti*; (a person possessed of this power) gets the desired for object, wherever it may be. *Prākāmya*; (a person possessed of this power) can do whatever he likes. *Īs'itva*; (a person possessed of this power) reigns over all the three worlds on account of his lordliness. *Vas'itva*; everything comes in the powsr (of the person possessed of this), *Yatrakāmāvasāyitva*; (A person possessed of this power) can stand, sit or wander over anything, from Brahman to grass, wherever he desires. These four are the *Sāttvika* forms of the intellect. When *Sattva* overcomes *Rajas* and *Tamas*, then a man acquires these intellectual qualities of virtue and the rest.

And moreover. *the Tāmasa form is the reverse of this.* The *Tāmasa* form of intellect is the reverse of this, virtue and the rest. The reverse of virtue is vice; similarly, ignorance, attachment and absence of lordly powers (are the reverse of knowledge, non-attachment and lordly powers respectively). Thus, intellect having eight forms according to its *Sāttvika* and *Tāmasa* nature is born of the Unmanifest possessed of the three Attributes.

The definition of intellect has been given; now, the nature of ego is described :—

Kārikā XXIV

Ego is self-consciousness. Two kinds of creations proceed from it, viz., the group of eleven and the five-fold subtle elements.

The group of eleven; the eleven organs; and the group of *subtle elements* which is *five-fold, i. e.*, endowed with the five characteristics, *viz.*, endowed with the subtle elements of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

(What sort of) creation from what sort,—is now explained :—

Kārikā XXV

From the Vaikṛta ego (proceeds) the group of eleven, characterised by Sattva. From the Bhūtādi ego (proceeds) the group of subtle elements which is Tāmasa. From the Taijasa ego (proceed) both.

When *Rajas* and *Tamas* are overcome by *Sattva* in the ego, then that ego is *Sāttvika*. The ancient teachers have named it *Vaikṛta*. *From that Vaikṛta ego, the group of eleven, i. e.*. the group of eleven organs proceeds. Therefore, the organs are *Sāttvika*, pure and capable of apprehending their objects. Therefore, it is said :—*the group of eleven characterised by Sattva.*

And again, *from Bhūtādi, the group of subtle elements, which is Tāmasa.* When *Sattva* and *Rajas* are overcome by *Tamas* in the ego, then that ego is called *Tāmasa.* The ancient teachers have named it *Bhūtādi.* From that *Bhūtādi* ego, the group of five subtle elements proceeds. It is called *Tāmasa*, as it is the origin of the gross elements and abounds in *Tamas*; from this *Bhūtādi* proceeds the group of subtle elements.

And *from Taijasa, both.* When *Sattva* and *Tamas* are overcome by *Rajas*, then for this reason, that ego gets the name of *Taijasa*. From that *Taijasa* both are born. Both means, the group of (eleven) organs and the group of five subtle elements. The *Sāttvika* ego, becoming *Vaikṛta*, *i. e.* modified, takes the help of the *Taijasa* ego, at the time of producing the eleven organs. The *Sāttvika* ego is inactive ; it is capable of producing the organs, (only) when united to *Taijasa* (ego). Similarly, the *Tāmasa* ego, termed as *Bhūtādi* and being inactive, produces the five subtle elements, (only) when united to the active *Taijasa* ego. Therefore it is said:—from *Taijasa* both. Thus, the *Taijasa* ego (in the company of *Sāttvika* and *Tāmasa* ones) produces the eleven organs and the five subtle elements.

It has been mentioned that the group of eleven (organs) is *Sāttvika*. What are the names of those, which are born of the modified *Sāttvika* ego ?—This is explained :—

Kārikā XXVI

The organs of sense are eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. Speech, hands, feet, anus, and the organ of procreation are called the organs of action.

From eye upto skin are called the *organs of sense*. *Spars'ana*, *i. e.* by which one touches, is the skin-organ. The word *Spars'ana* is used in that sense. Therefore, the text reads—"*Spars'anakāni*". They are called the five organs of sense, because they apprehend the five objects, viz., sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

Speech, hands, feet, anus and the organ of procreation are called the organs of action. The organs of action are so called because they (perform) action. The speech utters, the hands variously act, the feet perform going and com-

ing, the anus execrates and the organ of procreation (produces) pleasure by procreating children.

Thus, on the basis of organs of sense and organs of action, ten organs have been described. What is the nature, and of what essence is the mind?—this is now explained:—

Karika XXVII

Here, the mind is of the nature of both (organs of sense and action). It is determinative, and is also an organ on account of similarity. This diversity (of the organs) and the diversities of external things, arise from the specific modifications of the Attributes.

Here, in the set of organs, *the mind is of the nature of both.* Among the organs of sense, it is like an organ of sense; among the organs of action, it is like an organ of action. Why?—(Because) it determines the functioning of the organs of sense and action. Therefore, the mind is of the nature of both. *Saṅkalpaka*, because it determines.

Moreover, (it is an) *organ on account of similarity.* That is, on account of possessing similar characteristics. The organs of sense, as well as of action, proceeding along with the mind from the *Sāttvika* ego, bring about the similarity of the mind. On occount of that similarity, the mind also is an organ. Thus, these eleven organs are produced from the *Sāttvika* or *Vaikṛta* ego. Then, what is the function of the mind? Determination is the function of mind. The functions of the organs of sense are sound and the rest. The functions of the organs of action are speech and the rest.

Now, are these different organs, apprehending different objects, created by God or are they self-generated?—Because, the Nature, intellect and ego are non-intelligent

and the Spirit is also inactive—. In this connection it is replied. Herein, among the (followers of the) Sāṁkhya (doctrine), there is a certain spontaneity as the cause (?). In this respect it is said.—*The diversity (of the organs) and the external diversities arise from the specific modifications of the Attributes.* These eleven organs (function in different objects):—sound, touch, colour, taste and smell (are the functions) of the five (organs of sense); speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure (are the functions) of the five (organs of action); and determination (is the function) of mind. Thus, these different objects of the different organs, arise from the specific modification of the Attributes. *Guṇapariṇāma* is the modification of the Attributes On account of its (*i. e.*, of the modification) specification, arise the diversity (of organs) and the external diversities. So, this diversity is not caused by God, ego, intellect, Nature or the Spirit, but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes. But, can there be any activity among the Attributes, which are non-intelligent ? Yes, there can be. As it will be pointed out in this very book.—

"Just as there is an activity in the non-intelligent milk for the growth of the calf, similarly, there is an activity in the Nature for bringing about the liberation of the soul." (Kār. 57).

So, the non-intelligent Attributes become modified as the eleven organs. The specifications also are caused by these (Attributes). Hence, the eye is placed at a higher place (in the body) for observation, and so are nose, ear, tongue (placed at their proper places in the body) for apprehending their particular objects; similarly, the organs of action are at their proper places for apprehending their particular objects,—only these (organs) are a result of the spontaneous modification of the Attri-

butes, and not the objects of these organs (?). For, it is said in another text :—" The Attributes function in the Attributes." The functioning of the Attributes has the Attributes themselves as its own field. So, the external diversities are the result of only the Attributes, whose cause is Nature.

Now the various functions of the different organs are described :—

Kārikā XXVIII

The function of five (organs of sense) with respect to sound and the rest, is bare awaredness; while the functions of (the other) five (organs of action) are speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure.

The word *Mātra* stands in the sense of 'uniqueness' or the exclusion of what is not specified; as in the sentence, 'alms alone are received,' that is, no other speciality; so the eye functions with respect to colour only and not to taste and the rest. Similar is the case with others. That is,—(the object) of eye is colour, of tongue. is taste, of nose is smell, of ear is sound and of skin is touch:—thus the (field of) functioning of the organs of sense is described.

Now, the (field of) functioning of the organs of action is described:—*Of (the other) five are speech, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure, i. e.,* of the organs of action. Of speech speaking, of hands taking, of feet walking, of anus excretion of the filth from the food eaten and of the organ of procreation pleasure and birth of progeny—are the objects or (the field of) functioning. This is the syntactic relation (of the sentence).

Now, the functions of intellect, ego and mind are described:—

Kārikā XXIX

The function of the three (internal organs) is the specific nature of each and it is not common (to the three). The common function of the organs is (the circulation of) the five vital airs, *viz.*, Prāṇa and the rest.

The specific nature of each, means 'of the nature of its own characteristics'. The definition of intellect has been given as "Determination is intellect" (Kār. 23); this is also the function of intellect. Similarly, "Ego is self-consciousness" (Kār. 24), is the definition of ego, and also the function of ego. "Mind is determinative" (Kār. 27), is the definition of mind; therefore, the function of mind is only determinativeness. (Thus) the function of the three, *viz.*, intellect, ego and mind, is the specific nature of each.

Not common. Even that functioning of the organs of sense (as well as of action?) which has been explained before, is specific.

Now, the function which is common is explained. *The common function of the organs.* That is, the function of the organs which is common (to them). *The five vital airs, viz., Prāṇa and the rest.* The five vital airs, *viz.*, *Prāṇa, Apāna, Samāna, Udāna and Vyāna* are the common function of all the organs. For, the air named *Prāṇa*, resides inside the mouth and the nose; its circulation is the common function of all the thirteen organs. Since, the organs come into being when there is *Prāṇa*. *Prāṇa*, like a bird in a cage, gives motion to all. It is called *Prāṇa*, because of breathing. So *Apāna* is so called, because it takes away. Its circulation also is the common function of the organs. So, *Samāna*, residing in the centre (of the body), is so called because it distributes food and the rest properly. Similarly, *Udāna* is so called, because it

carries up, or draws or lifts. It resides between the naval and the head. The circulation of *Udāna* is the common function of all the organs. Moreover, that which pervades the body and divides its interior is *Vyāna*; and it is so called because it pervades the body like space. Its circulation is the common function of all the organs. Thus, these five airs are explained as the common function of all the organs, *i. e.*, the common function of all the organs of thirteen kinds.

Kārikā XXX

With regard to visible objects, the function of the four (the three internal organs and an organ of sense) is simultaneous and gradual. So, also, with regard to invisible objects the function of the three (internal organs) is preceded by that.

Of the four is simultaneous. Intellect, ego and mind, when united to any one of the organs become four. Of these four, there is simultaneous *functioning* with regard to *visible* objects. Intellect, ego, mind and *the eye* simultaneously perceive the form, that it is a post; intellect, ego, mind and *the tongue* simultaneously apprehend taste; intellect, ego, mind and *the nose* simultaneously apprehend the smell; so do the skin and the ears.

And of that, is also regarded as *gradual*; that is, there is also the gradual functioning of the four. For example, a man walking on the path, sees something from afar, and is beset with the doubt as to whether it is a post or a man. Then he sees some mark or a bird over it. Then in his doubtful mind arises the determining intellect that it is a post. Thence (comes the) ego for making it a certainty that it is certainly a post. Thus, the gradual functioning

of intellect, ego, mind and the eyes is observed. As it is in the case of form, so it is in the case of sound and the rest. Visible means the visible objects.

Moreover, *so also with regard to invisible objects the function of the three is preceded by that.* In the invisible, *i.e.*, the past and future forms, the functioning of the three, *viz.*, intellect, ego and mind, is preceded by that (of) the eye; in the touch, it is preceded by that of the skin; in smell, it is preceded by that of the nose ; in taste, it is preceded by that of the tongue ; in sound, it is preceded by that of the ear. With regard to future and past, the functioning of intellect, ego and mind, preceded by that (of any other organ) is gradual; with regard to present, it is simultaneous as well as gradual.

Moreover—

Kārikā XXXI

The organs perform their respective functions incited by mutual impulse. The motive (of their action) is the goal of the Spirit; an organ is not caused to function by anyone.

Svām is repeated (in the sense of respectively theirs). Intellect, ego and mind (perform) *their respective functions incited by mutual impulse.*

Ākūta means respect or zeal. Intellect, ego, mind and the rest tend to bring about the goal of the Spirit. Intellect proceeds to its particular function after knowing the impulse of the ego.

If it be asked—what is the motive? (then we reply)—*The motive is only the goal of the Spirit.* The goal of the Spirit is to be achieved; for this purpose do the Attributes act. Therefore, these organs manifest the goal of the Spirit.

How do they act of their own accord when they are non-intelligent ?—*An organ is not caused to function by any-one.* The meaning of the sentence is that only the goal of the Spirit causes them to function. The organs are not caused, *i. e.*, actuated by any superior Being.

Now it is described—Of how many kinds (the organs, *viz.*,), intellect and the rest are.

Kārikā XXXII

The organs are of thirteen kinds; their functions are seizing, retaining and manifesting. Their objects, (which are of the nature of) what is seized, retained and manifested, are tenfold.

The organs, *viz.*, *Mahat* and the rest, should be known to be of *thirteen kinds*. Five organs of sense, *viz.*, the eye and the rest; five organs of action, *viz.*, the speech and the rest; (and intellect, ego and mind);—these are the organs of thirteen kinds.

What are their functions?—It is replied:—*Their functions are seizing, retaining and manifesting.* Here, seizing and retaining are performed by the organs of action and manifesting by the organs of sense.

Of how many kinds are their objects ? It is replied:—*Their objects are tenfold.* The objects, *i.e.*, the functions to be performed by these organs, are tenfold, *i. e.*, of ten kinds. The ten kinds of objects, *viz.*, sound, touch, form, taste, smell, speaking, taking, walking, excretion and pleasure are manifested by the organs of sense and are seized and retained by the organs of action.

Moreover :—

Kārikā XXXIII

The internal organs are threefold ; the external (organs) are tenfold and they are the objects of the three (internal organs). The external organs function in the present, and the internal organs function in all the three times.

The internal organs, viz., intellect, ego and mind, are *threefold*, distinguished as *Mahat* and the rest.

And the external (organs) are tenfold. The five organs of sense and the five organs of action,—these are the tenfold external organs.

They are the objects of the three. That is, they are the objects of enjoyment by intellect, ego and mind.

Function in the present. The ear hears only the present sound and not the past or the future; the eye sees only the present form and not the past or the future; the skin (touches) the present touch; the tongue (tastes) the present taste; the nose (smells) the present smell. Similarly, the organs of action: the speech utters the present word and not the past or the future; the hands take the present jar and not the past or the future; the feet walk on the present road and not on the past or the future; the anus and the organs of procreation perform excretion and produce pleasure in the present and not in the past or the future. Thus, the external organs are said (to function) in the present.

The internal organs function in all the three times. Intellect, ego and mind apprehend their objects in all the three times. The intellect cognises the jar in the present, past and future times. The ego is self-conscious of the present, past and future. Similarly, the mind ponders

over the present, past and future. Thus, the internal organs function in all the three times.

Now it is explained, which of the organs apprehend specific objects and which non-specific :—

Kārikā XXXIV

Of these, the five organs of sense apprehend specific and non-specific objects. Speech has sound (alone) for its object. The rest, on the other hand, have five objects.

The organs of sense. They apprehend specific objects (in the case of human beings). The human organs of sense apprehend specific objects, *viz.*, sound, touch, form, taste and smell, endowed with pleasure, pain and delusion. In the case of gods (the organs of sense) manifest non-specific objects.

Again, among the organs of action, *the speech has sound for its object.* The speech of gods as well as of human beings, utters verses and the rest. Therefore, the organ of speech is similar in the case of gods and human beings.

The rest also, viz., with the exclusion of speech, termed as hands, feet, anus and the organs of procreation, *have five for their objects. Pañcaviṣayāṇi* means those which have five, *viz.*, sound and the rest, as their objects. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell are present in the hands. The feet walk over the ground endowed with the five *viz.*, sound and the rest. The anus excretes that which is endowed with the five (sound and the rest). Similarly, the organ of procreation produces pleasure by the semen endowed with the five characteristics (of sound and the rest.)

Kārikā XXXV

Since the intellect along with the internal organs apprehends all the objects, these three (internal) organs are the gate-keepers and the rest are the gates.

Intellect along with the internal organs, i. e., along with ego and mind. *Since apprehends all the objects,* apprehends sound and the rest in all the three times; *therefore, these three (internal) organs are the gate-keepers, and the rest are the gates* ;......the (word) 'organs' is understood in the sentence.

And further :—

Kārikā XXXVI

These (organs which are the) specific modifications of the (three) attributes, (and which are) different from one another, disclose all the objects like a lamp and present them to the intellect for the sake of the Spirit.

All the organs mentioned (above) are *the specific modifications of the attributes.* What is their characteristic? (They) are *like a lamp*; that is, they disclose all the objects like a lamp.

Different from one another, i. e., dissimilar or having different objects. That is, they have (the modifications of) the Attributes as their objects.

Specific modifications of the Attributes, i. e., born of the Attributes.

All for the sake of the Spirit. The organs of sense, the organs of action, ego and mind, having *disclosed* their respective objects, *present them to the intellect i. e.,* place them in the intellect. Because, the Spirit apprehends pleasure and the rest, arising from the objects when they are placed in the intellect.

And also :—

Kārikā XXXVII

As it is the intellect which brings about the entire enjoyment (of objects), so it is again that (very intellect) which discriminates the subtle difference between the Nature and the Spirit.

Entire means the objects of all the organs in all the three times. *Enjoyment* (means) respective enjoyment. *Since*, the intellect along with the internal organs brings about or effects (the enjoyment) through the organs of sense and action of gods, human beings and animals, *so it is again that (very intellect) which discriminates* or distinguishes between the province of the Nature and that of the Spirit; *the difference between the Nature and the Spirit* means diversity.

Subtle means, which cannot be grasped by people who have not practised austerities....This is the Nature, the state of equilibrium of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*; this is intellect, this is ego, these are the five subtle elements, the eleven organs and the five gross elements; this another one is the Spirit different from all these; thus does the intellect explain by complying with which salvation is attained.

It has been mentioned above that (the five organs of sense apprehend) "specific and non-specific objects" (Kār. 34). Next is explained, which are the objects :—

Kārikā XXXVIII

The subtle elements are non-specific, from these five, the five gross elements are produced. The latter are called specific and are tranquil, violent and delusive.

The five subtle elements produced from ego are :— The subtle element of sound, the subtle element of touch, the subtle element of form, the subtle element of taste

and the subtle element of smell. These are called non-specific. They are the objects of the gods (*i. e.*, apprehended only by the gods), have the characteristic of pleasure and are devoid of pain and delusion.

From these five subtle elements, *the five gross elements* termed as earth, water, fire, air and ether are produced. *These are called specific.* From the subtle element of smell, earth ; from the subtle element of taste, water; from the subtle element of touch, wind ; from the subtle element of sound, ether ;...thus these gross elements are produced.

These specific objects are apprehended by men, and are *tranquil*, *i. e.*, have the characteristic of pleasure, *violent*, *i. e.*, have the characteristic of pain, and *delusive i. e.*, produce delusion. Just as the ethereal element is tranquil, *i. e.*, gives pleasure to a man coming out of a closed room ; (and the same becomes violent, *i. e.*, gives pain to a man who is affected by cold, heat, wind and rain);* and the same becomes delusive, *i. e.*, produces delusion in the mind of a man who loses his way in the forest; similarly, wind is tranquil to a person oppressed by heat, violent to a person oppressed by a cold and delusive when mixed with sand and dust. The same may be said of fire and the rest.

The other non-specific objects are :—

Kārikā XXXIX

Subtle (elements) those born of parents and the gross elements are the threefold specific objects. Of these, the subtle are permanent, while those born of parents are perishable.

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* The following line has been left out in the text by mistake :—
" तदेव शीतोष्णवातवर्षाभिभूतस्य दुःखात्मकं घोरं भवति

Subtle, i. e., the subtle elements; composed of which and characterised by *Mahat* and the rest, the subtle bodies always exist and undergo transmigration; they are subtle.

And *those born of parents* which aggregate (*i. e.*, compose) the gross bodies;—they compose the gross body inside the womb by the mixture of the seminal fluids of parents, cohabiting after the menses. That subtle body is then nourished through the umblical chord by the various saps of food and drink taken by the mother.

The body thus commenced by the three specific objects, *viz.*, the subtle elements, those born of parents and the gross elements, becomes furnished with back, stomach, thighs, chest, head and the rest, and is enveloped in six sheaths. It is endowed with blood, flesh, tendons, semen, bones and marrow, and is composed of five gross elements;—ether provides space (for the body), wind provides growth, fire provides cooking, water provides aggregation and earth provides stability. Thus endowed with all the limbs, the body comes out of mother's womb. Thus, *these are the threefold specific objects.*

Now the author states, which (of the specific objects named above) are permanent and which temporary:—The subtle ones called *tanmātrās* are permanent, *i. e.*, lasting, among them. The body commenced by them and impelled by actions (performed in a previous birth), migrates into the species of animals, deer, birds, reptiles and immobile objects; impelled by virtuous actions, it migrates to the regions of Indra and others. Thus, this subtle body migrates till discriminative wisdom is not attained. After achieving this wisdom a wise man leaves the body and attains salvation. Therefore, these subtle specific objects are permanent.

Those born of parents are perishable:—(The elements which are) born of parents perish in this very world.

leaving the subtle body at the time of death. At the time of death, the body born of parents is left behind and its elements are dissolved into the earth and the rest.

Now the author explains the way in which the subtle body migrates:—

Kārikā XL

The subtle (body) Liṅga, formed primevally, unimpeded, permanent, composed of intellect and the rest down to the subtle elements, incapable of enjoyment, migrates and is endowed with dispositions.

When the Universe is uncreated, then at the first creation of the Nature, the subtle body *is formed.*

Moreover, (it is) *unimpeded*; that is, it is not attached to the states of beasts, gods and men. On account of subtlety, it is not impeded anywhere. It migrates or moves, with its gait unimpeded through the mountains and the rest.

Niyatam, *i. e.*, permanent. It migrates till the (descriminative) knowledge is not attained.

That is *composed of Mahat and the rest down to subtle elements. Mahadādi* means which is preceded by *Mahat*,*i.e.*, intellect, ego, mind and the five subtle elements;—down to the subtle, *i. e.*, subtle elements, it migrates or moves through the three worlds like an ant on the body of *S'iva.*

Incapable of enjoyment, i. e., devoid of enjoyment. That subtle body becomes capable of enjoyment, 'because it assumes activity through the aggregation of the external body born of parents.

Endowed with disposition. The dispositions, *viz.*, *Dharma* and the rest, we shall explain hereafter; 'endowed with them' (means) 'affected by them.'

Liṅgam—At the time of dissolution, the Mahat and the rest down to the subtle elements, along with the organs, merge in the Nature; when not migrating they remain intact in Nature till creation; that is, tied down by the bonds of delusion in the Nature, they are incapable of actions of migration and rest. Therefore, the subtle *liṅga* (*i. e.*, mergent) migrates again at the time of creation.

If it be asked,—why do the thirteen organs migrate,—the author replies.—

Kārikā XLI

Just as a picture does not exist without a substrate, or a shadow without a post and the like, so the linga does not subsist supportless, without the non-specific (*i. e.*, subtle body).

Just as a picture does not subsist without a substrate of the wall; just as a shadow does not subsist, *i. e.*, cannot exist without *a post and the like*, *i. e.*, a stake and the like. The word *ādi* comprises (of other illustrations also), *viz.*, just as there can be no coolness without water, or water without coolness; fire without heat; wind without touch; ether without space; earth without smell; similarly, (it is so).

According to this illustration, *without the non-specific*, *i. e.*, without the non-specific subtle elements, (the *liṅga*) does not subsist. Here, the gross elements, *i. e.*, the body formed of five gross elements, are the specific. For, where can tke *liṅga* (the subtle body) exist, if there be specific (*i. e.*, gross body) ? How can it renounce one body and take another ?

Supportless, viz., the supportless *liṅga, i. e.*, the thirteen organs.

For what purpose is the *liṅga* embodied is further explained :—

Kārikā XLII

For the purpose of the Spirit, the liṅga, through its connection with the means and their results, and with the aid of the might of Nature, acts like an actor.

The Nature functions because the aim of the Spirit is to be achieved. That (aim) is twofold:—The apprehension of sound and the rest ; and the attainment of discrimination between the Spirit and the Attributes. The apprehension of sound and the rest is the attainment of enjoyment of sound and the rest in the regions of Brahman and the like. The attainment of discrimination between the Spirit and the Attributes is salvation. Therefore, it is said that this subtle body is active *for the purpose of the Spirit*.

Through its connection with the means and their results. The means are Virtue and the rest, the results are ascending the heaven and so forth;—they will be explained further. *Prasaṅgena* means through its connection.

With the aid of the might of Nature i. e., Pradhāna. Just as a king, being mighty in his kingdom, does whatever he likes, similarly, on account of the supreme authority of Nature over everything (the liṅga) *acts* through its connection with the means and their results. (That is, the Nature) determines (the conditions of) liṅga in assuming the different bodies.

Liṅgam—The subtle body composed of minute particles, *i. e.*, the subtle elements, and endowed with

thirteen-fold organs, acts in the bodies of gods, men and beasts. How?—Like an actor. Just as an actor entering behind the scenes comes out as a god, then as a man, and afterwards as a buffoon, so the subtle body, through its connection with the means and their results, enters the womb and comes out as an elephant, a woman or a man.

It was stated that endowed with dispositions, the *liṅga* migrates; now the author explains the dispositions:—

Kārikā XLIII

The dispositions, *viz.*, virtue and the rest, are connate, natural and acquired. They subsist in the instrument (*i. e.*, intellect). The embryo and the rest subsist in the effect (*i. e.*, the body).

The dispositions are considered to be of three kinds:... Connate, natural and acquired. The connate dispositions are virtue, knowledge, non-attachment and power, and they were born along with the revered Kapila at the first creation. The *natural* ones are described :—Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra were the four sons of Brahman. These dispositions were produced with them, who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age, and whose (disposition) were a result of the relation of cause and effect (*i. e.*, as a result of the merits performed in previous birth); therefore, these dispositions are called natural. The acquired dispositions (are to be found in men) like us, to whom the knowledge comes from the corporeal frame of a teacher; from knowledge, non-attachment is produced; from non-attachment, virtue arises; and from virtue, power is attained. As the corporeal frame of a teacher is a product of Nature, so these dispositions are called acquired.—Endowed with these (dispositions),

the subtle body migrates. These four dispositions are *Sāttvika*; the *Tāmasa* ones are the reverse; they have been explained in —" This is the *Sāttvika* form and the *Tāmasa* is its reverse." (*Kar.* 28). Thus, the dispositions are eight :—Virtue, knowledge, non-attachment, power, vice, ignorance, attachment and absence of power.

Wherein do the eight dispositions subsist ?...*They are seen to subsist in the instrument.* Intellet is the instrument; they subsist in that. This has been explained in : " intellect is determination, virtue, knowledge," etc., (*Kār.* 23).

The *effect* is body, subsisting in that are *embryo and the rest*, which have been referred to before as born of mother. With the union of sperm and ovum, are produced embryo and the rest, *viz.*, bubble, flesh, muscles etc., which cause the growth of the body; and the state of infancy, youth and old age are produced as a result of the saps of food and drink. Therefore, they are called as subsisting in the effect, and are caused by the enjoyment of objects like food and the rest.

Next is explained what has been said before, *viz.*, "Through its connection with the means and their results". (*Kār.* 42).

Kārikā XLIV

Through virtue (comes about) going upwards, and through vice, going downwards; through knowledge salvation (is acquired), and through the reverse (*i. e.*, ignorance) the bondage.

Through virtue going upwards. A man goes upwards through the instrumentality of virtue. Upwards stands for the eight regions *viz.*, of Brahman, of Prajāpati, of Soma, of Indra, of the Gandharvas, of the Yaksas, of the Rāk-

ṣasas and of the Piśācas. There the subtle body goes. For migrating to the bodies of animals, deer, birds, reptiles and immobile objects, the instrument is *vice*.

And again, *through knowledge salvation is acquired*: Salvation is the knowledge of the twenty-five principles. By this instrument (of knowledge), salvation is brought about. Then the subtle body ceases and (the Spirit) is called the Supreme Spirit.

Through the reverse the bondage. Ignorance is the instrument; the effect is the bondage called *prākṛta* (connate), *Vaikṛta* (natural) and *dākṣiṇa* (personal) ; this will be explained further. It is also said—" He who is bound by the connate, natural and personal bondages, is not liberated by anything else (except the knowledge). "

And there are other instruments also :......

Kārikā XLV

Through non-attachment (comes about) the absorption into nature ; through passionate attachment, migration; through power, unimpediment: and through the reverse, its contrary.

Suppose, one is possessed of non-attachment, but has no knowledge of the principles. Then, *through that non-attachment* preceded by ignorance, comes about *the absorption into Nature.* After his death, such a person is absorbed into the eight evolvents *viz.*, the Nature, intellect, ego and the five subtle elements, and gets no liberation. He migrates again.

And, even as regards this *Rājas* (passionate) attachment, *e. g.*, ' I perform the sacrifice, and give gifts so that I may enjoy divine and human happiness in Heaven and on this earth '...*from this passionate attachment, results migration.*

And *through power, unimpediment.* The power is eightfold, and comprises of *aṇimā* and the rest. From the instrumentality of power, results unimpediment, *i. e.*, there is no obstacle to power in the regions of Brahman and the rest.

And lastly, *through the reverse, contrary* : The contrary of that unimpediment, *i. e.*, impediment, results. On account of absence of power, obstacles come in everywhere.

Thus sixteen effects along with their means have been explained. Now, what is their nature, is next explained :—

Kārikā XLVI

This is a creation of intellect, and is distinguished as ignorance, incapacity, contentment and attainment. On account of the conflict among the inequalities of the attributes, this (creation) has fifty varieties.

This sixteen-fold aggregate of the means and effects, which has been explained before, is called *a creation of intellect. Pratyaya* stands for intellect, (which has been explained in)..." Intellect is determination, virtue, knowledge, " etc. (*Kār.* 23).

This creation of intellect is divided into four classes:– *Ignorance, incapacity, contentment, and attainment.* Ignorance is doubt as when a man after seeing a post is in doubt whether it is a post or a man. Incapacity; *e. g.*, even after observing that post well, he cannot remove his doubt. The third is called contentment; *e. g.*, when a person does not want to know or to be in doubt about the same post, thinking, what have I to do with this. The fourth is called attainment; *e. g.*, when a person with delighted senses,

sees that post surmounted by a creeper or a bird, he attains (the knowledge) that it is a post.

Thus, *on account of the conflict among the inequalities of the Attributes*, there are *fifty varieties of that* creation of intellect. This conflict endowed with (*i. e.*, among) the inequalities of *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*—from this, there arise fifty varieties of intellect. Somewhere *Sattva* predominates and *Rajas* and *Tamas* are subordinate, somewhere *Rajas* predominates and somewhere *Tamas*.

The varieties are described :—

Kārikā XLVII

Five are the varieties of ignorance; due to defect in organs, there are twenty-eight varieties of incapacity; contentment is of nine kinds and attainment is eight-fold.

Five varieties of ignorance, are *Tamas* (obscurity), *Moha* (delusion), *Mahāmoha* (extreme delusion), *Tāmisra* (gloom) and *Andkatāmisra* (utter darkness). Their varieties will be presently explained.

Of the incapacity there are *twenty-eight varieties, due to* defect in organs. They also will be explained.

Contentment is of nine kinds, viz., the kinds of knowledge characterised hy *Rajas* in an ascetic.

Attainment is eight-fold, viz., the kinds of knowledge characterised by *Sattva* in an ascetic. All this will be explained in order.

Now the varieties of ignorance are described :—

Kārikā XLVIII

The varieties of obscurity and delusion are eight, extreme delusion is of ten kinds, gloom and utter darkness are eighteen-fold.

Obscurity is of eight kinds. Final dissolution is differentiated by ignorance. A man merges into the eight evolvents, viz., the Nature, intellect, ego and the five subtle elements. When merged in these if he thinks, 'I am liberated' (then) this is called (the variety of) obscurity.

The varieties of the eight-fold delusion are also eight. The gods like Indra and the rest do not obtain liberation on account of attachment to eight-fold power; but after the destruction of this (power) they again migrate. This is eight-fold delusion.

The extreme delusion is of ten kinds. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell,—these five are the objects of enjoyment for the gods; these five, *viz.*, sound and the rest, are the objects of enjoyment for men also. Thus extreme delusion arises with regard to these ten.

The gloom is eighteen-fold. Eight-fold power and the ten objects of human and divine enjoyment,—they make up eighteen. When people approve of their increase and disapprove of their decrease, then arise the states of eighteen-fold gloom.

Again, as the eight-fold power and the ten-fold human and divine objects go to make up gloom, similarly the *utter darkness is also eighteen-fold.* But (the difference is that) when a person dies at the moment of enjoying the abundance of sensual pleasures or falls from the eight-fold power, then profound grief comes to him. This is utter gloom. Thus the five varieties of ignorance, *viz.*, obscurity and the rest, are severally divided and go to make up the sixty-two varieties.

The varieties of incapacity are explained :—

Kārikā XLIX

Injuries of the eleven organs along with those of intellect are termed as incapacity. The seventeen injuries of intellect result from the inversion of contentment and attainment.

"There are twenty-eight varieties of incapacity due to the defect of organs,"—this has been said above (in Kār. 47). The *injuries of the eleven organs* are—deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness mutilation (of arm), lameness, constipation, impotence and insanity.

Along with those of intellect are termed as incapacity. Along with the injuries of intellect, the varieties of incapacity are twenty-eight.

Seventeen are the injuries of intellect. These seventeen injuries result from the inversion of contentment and attainment. The varieties of contentment are nine, and those of attainment are eight; along with the inversion of these, the injuries of the eleven organs go to make up the twenty-eight-fold incapacity.

The order of the varieties is to be observed as laid down in, "From the inversion of contentment and attainment." (Kār. 49). The nine-fold contentment is now described :—

Kārikā L

Contentment is said to be of nine kinds ; four internal, *viz.*, prakṛti (Nature), upādāna (Means), kāla (Time), and bhāgya (Luck) and five external, *viz.*, those due to aversion from the objects of senses.

There are four kinds of internal contentment. The word *adhyātma* means residing in the self. They are Nature,-Means, Time and Luck. Now, what is termed as

Nature (is explained):—for example, a man knows about the Nature and about its having the Attributes or otherwise ; if he remains content with the knowledge of the Nature and its effects, then he cannot get liberation: this is called the Nature-contentment. That what is called the Means (is explained);—*e. g.*, when a man without understanding the (twenty-five) principles, gets hold of the means (of asceticism) and thinks that salvation is attained by a triple staff, a pot and *vividikā* (?) then he also does not obtain liberation; this is called the Means-contentment. Now the Time-contentment (is explained); *e. g.*, (when a man thinks), well, I shall get salvation in time ; what is the use of practising (the knowledge of) the principles—; such contentment is called Time-contentment and such a person gets no liberation. Similarly, the Luck-contentment is :—when a person thinks that salvation will be attained by luck ; this is Luck-contentment. Thus, (this) contentment is four-fold.

The five external, due to aversion from the objects of senses. The external contentment arises from the aversion to the five objects of senses. A person feels aversion to sound, touch, form, taste and smell, seeing that these have the evils of acquiring, protecting, waste, attachment and injury. For one's prosperity, one should pasture the cattle, engage in trade, accept gifts and engage in service—; these are the troubles of acquiring. There is trouble in protecting the acquired objects. Things become wasted by enjoyment ; this is the trouble of waste. The senses can never have any cessation from attachment to sensual pleasures; this is the evil of attachment. There can be no enjoyment without causing injury to the living beings ; this is the evil of injury. Thus, aversion from five objects of senses, resulting from seeing the evils of acquiring and the rest, is five-fold (external) contentment.

Thus there are *nine kinds of contentment* according to internal and external varieties. In other works they are named as *Ambhas*, *Salila*, *Ogha*, *Vṛṣṭi*, *Sutamas*, *Pāra*, *Sunetra*, *Nārīka* and *Anuttamāmbhasika*. From the inversion of these kinds of contentment, constituting the varieties of incapacity, the injuries of intellect arise. By such inversion the injuries of intellect are called:—*Anambhas*, *Asalila*, *Anogha* and so on.

Now Attainment is defined:—

Kārikā LI

The eight Attainments are reasoning, oral instruction, study, the three-fold suppression of misery, intercourse of friends and gifts. Those mentioned before (ignorance, incapacity and contentment) are the three-fold curb on attainments.

Reasoning; *e. g.*, somebody might daily reason: What is true here? What is the future? What is the highest good? By doing what can I attain my goal?—While pondering like that he attains the knowledge that the Spirit is quite distinct from the Nature; intellect is quite distinct; ego is quite different; the subtle elements, the organs and the five gross elements are quite different. Such knowledge of the principles arises, from which salvation is attained. This is the first Attainment termed as *Reasoning*.

From the knowledge obtained by oral instruction proceeds the knowledge about the Nature, Spirit, intellect, ego, the subtle elements, the organs and the five gross elements. Thence arises salvation. This is the Attainment known as *Oral Instruction*.

From *Study*, *i. e.*, the study of the scriptures like the Vedas and the rest, one attains the knowledge of the

twenty-five principles and afterwards salvation. This is the third Attainment.

The three-fold suppression of misery. In order to destroy the internal, external and divine miseries, when a person goes to a teacher, and after getting instruction from him gets salvation;–then this constitutes the fourth Attainment. This should be split up into three, on account of the three-foldness of misery. Thus, (they make up) six Attainments

And *intercourse of the friends*; *e. g.*, a person attains salvation through the knowledge (got) from a friend. This is the seventh Attainment.

Gifts. For example, a person helps the holy men by making gifts of dwelling, medicine, triple staff, bowl, food, clothes and the rest to them; he gets knowledge from them and attains salvation. This is the eighth Attainment.

In other treatises these eight Attainments are termed as :—*Tāra*, *Sutāra*, *Tāratāra*, *Pramoda*, *Pramudita*, *Pramodamāna*, *Ramyaka* and *Sadāpramudita*. The injuries of intellect arising from the inversion of these (Attainments) are included under *Incapacity*. They are *Atāra*, *Asutāra*, *Atāratāra* and so on.

The varieties of Incapacity have been mentioned to be twenty-eight. They are the injuries of intellect along with the eleven injuries of organs. The injuries of intellect are seventeen in number, *viz.*, nine contraries of Contentment and eight contraries of Attainment. Along with these, the injuries of organs make up the twenty-eight varieties of Incapacity mentioned before. Thus the varieties of Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment have been stated and explained.

Again, *those mentioned before are the three-fold curb on Attainment.* Ignorance, Incapacity and Contentment, which are (mentioned) before Attainment (in Kār. 46), are

the curb and are three-fold on account of their being of three sorts. Just as an elephant is curbed by a man with a goad in his hand, so people curbed by Ignorance, Incapacity and Contentment suffer from ignorance. Therefore, leaving aside these, Attainment (alone) should be pursued. A person endowed with Attainment, acquires knowledge and thence salvation.

It was stated: "The subtle body is endowed with dispositions," (Kār. 40); the eight dispositions, *viz.*, Virtue and the rest, which are the modifications of intellect and which are again modified as Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, have been described. This is the creation of intellect known as "dispositions". "*Linga*" has also been mentioned as the creation of the subtle elements ending with the fourteen kinds of created beings. Now, when the aim of the Spirit can be attained by one sort of creation only, where is the necessity of both kinds of creations?—This is explained:—

Kārikā LII

There can be no Liṅga without dispositions, nor elaboration of dispositions without Liṅga. Therefore, proceeds the two-fold creation, *viz.*, that of Liṅga and that of dispositions.

Without dispositions,—the creation of intellect—, there can be no *liṅga*—the creation of the subtle elements. Because every successive body is acquired by the impressions of the actions performed in previous birth.

Without liṅga—the creation of intellect,— *there can be no elaboration of dispositions*; because, Virtue and the rest can be acquired by the (formation of) subtle and gross bodies. The mutual dependence of these two, like that of seed and sprout, is not a fault, because the creation is

beginningless; and although the different species stand in need (of mutual dependence), the different individuals do not. Therefore, *two-fold creation proceeds, namely, that of Liṅga and that of dispositions.*

Moreover:—

Kārikā LIII

The divine class has eight varieties, the sub-human has five and the human has one (only). Such, in brief, is this creation.

The *divine* is of eight varieties, *viz., Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Saumya, Aindra, Gāndharva, Yākṣa, Rākṣasa* and *Pais'āca.* Animals, deer, birds, reptiles and immobile beings,—this is the five-fold *sub-human* (variety). There is only one *human* race. These are the fourteen varieties of living beings.

The three Attributes pervade all the three worlds. Now it is explained :—what is supreme in which world:—

Kārikā LIV

Above, there is predominence of Sattva: below, the creation abounds in Tamas; in the midst, the Rajas predominates; (this is so) from Brahman down to stock.

Above; *i. e.*, in the eight regions of gods, (the creation) is *sattvavis'āla, i. e.*, has prevalence of *Sattva*; (in other words), has excessiveness or predominence of *Sattva.* (Of course), *Rajas* and *Tamas* also reside there.

Below (the creation) *abounds in Tamas.* From animals down to immobile beings, the entire creation is pervaded

by *Tamas* in excess. (Of course), even there *Sattva* and *Rajas* are present.

In the midst, i. e., in human creation, *Rajas* is strong. Even here, *Sattva* and *Tamas* are present. Therefore, human beings are mostly in pain.

Thus, *from Brahman down to stock, i. e.*, from Brahman down to immobile beings. Thus, non-elemental creation, creation of the subtle elements, creation of dispositions, creation of the gross elements and the divine, sub-human and human creations are the sixteen varieties of creation produced by the Nature.

Kārikā LV

There, the intelligent Spirit experiences pain due to old age and death, till the cessation of the Liṅga; hence misery is of the nature of things.

There, i. e., in the divine, sub-human and human bodies; *misery* produced by *old age* and produced *by death*, is experienced by the intelligent Spirit, and not by the Nature, or intellect, or ego, or the subtle elements, or the organs, or the gross elements.

Now, (the author) discusses—How long does the Spirit suffer from misery? *Till the cessation of the liṅga*. As long as the *Mahat* and the rest, which manifest themselves after entering the subtle body, do not cease, *i. e.*, (as long as) this migratory body (does not cease), so long, in brief, does the Spirit experience pain due to old age and death in the three worlds. *Till the cessation of liṅga* (means), till the subtle body has ceased to be. After the cessation of the subtle body there is salvation; after the attainment of salvation there is no misery. By what is it (the subtle body) removed? By the attainment of the

knowledge of twenty-five principles in the shape of the distinctness of the Nature from the Spirit. By such knowledge, *i. e.*, this is Nature, this is intellect, this is ego, these are the five gross elements, different and distinct from which is the Spirit,—the subtle body ceases to be, and then the salvation is attained.

Next is explained the purpose of Nature's activity or effort :—

Kārikā LVI

Thus, this effort in the activity of the Nature, beginning from Mahat down to the gross elements, is for the liberation of each Spirit ; (and although) it is for another's benefit (yet) it seems as if it were for itself.

The phrase *ityeṣaḥ* (this one), implies 'finishing' and 'pointing out'. *Prakṛtikṛtau* means, in the instrumentality or the activity of the Nature. This effort, *beginning from Mahat down to the gross elements*—from Nature intellect, from intellect ego; from ego the subtle elements and eleven organs ; from the subtle elements the five gross elements; *this one.*—

(Is) *for the liberation of each Spirit i. e.*, for every Spirit which has assumed divine, sub-human or human forms ; for the liberation (of these Spirits) is the effort (of the Nature).

How ?—(*Although*) *this effort is for another's benefit,* (*yet*) *it seems as if it were for itself.* The Nature behaves like that man who forsakes his own business and performs that of his friend. The Spirit in no way does any good to Nature in return. It is, *as if it were for itself,* not actually for itself *i. e.*, for another's benefit. The benefit

is the acquisition of the objects of senses like sound and rest, and the comprehension of distinctness between the Attributes (*i. e.*, Nature) and the Spirit. The effort of the Nature is for this purpose.—In all the three worlds, the Spirits are to be supplied with the objects of senses like sound and the rest, and at the end (the Spirits are to be provided) with salvation. As it is said : " The Nature is like a jar and having fulfilled the purpose of the Spirit, it ceases."

It may be argued that the Nature is non-intelligent and the Spirit is ignorant. Then, how can the Nature act like an intelligent principle, thinking, ' I should supply the Spirit with the objects of senses like sound and the rest in all the three worlds, and (should) provide (the Spirit) with liberation at the end '? True, (we reply). Because activity and cessation (from activity) have been observed in the case of non-intelligent things also; therefore, says the author, (the Nature acts):—

Kārikā LVII

As non-intelligent milk functions for the nourishment of calf, so does the Nature function for the liberation of the Spirit.

Just as grass and the like consumed by a cow and modified as milk nourish the calf and after its nourishment cease, so does the Nature (function) *for the liberation of the Spirit.* Thus, there is activity in the non-intelligent (Nature).

Moreover,

Kārikā LVIII

As people engage in action for relieving desires, so does the Unmanifest for liberating the Spirit.

As people having some favourite desire, *for relieving that desire, engage in action, i. e.*, the activity in the shape of going and coming, and after its accomplishment desist, so, *for liberating the Spirit*, the Nature ceases to function after having effected the purpose of the Spirit which is two-fold, *viz.*, one, the enjoyment of the objects of senses like sound and the rest; and the other, the knowledge of the distinctness of the Attributes (*i. e.*, the Nature) from the Spirit.

And again,

Kārikā LIX

As a dancer desists from dancing after showing herself to the audience, so the Nature desists after showing itself to the Spirit.

As a dancer, having exhibited to the audience the episodes which are set to music in the form of songs, and which are full of the sentiments of love and the like, by means of her graceful movements, desists from dancing after discharging her duty, so also does the Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit in the different characters of intellect, ego, the subtle elements and the gross elements desist.

Next is explained—How and what is the cause of the cessation of (the activity of) Nature :—

Kārikā LX

Generous Nature, endowed with the Attributes, without any benefit to itself, causes by manifold means the benefit of the Spirit which is devoid of the Attributes and which confers no benefit in return.

By manifold means does the Nature *benefit the Spirit*' which *Spirit confers no benefit in return.* In what way (does the Nature benefit)?—By transforming itself into divine, sub-human and human forms; (by transforming itself) into pleasure, pain and delusion, and by (transforming itself) into the objects of senses in the shape of sound and the rest.

In this way, having exhibited itself (to the Spirit) by manifold means,—' ' I am one; thou art another'—, the Nature desists. Thus, *it causes the benefit of* the eternal *Spirit without any benefit to itself.* Just as a generous person does good to all and wants no good in return, so does the Nature effect the purpose of the Spirit, without any return.

It was said above (under Kār. 59):—" The Nature desists after exhibiting itselt." Next is explained what it does after having desisted :—

Kārikā LXI

Nothing in my opinion is more modest than Nature, who because (of thinking that) " I have been seen ", never again exposes itself to the view of the Spirit.

In this world, *nothing is more modest than Nature,—such is my opinion.* Because, such an idea (to be stated below), arose for another (*i. e.*, the Spirit). Why? " I have been seen by this Spirit", thinking so, the Nature *never exposes itself to the view of the Spirit, i. e.*, becomes invisible to the

Spirit. Now the characteristic of being more modest is explained. Some advocate God to be the cause :—

"The ignorant being is helpless with regard to his pleasure and pain. He goes to heaven or hell, as impelled by God." (Mbh. III, 30. 88).

Others who advocate Spontaneity as the cause, say:—

"Who whitened the swans? Who made the peacocks variegated?" (The reply is), the Spontaneity alone. Here, the teachers of Sāṁkhya say in this connection :— How can the beings endowed with the Attributes be created by God who is Attributeless? Or, how even by the Attributeless Spirit? Therefore, (the causality) of the Nature is proper. Just as from white yarn, only white cloth is produced and from black yarn, only black cloth, so it is inferred that the three worlds endowed with the three Attributes, proceed from the Nature endowed with the three Attributes. God is Attributeless; therefore, production of this world endowed with the three Attributes is illogical from Him. This explains (away also the possibility of) the Spirit (being regarded as a cause). Some regard Time as the cause; it is said :—

"Time rears (lit. cooks) the beings; Time withdraws the world; Time is awake while the others sleep: Time is not to be surpassed."

(To this we reply)—There are (only) three categories, *viz.*, the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. Time also is included under (one of) them. Time is Manifest. (And as) the Nature is the producer of all, (so) it must be the cause of Time also. Spontaneity is also included here. Therefore, neither Spontaneity nor Time is the cause; the Nature alone is the cause and there is no other cause of the Nature.

Does not again come within the view of the Spirit. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no other cause, like

Iśvara and the rest which may be more modest, more-enjoyable than the Nature.

But if it be urged that it is a practice in this world to say that the Spirit is liberated, the Spirit migrates.— To this the author replies:—

Kārikā LXII

Therefore, not any (Spirit) is bound or liberated, nor (does any) migrate. It is the Nature, abiding in manifold forms, that migrates or is bound or liberated.

For this reason, *the Spirit is not bound or liberated, nor does it migrate*; because, it is the *Nature* alone, *abiding manifold forms, i. e.*, abiding in divine, human and sub-human forms, *which is bound or liberated or migrates* in the forms of intellect, ego, the subtle elements, the organs and the gross elements.

If the Spirit is spontaneously liberated and is all-pervading, then why does it migrate? The migration is for the purpose of acquiring that which is not previously attained. (To this the reply is)—The phrases, 'the Spirit is bound', 'the Spirit is liberated', 'the Spirit migrates', are used because (the nature of) migration is not (properly) understood (by people). By discriminating between the Spirit and the Nature, the real character of the Spirit is manifested. After its manifestation, the Spirit becomes single, liberated and established in its own nature.

Well, if the Spirit is not bound, then it is not even liberated. To this we reply:—It is the Nature alone which binds or liberates itself. For, wherever, the subtle body, endowed with the subtle elements and the three-fold internal organs, exists, such body is bound by triple bondage. As it has already been said:—(under Kār. 44)—

" He who is bound by the connate, natural and personal bondages is not liberated by anything else (except knowledge) ".

And that subtle body is endowed with Virtue and Vice.

How is it that the Nature is bound, the Nature is liberated and the Nature migrates?—It is replied:—

Kārikā LXIII

The Nature binds itself by itself through seven forms alone: the same (Nature), for the purpose of the Spirit, liberates itself through one form.

Through seven forms alone. These seven (forms) are:—Virtue, Non-attachment, Power, Vice, Ignorance, Attachment and Absence of Power: these are the seven forms of the Nature. Through these the Nature binds itself by itself. The same Nature (thinking), that the purpose of the Spirit is to be accomplished, *liberates* itself through one form of knowledge.

How is that knowledge produced ?—(It is replied):—

Kārikā LXIV

By practising the principles thus, there arises the knowledge, *viz.*, 'I am not, naught is mine, there is no Ego', which is complete, absolute and pure, because there remains no doubt.

Thus, in the way described above, *by practising* the meditation of twenty-five principles, *viz.*, 'this is Nature; this is Spirit; these are the five subtle elements, the organs and the gross elements', there arises this knowledge in the Spirit:—*I am not, i. e.*, I do not exist; *naught is mine, i. e.*,

this body is not mine, for I am one thing and the body another; *there is no ego, which is complete, i. e.*, I am exempt from ego ; which knowledge is complete.

Pure, because there remains no doubt. Viparyaya means doubt. *Aviparayayāt, i. e.*, because there remains no doubt, it (knowledge) is pure. *Absolute, i. e.*, only this (knowledge) is the cause of salvation and no other. There *arises i. e.*, is manifested, the *knowledge, viz.*, the knowledge of twenty-five principles in the Spirit.

What does the Spirit do after obtaining this knowledge ? :—

Kārikā LXV

By this knowledge, the Spirit, seated composed like a spectator, perceives the Nature which has ceased to be productive and, consequently, which has now reverted from seven forms.

By *this* pure and absolute knowledge, *the Spirit perceives the Nature, prekṣakavat, i. e.*, like a spectator, *seated composed*; as a spectator of play perceives an actress from his own seat. *Composed*, who stays in self, *i. e.*, seated in his own place.

What kind of Nature?—*Which has ceased to be productive, i. e.*, which has ceased (to produce) the effects in the shape of intellect, ego (and the rest). *Consequently, which has now reverted from seven forms.* Because, it has fulfilled both the purposes (of enjoyment and release) of the Spirit. The Spirit perceives the Nature which has reverted from the seven forms,—the seven forms of Virtue and the rest by which the Nature binds itself.

Kārikā LXVI

One (the Spirit) is indifferent like a spectator in play; one (the Nature) desists, (saying) that I have been seen. (Now), in spite of their contact, there is no motive for creation.

Raṅgastha, etc., Like a spectator in a play, the one, absolute and pure Spirit is *indifferent*. 'I have been seen by it (the Spirit)', thinking like that desists the one, *i. e.*, the Nature, which is the sole and the chief cause of all the three worlds. There is no second Nature, because, if there be another form, then it will be a variety of genus

Although, the Spirit and Nature both desist thus, and on account of their omnipresence there is contact (between the two), yet there is no creation resulting from that contact. *In spite of their contact, i. e.*, on account of the omnipresence of Spirit and Nature, though there is contact between them, *there is no motive for creation*, for creation has served its purpose. There are two motives for creation : (i) the apprehension of the objects of senses, like sound and the rest, and (ii) the apprehension of discrimination between the Attributes and the Spirit. When creation has served both the purposes, there is no motive for it, *i. e.* for further creation. As the contact between a debtor and a creditor is for receiving loan; after the payment of debt, in spite of contact between them, there is no money transaction, similarly, the Spirit and the Nature also have no more purpose (*i. e.* transaction).

(One may ask)—If after the production of knowledge, a man attains salvation, then why do *I* not attain it ?—To this it is replied :—

Kārikā LXVII

(Although) by the attainment of perfect knowledge, Virtue, and the rest cease to be producers, (yet) because of past impressions, the Spirit remains invested with a body like a potter's wheel with a whirl.

Though the perfect knowledge of twenty-five principles is attained, yet, *because of past impressions*, a yogin *remains invested with a body* ; *how? Like the whirl of a wheel.* As a potter, having set his wheel in motion, makes a pot by putting clay on the wheel; after making the pot he forsakes the wheel, but the wheel continues to turn round on account of the past momentum.

Thus, *by the attainment of perfect knowledge, i. e.*, in the case of a man in whom perfect knowledge is produced *Virtue and the rest cease to be producers.* That is, these seven forms of bondage are burnt (destroyed) by perfect knowledge. And as seeds burnt by fire cannot germinate, so these forms of bondage in the form of Virtue and the rest are incapable (of producing bondage). When Virtue and the rest cease to be producers then, because of past impressions, the Spirit remains invested with a body. Why does not the knowledge destroy Virtue and Vice of the present (birth) ?—Because, they are present. Of course, the next moment they are destroyed. Knowledge destroys all the future actions, as well as those which are done by the present body, by engaging in actions prescribed (by the Scriptures). After the exhaustion of the (previous) impressions, the body perishes and salvation results.

Of what nature is that salvation ?—This is now explained.

Kārikā LXVIII

After obtaining separation from body and after the cessation of the Nature, (the Spirit) acquires the salvation which is both certain and final.

On account of the destruction of all the impulses generated by Virtue and Vice, *after obtaining separation from body and after the cessation of the Nature*, (the Spirit acquires salvation); then *certain*, *i. e.*, absolute and *final*, *i. e.*, unobstructed *salvation*, liberation due to singleness, *both*, *viz.*, certain and final salvation, *acquires* (the Spirit).

Kārikā LXIX

This abstruse knowledge of the aim of the Spirit, wherein the existence, origin and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage (Kapila).

The aim of the Spirit is salvation; for that purpose, *this abstruse i. e.*, secret (knowledge) *has been expounded*, *i. e.*, fully explained, by the *great sage*, *viz.*, the sage Kapila. *Wherein*, *i. e.*, in which knowledge, *are considered*, *i. e.*, discussed, *the existence, origin and dissolution*, *i. e.*, the being, appearance and disappearance of *the beings*, *i. e.*, the products (of Nature). From meditation upon which there arises the perfect knowledge about the twenty-five principles.

" Sāṁkhya, the cause of liberation from transmigration, has been expounded by the sage Kapila; in which there are seventy verses and the Bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda."

Kārikā A

This sacred and supreme (knowledge), the sage (Kapila) gave to Āsuri out of compassion. Āsuri also (gave it) to Pañcas'ikha. who elaborated the doctrine.

Kārikā Ā

Handed down by tradition of disciples, this was summarised in Ārya verses by Īs'varakṛṣṇa of noble mind, having fully understood the demonstrated truth.

Kārikā I

The topics of these seventy verses are those of the entire Ṣaṣṭitantra; they are devoid of anecdotes and also omit discussions of rival views.

SĀṀKHYA KĀKIKĀ

NOTES

I

About the sons of ब्रह्मा, कपिल, आसुरि, पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरकृष्ण see Introduction. The quotation ' पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञः, ' etc., is taken from पञ्चशिख; see Introduction.

आधिभौतिक. The word भूत stands for living beings, according to चन्द्रिका.

आधिदैविक, according to गौड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानामिदं दैवं, Davies remarks—" But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gṛitsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (*daivya*). " (p. 15).

The reading adopted by गौड०, *viz.*, तदभिघातके is more expressive of the सांख्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तदपघातके of वाच० (See, S. N. S., 1, 1n.). cf. तत्र त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः (सां. सू. १. १). The reading of जय० *viz.*, तदवघातके does not materially differ from तदपघातके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6–7; Davies, pp. 13–14, note on this reading.

विष्णुपुराण describes the three दुःखs in the following verses :

अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा ।
शारीरो बहुभिर्भेदैर्भिद्यते श्रूयतां च सः ॥ २ ॥
शिरोरोगप्रतिश्यायज्वरशूलभगन्दरैः ।
गुल्मार्शःश्वयथुश्वासछर्द्यादिभिरनेकधा ॥ ३ ॥
तथाक्षिरोगातीसारकुष्ठांगामयसंज्ञितैः ।
भिद्यते देहजस्तापो मानसं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥ ४ ॥

कामक्रोधभयद्वेषलोभमोहविषादजः ।
शोकासूयावमानेर्ष्यामात्सर्यादिमयस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥
मानसोऽपि द्विजश्रेष्ठ तापो भवति नैकधा ।
इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो ह्याध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥
मृगपक्षिमनुष्याद्यैः पिशाचोरगराक्षसैः ।
सरीसृपाद्यैश्च नृणां जायते चाधिभौतिकः ॥ ७ ॥
शीतवातोष्णवर्षाम्बुवैद्युतादिसमुद्भवः ।
तापो द्विजवरश्रेष्ठैः कथ्यते चाधिदैविकः ॥ ८ ॥ (६. ५)

II

अपाम सोममस्मृता अभूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, माठर and जय०
माठर reads तृणवत् (perhaps a mistake) in place of कृणवत्. Following are the principal points of difference:—

कृणवत्	=	कर्ता	according to	गौड०.
(तृणवत्)	=	„	„	„ माठर.
कृणवत्	=	मृत्युः	„	„ जय०.
अराति	=	शत्रुः	„	„ गौड०.
„	=	शत्रुः = मृत्युः	„	„ माठर.
„	=	व्याधिः	„	„ जय०.

According to Principal V. Bhattacharya of Santiniketan (in a letter to me), the reading अमृतमर्त्यस्य, which is common to all the commentators, cannot be accepted; for the accent on the word अमृत shows that it is a vocative case and should, therefore, be written separately from मर्त्यस्य. Moreover, जय०'s interpretation of कृणवत् = मृत्यु cannot be accepted, as this word never means मृत्यु.

According to the editor of माठरवृत्ति (Chow. S. S., No. 296, p. 2), ' षट् शतानि नियुज्यन्ते ' etc., is quoted in the भाष्य of महीधर on the last verse of the 24th chapter of यजुर्वेदसंहिता, the second line of the verse there being—'अश्वमेधस्य यज्ञस्य नवभिश्चाधिकानि च । '

With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—

श्रुतं च दृष्टवद्दुष्टं स्पर्धासूयात्ययव्ययैः ।
बह्वन्तरायकामत्वात् कृषिवच्चापि निष्फलम् ॥ (११.१०.२१)
एवं लोकं परं विद्यान्नश्वरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।
सतुल्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनाम् ॥ (११.३.२०)

The reconciliation of वैदिकी हिंसा with the श्रुति text—मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, 1n. ; Sovani, p. 400). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24–36).

The order of व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सां. सू. —स्थूलात् पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य (१. ६२); बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य (१. ६३); तेनाहङ्कारस्य (१. ६४); ततः प्रकृतेः (१. ६५); and संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य (१. ६६).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्यक्त. Some call the महाभूतs as व्यक्त, wkileas, the author of कारिकाs seems to regard everything व्यक्त (and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य), except the प्रधान and पुरुष. वाच० agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says —सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्तत्त्व etc., by the word आदि (See बालराम p. 16 1n.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to वंशीधर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and पुरुष. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगग्रहः । प्रकृतिपुरुषतत्संयोगा नित्यानुमेया इत्युक्तेः (वंशीधर, p. 183) 1 See Sovani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.

III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāṁkhyas (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. " Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सत्यजन्य इत्यर्थः । आद्यविशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिरासः, द्वितीयेनेन्द्रियसामान्यादिनिरासः। Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पुरुष as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहङ्कार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the 'base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—" If at all there exists *Something Real* as opposed to *ideal*, then that *Something Real* must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिन्, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहङ्कार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (शुद्धब्रह्म),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी–बौद्ध also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांख्यवादिन्

does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः (सां सू. १. ४२.).

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, *viz.*, प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recognised by other schools. The चार्वाक materialist recognises only प्रत्यक्ष, the जैन and वैशेषिक schools recognise प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the माध्वs also recognise only two प्रमाणs, but they are प्रत्यक्ष and शब्द according to them. The followers of रामानुज, the जरन्नैयायिकs, and the सांख्य and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द. The oldest and the most modern नैयायिकs and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school add अर्थापत्ति as the fifth. The मीमांसकs of कुमारिलभट्ट school and the अद्वैतवेदान्तिन्s recognise one more, *viz.*, अनुपलब्धि or अभाव. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the पौराणिकs who add संभव and ऐतिह्य to the list. Some तान्त्रिकs recognise चेष्टा also in addition to the above; others add प्रतिभा to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कारिका, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

   वाच॰ splits it up into प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द;
   माठर regards it to be अनुमान;
   जय॰ includes it under अनुमान and शब्द;
   गौड॰ includes it under शब्द;
   and चन्द्रिका under अनुमान.

2. अर्थापत्ति—

   All the commentators include it under अनुमान.

3. अभाव—

वाच॰ and जय॰ regard it as प्रत्यक्ष;
माठर includes it under अनुमान. Although गौड॰'s remark—सम्भवाभावप्रतिभैतिह्योपमाश्चाप्तवचने, suggests its inclusion under शब्द, yet another remark of his, *viz.*, शुष्कधान्यदर्शनाद्वृष्टेरभावो गम्यते, would lead us to infer that he will have it under अनुमान;
चन्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्यक्ष, and, therefore, no independent प्रमाण.

4. संभव—

वाच॰, जय॰ and माठर include it under अनुमान;
गौड॰ and चन्द्रिका include it under शब्द.

5. ऐतिह्य—

वाच॰ opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is शब्द, otherwise it is no प्रमाण;
गौड॰ and चन्द्रिका also include it under शब्द:
माठर includes it under अनुमान.

6. प्रतिभा—

वाच॰ and चन्द्रिका do not mention it;
जय॰ includes it under प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, when it is correct, otherwise it is no प्रमाण; माठर includes it under अनुमान; and गौड॰ includes it under शब्द.

7. चेष्टा—

Noticed only by चन्द्रिका and माठर, and included under अनुमान.

Wilson is right in remarking that although the मीमांसकs do recognise six प्रमाणs, yet गौड॰'s remark that they are अर्थापत्ति, संभव, अभाव, प्रतिभा, ऐतिह्य and उपमान, is not correct; for संभव, ऐतिह्य and प्रतिभा are nowhere recognised as प्रमाणs by the मीमांसकs; rather, "the author of शास्त्रदीपिका excludes expressly संभव, प्रतिभा and ऐतिह्य from the character of proofs." (p. 28). जैमिनि nowhere mentions the प्रमाणs, but the six प्रमाणs (*viz.*, प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, शब्द, उपमान, अर्थापत्ति and अभाव) are discussed by शबरस्वामिन् in his भाष्य on मीमांसासूत्र I. 1. 5. प्रभाकर does not recognise अभाव, but कुमारिल does.

प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच० says—बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit ? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्रs—'द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः' (II. 20) and 'चितेरप्रतिसंक्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम्' (IV. 22).

V

Following the न्यायसूत्र—तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । (1, 1, 5), वाच० first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification :

- अनुमान
  - वीत
    - पूर्ववत्
    - सामान्यतोदृष्ट
  - अवीत or शेषवत्

The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वात्स्यायन himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (*a*) पूर्ववत्—*A priori* or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(*b*) शेषवत्—*A posteriori*, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.

(*c*) सामान्यतोदृष्ट—*Commonly seen*, or based on Analogy,— *e. g.*, we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (*a*) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(*b*) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः परिशेषः). The question is—, under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(*c*) सामान्यतोदृष्ट—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or *Commonness*, we transfer the व्याप्ति from the *perceived* to the *unperceived* instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are *qualities*. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वात्स्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC., Poona, pp. 251–280.

वाच० agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But अवीत or शेषवत् according to वाच०, is a negative reasoning. वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, *viz.* शब्द is a गुण, is rejected by

वाच० in his तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतसीरीज). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. The inference of शब्द being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु ; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषगुणs cannot be the qualities of दिशा, काल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्यs are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the nineth द्रव्य, *viz.*, आत्मन्. So there being no सपक्ष of आत्मन् it is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. जय० and गौड० agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यायन. गौड० and माठर explain शेषवत् differently —समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति (गौड०) ॥.

लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्—वाच० would read one more लिङ्गि *i. e.* लिङ्गलिङ्गिलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्. गौड० has a curious explanation to offer—तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी अनुमीयते, यथा दण्डेन यतिः। लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा दृष्ट्वा यतिं, अस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति । जय० agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्धs which ought to exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गिन्. They are—

(1) स्वस्वामिभाव	as	between	राजा	and	पुरुष.
(2) प्रकृतिविकार	,,	,,	यव	,,	सक्तु.
(3) कार्यकारणभाव	,,	,,	धेनु	,,	वत्स.
(4) पात्रपात्रिक	,,	,,	परिव्राट्	,,	त्रिविष्टब्ध.
(5) साहचर्य	,,	,,	चक्रवाक	,,	चक्रवाकी.
(6) प्रतिद्वन्द्वि	,,	,,	शीत	,,	उष्ण.
(7) निमित्तनैमित्तिक	,,	,,	भोज्य	,,	भोजक.

As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the वैशेषिक school do not recognise शब्द as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच० says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वह्नि. वाक्यार्थ, being only an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known by inference.

It will be interesting to know how वाच० has tried to bring the other प्रमाणs under the three recognised by the सांख्यs.

उपमान. According to the नैयायिकs (प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्—न्या० सू० 1 1. 6), उपमान is that sentence which establishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, according to the सांख्यs, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge (ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकs, उपमान is the सादृश्यज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the directly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a गवय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवय directly perceived. This is the फल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोत्व in गो, so we have गोसादृश्य in गो. And as we directly perceive गोत्व along with गो, so we perceive गोसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवय. Therefore, गोसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमान) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमानफल) both are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation (like संयोग) which should reside on two objects; it is only भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोग, that is, *the existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another.* This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गोत्व; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गवय also.

अर्थापत्ति is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चैत्र outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसक objects— देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिक: etc. He says that when we hear जीवन् चैत्रः क्वचिदस्ति, then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र is देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चैत्र's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्थापत्ति. वाच० replies that गृह (in

which the non-existence of चैत्र has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly चैत्र's non-existence in गृह (which is opposed to his existence in गृह) cannnot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, घटाभाव-वद्भूतल is merely a modification of भूतल. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)? *Answer.* Under एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याता: योo सूo III. 13), व्यास has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्ति: परिणाम इति—*i. e.* modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घट was on the भूतल, then it was सद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल; and when there is no घट, then it is the केवल or अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now " things beyond the senses are not only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes " (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाचo regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोदृष्ट (and शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाचo), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जयo rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत् both (p. 9).

VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि (महाभाष्य IV. I. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपलब्धि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by जय०—

(1) देशदोष includes अतिदूर and अतिसामीप्य.
(2) इन्द्रियदोष „ इन्द्रियघात and मनोऽनवस्थान.
(3) विषयदोष = सौक्ष्म्य, and
(4) अर्थान्तरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभव and समानाभिहार.

Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two— इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष (See p. 405). माठर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of असत् (non-existent) things even— इदानीमसतां चतुर्धा भवति। तत्रोच्यते-प्राक्प्रध्वंसेतरेतरात्यन्ताभावभेदात्...... एवमियं द्वादशधानुपलब्धिः। सतामष्टधा ह्यसतां चतुर्धा ॥

VIII

On the reading प्रकृतिसरूपं, Davies remarks—' Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं (having its own form), from the सांख्यकौमुदी, which must be referred to intellect (महत्). All the Mss. but one have सरूपं (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has " dissimile et simile ". ' (p. 27, 1n).

IX

वाच० here lays down the opinions of (1) the बौद्धs, (2) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and (3) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.

(1) The बौद्धs maintain that *existence* comes into being from *non-existence* (असतः सज्जायते).

(2) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an *existent* cause produces a *non-existent* effect (सतोऽसज्जायते).

(3) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is *existent*, the effect being only an apparent change (एकस्य सतो विवर्तः न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत्). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानग्रहणात्—वाच० interprets ग्रहणात् as सम्बन्धात्. But जय०, गौड०, माठर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गौड०'s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्. वाच०'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावात्. "It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former." (S. N. S. p. 28, 1n).

कारणभावाच्च—जय० gives two explanations of this phrase—कारणस्य सत्त्वादित्यर्थः। यद्यसत्कार्यमुत्पद्यते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति। भवति च। तस्माच्छक्तिरूपेणावस्थितमिति गम्यते। अथवा-कारणभावादिति कारणस्वभावात्। यत्स्वभावं कारणं तत्स्वभावं कार्यम्। यथा स्निग्धस्वभावभ्यास्तिलेभ्यः स्निग्धमेव तैलम्, मृदो मृत्स्वभावो घटः॥ (p. 12). माठर and गौड० agree with the latter explanation. वाच०, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

X

हेतुमत्—, *i. e.*, caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to माठर, is of two kinds : कारक (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्रा's are the कारकहेतु's, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्राs are हेतुs and हेतुमत्s both, whileas, अव्यक्त (*i. e.* प्रधान) is only a हेतु. The ज्ञापक हेतुs are five-fold, *viz.*, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तुष्टि, सिद्धि and अनुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति तुष्टि and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्गs (*i. e.* creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्वs. (But what is this अनुग्रह ?) Thus अव्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.

अनित्यम्—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. cf.—नाशः कारणलयः (सां० सू० १. १२१). For, according to the theory of सत्कार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्रधान is नित्य, because it has no कारण to which it could return.

अव्यापि—. The twenty-three तत्त्वs are not all-pervading, like प्रधान and पुरुष; "each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महत्तत्त्व all-pervading? To this वंशीधर replies—महदादेः स्वस्वकारणाव्यापकत्वादुपचरितव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थः (p. 201),—the pervading-ness of महत्, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रधान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि.

सक्रियम्—वाच० explains the word क्रिया as परिस्पन्द which means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञान०, on the other hand, says—सक्रियत्वमध्यवसायादिरूपनियतकार्यकारित्वम्। प्रधानस्य तु सर्वक्रियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वान्न कार्यैकदेशमात्रकारित्वम्। न च क्रिया कर्मैव वक्तुं शक्यते। प्रकृतिक्षोभात् सृष्टिश्रवणे नप्रकृतेरपिकर्मवत्तयात्र संक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति (१. १२४). On this बालराम remarks—क्षोभादिपरिणामलक्षणक्रियायाः प्रधाने सत्त्वेऽपि गमनागमनलक्षणपारिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया असत्त्वान्न प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्थोऽयं भिक्षोःप्रयास इति बोध्यम् (p. 121).

अनेकम्—*i. e*, सजातीयभेदवत्, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has सजातीयभेद, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, बुद्धि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But विज्ञान० explains it otherwise—अनेकत्वं सर्गभेदेन भिन्नत्वम्—सर्गद्वयसाधारण्यमिति यावत्। न पुनः सजातीयानेकव्यक्तिकत्वम्, प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तेः। प्रकृतेरपि सत्त्वाद्यनेकरूपत्वात्. The fallacy of विज्ञान० is pointed out by बालराम—प्रकृतेरनेकरूपत्वेऽप्यनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावस्य प्रकृतावसम्भवात्, किञ्च —'अजामेकाम्' इति श्रवणादप्रामाणिकं प्रकृतेरनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभिधानमित्यस्थान एव व्यामोहो भिक्षोरिति। (pp. 121–122).

लिङ्गम्—According to गौड० and माठर, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, जय० and विज्ञान० give another alternative explanation, *viz.*, that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रधान. This is the sense taken by वाच० also. But प्रधान itself is a characteristic (लिङ्ग) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच० remarks—प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं पुरुषस्य लिङ्गं भवदपीति भावः. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it "seems hardly adequate to the

contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." (p. 32, 1n.)

सावयवम्—वाच० explains it as अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि Why can there be no अवयवावयविसंयोग between प्रधान and बुद्धि, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is समवाय (=identity or तादात्म्य), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तन्तुs and the पट produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहङ्कार, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गौड०, माठर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc., But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त (*viz.*, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार etc.) cannot be called as शब्दस्पर्शादिसम्पन्न. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रधान also. Even वाच०, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि पृथिव्यादयः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि ।

परतन्त्रम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वs is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियs and the तन्मात्राs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति; प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium. The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—" In the system of Valentinus the

Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुणs of कपिल and is probably an importation from India." (p. 37, 2n.)

विषय:—The view-point of the विज्ञानवादिन् बौद्ध is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. 'सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः। भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये॥' (सर्वदर्शन०, p. 32), वाचस्पति's refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बालराम—यत्र किलैकस्मिन्नेव योषिद्रूपे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विष्टविमूढानां जनानां विभिन्नानि सुखादिज्ञानानि जायमानान्युपलभ्यन्ते तत्र प्रमातॄणां परस्परप्रतिसन्धानाद् वस्त्वैक्येऽपि ज्ञाननानात्वं दृश्यते। यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्यासाधारण्यादनेकविज्ञानालम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु न सम्भवेत्। अतः वस्तुसाधारण्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तदभ्युपेयमिति। (p. 128).

अचेतनम्—बुद्धि (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चैतन्य, and not identical with it, because बुद्धि is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त	पुरुष
त्रिगुण	अगुण
अविवेकि	विवेकी
विषय	अविषय
सामान्य	असामान्य
अचेतन	चेतन
प्रसवधर्मि	अप्रसवधर्मी

Similarity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त from अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त	अव्यक्त	पुरुष
हेतुमत्	अहेतुमत्	अहेतुमान्
अनित्य	नित्य	नित्य
अव्यापि	व्यापि	व्यापी
सक्रिय	निष्क्रिय	निष्क्रिय
अनेक	एक	अनेक
आश्रित	अनाश्रित	अनाश्रित
लिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग
सावयव	निरवयव	निरवयव
परतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र

It should be noted that गौड० and माठर say पुरुष एकः, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व. जय० and वाच०, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अनेकत्व. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—"Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31), 'individual'. So in the Sūtras it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)'. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65)

XII

गुणs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the न्याय and वैशेषिक systems. They are of the

nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच० says—गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called गुणs (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

गौड०, माठर and जय० mention अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः also, whileas वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योऽन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिभव, आश्रय, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation). जय० explains वृत्ति as सुखादिरूपेण परिणतिः. According to गौड०, अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, *i. e.* are reciprocally present. माठर, however, seems to take वृत्ति in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—" वृत्ति means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect. " (p. 36, 1n.)

गौड०, माठर and जय० quote one verse, *viz.*, रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc.; जय० ascribes this verse to विष्णुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for हरिगीता = भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजस्तमश्चाभिभूय सत्त्वं भवति भारत। रजः सत्त्वं तमश्चैव तमः सत्त्वं रजस्तथा ॥ (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अश्वमेधपर्वन् of the महाभारत—तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः। रजसश्चापि सत्त्वं स्यात् सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ (३६. ६).

XIII

अर्थतः—जय० and वाच० explain it as पुरुषार्थतः, but गौड० takes it in the sense of साधना, and माठर explains it as कार्यवशात्.

Now, these गुणs, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्याभिभव, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुणs perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाच० gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणs. गौड०, माठर and जय०, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्व by a lady, रजस् by warriors and तमस् by clouds. A virtuous

woman (and therefore, a सात्त्विक type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing रजस्) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तामस type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणs (=प्रकृति or मूलकारण) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिकs who also assume the plurality of causes ? Cf.—नन्वेवं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिन्नासंख्यव्यक्तिकत्वे वैशेषिकमतादत्र को विशेष इति चेत्—The reply is कारणद्रव्यस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ॥ 'शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम्। त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥' इति विष्णुपुराणादिभ्यः ॥ विज्ञान० (I. 128).

But are not these गुणs opposed to one another ? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for पुरुषार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वर्ति and दीप in spite of the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.—दीपोपरि तैलपतनेन दीपनाशात् तैलमपि दीपविरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वल्पकेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच० gives another example of this विरोध,—*viz*., यथा वा वातपित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्यकारिणः. बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवीभागवत (3. 9)— " "प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्यं प्रकरोत्यर्थदर्शनम्। वर्तिस्तैलं यथार्चिश्च विरुद्धाश्च परस्परम्॥ २९ ॥ विरुद्धं हि तथा तैलमग्निना सह सङ्गतम्। तैलं वर्तिविरोध्येव पावकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥ ३० ॥ एकत्रस्थाः पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम्॥" (pp. 139-140). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of these गुणs in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था *i. e.* प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुणs in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is no तुल्यबलत्व in the विकारs. Cf. रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते—(व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15).

XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गौड० and माठर explain it as—' on account of the absence of the contraries of त्रैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान.' वाच० offers an alternative explanation—' on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, *i. e.*, पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.' चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. जय० also agrees with it. cf. त्रैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोरभावात् (?) । न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्मात् त्रैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ (p. 20). The explanation of गौड०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. (See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जय० uses a curious expression, (संसर्गिन्) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्मादेतेषामेकेन संसर्गिणा भवितव्यम् । यत्रैतेषां संसर्गस्तदव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति (p. 21).

समन्वय = एकरूपता, similarity, or एकजात्यनुगम (*i. e.* belonging to one genus), according to जय०. गौड० understands समन्वय in the sense of 'inference—' यथा व्रतधारिणं बटुं दृष्ट्वा समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्राह्मणाविति । The explanation of समन्वयात् (सां. सू. I. 131) as offered by विज्ञान०, *viz.*, उपवासादिना क्षीणं हि बुद्ध्यादितत्त्वमन्नादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतेन पुनरुपचीयते (*i. e.* intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast, are again strengthened by food, etc.). 'does not directly fit in this Kārikā,' as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411).

कारणकार्यविभागात्—वाच० understands the word विभाग as emergence',—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay.

etc. जय०, माठर and गौड० explain it as 'separation' or 'distinction' between the functions of the cause and the effect; —just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (पृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात्). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम्. जय० here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable) :—अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैवासिद्धत्वादन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते—यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, तयोर्विभागात्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः। यथाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिकृत इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापिता [पायेता] स्यात्, कुतोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः॥ (pp. 21-22).

अविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यस्य—According to वाच०, गौड० and माठर, the term अविभाग means 'merging';—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जय० also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading आविभागे, where अविभाग means लय. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविभक्त, and explains the phrase as—'because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. इह लोकेऽविभक्तादेकस्मादिक्षुद्रव्याद्रसफाणितगुडखण्डशर्करादि-वैश्वरूप्यं नानात्वं दृश्यते......एवमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम्। तस्मा-देषामविभक्तेनैकेन भवितव्यम्। (p. 22).

प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च—According to वाच० and जय०, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of प्रवृत्तिs of गुणs, because गुणs are in constant modification—cf. परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम् (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. IV. 33). The first kind of modification is that सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् modify themselves as सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्. Here, the साम्यावस्था is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a विषमपरिणाम (or समुदय), we have creation. Here सत्त्व and the rest combine with one another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take त्रिगुणतः and समुदयात् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति.

XVII

The reading संहतपरार्थत्वात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गौड॰, who reads संघातपरार्थत्वात्. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सां. सू.—संहतपरार्थत्वात्, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

अधिष्ठानात्—पुरुष is the अधिष्ठाता of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. *Question* :—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण=निष्क्रिय, is not active; how can he become an अधिष्ठाता? *Reply* :—It is not essential that only an active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवद् (सां. सू. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुंक्ते च्छेदनं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥
सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।
राजा सांनिध्यमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥
तस्मादचलतोऽपि स्याच्चलने कर्तृतात्मनः ।

(कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक on मी. सू. I. 5,
Chowkhamba edn., p. 710).

बालराम thinks that this argument about the अधिष्ठातृत्व of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by शङ्कराचार्य in his भाष्य on रचनानुपपत्तेश्च and प्रवृत्तेश्च (ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2).

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च—माठर assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्रधान, whileas, वाच॰ and others take this प्रवृत्ति as belonging to the शास्त्र and the sages—आगमानां महाधियां च ॥

XVIII

On जन्म and मरण, विज्ञान० says—जन्ममरणे चात्र नोत्पत्तिविनाशौ पुरुषनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । किन्त्वपूर्वदेहेन्द्रियादिसंघातविशेषेण संयोगश्च वियोगश्च भोगतदभावनियामकाविति (सां. सू. I. 149).

The view of the वेदान्तिन् is that one and the same आत्मन् assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. ' उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः । " " उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् । " " एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः । ' (सां० सू० I 150-152). माठर sets the पूर्वपक्ष in the following words:—इह केचिदाचार्या वेदवादिन इति मन्यन्ते–, एकोऽयं पुरुषः सर्वशरीरेषूपलभ्यते मणिसूत्रवत्। इह रसनायां यावन्तो मणयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वेकमेव सूत्रं प्रवर्तते । एवं मणिभूतेषु शरीरेषु किमेकः सूत्रभूतः परमात्मा, आहोश्वित् जलचन्द्रवत् पुरुष इत्येक एव बहुषु नदीकूपतडागादिष्विवोपलभ्यते इति ॥ Cf. भिमानन्द (सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):–" आकृतिगर्भाशयभावसङ्गतिशरीरविभागालिङ्गबहुत्वात् सांख्याचार्याः कपिलासुरिपञ्चशिखपतञ्जलिप्रभृतयः पुरुषबहुत्वं वर्णयन्ति । वेदवादिन आचार्या, हरिहरहिरण्यगर्भव्यासादय एकमात्मानं, तथा च श्रुतिः......... एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः। एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्॥" (This verse from ब्रह्मबिन्दूपनिषद्, १. २, is quoted by विज्ञान० also on सां. सू. I. 153).

But, does not this doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व contradict the श्रुतिs which lay down the unity of soul (*i. e.* आत्मैक्य)? The सां. सू. says, No.—" नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् " (I. 154).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मन् in the sense of class notion. वाच० also tries to reconcile the अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोध as follows—" एकत्वश्रुतीनां च प्रमाणान्तरविरोधात् कथंचिद्देशकालविभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्युपपत्तेः। प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानात्वयोश्च श्रुत्यैव साक्षात् प्रतिपादनात् । ' अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः । अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥ ' (तै. आ. ६. १०) ॥ " तत्त्ववैशारदी, on यो. सू. II. 22.

Further on, says the सांख्य, if you are going to explain away this नानात्व by उपाधिs, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs (अवयवs) are the उपाधिs of a body (a संघात). And

when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदान्तिन् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body ?

XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or औदासीन्य is of seven kinds according to जय०:— सप्तविधं चास्यौदासीन्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—पश्यति शृणोति सर्वं करोति स्थितिं प्रसङ्गं च नापि । स्वतो न परतो...नोभयतश्चाप्युदासीनः ॥ जय०, further raises the question that if पुरुष is मध्यस्थ and अकर्ता, then how is he a भोक्ता?—ननु च यद्यकर्ता तत्कथं भोक्तृभावादस्ति पुरुषः? तथा चाहुः— बाल्हुताशनतरवः स्वयमकृतानां यथा हि भोक्तारः । पुरुषोऽपि विषयफलानां स्वयमकृतानां तथापि भोक्ता ॥ इति ।

अचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—'I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सांनिध्यात् (सां. सू. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—'यथाग्निसंयोगात् लोहमणिरित्युच्यते ।' (जय०) ' अनुष्णाशीतो घटः शीताभिरद्भिः संस्पृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्त उष्णो भवति ।' (माठर) ॥ 'यथाग्न्ययसोः परस्परं संयोगविशेषात् परस्परधर्मव्यवहार औपाधिको यथा वा जलसूर्ययोः संयोगात् परस्परधर्मारोपस्तथैव बुद्धिपुरुषयोरिति भावः । ' (विज्ञान०, सां. सू. I, 164) ॥

अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय० by the following quotation—प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः । अहं करोमीत्यबुधोऽभिमन्यते तृणस्य कुब्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः ॥ This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमाससूत्रवृत्ति (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 124) and सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन also (ibid, p, 12) with slight variants.

वाच० connects दर्शनार्थं (in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य) with प्रधानस्य, and कैवल्यार्थं with पुरुषस्य. The other commenta-

tors take the line as it stands, *i. e.* पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं and प्रधानस्य कैवल्यार्थम्. While explaining 'विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा' (सां. सू. II, 1). विज्ञान° also connects कैवल्य with प्रधान.

XXII

In his भाष्य (on यो. सू. II 19) व्यास describes the तन्मात्रs as the products of महत्तत्व (—एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महतःषडविशेषपरिणामाः). But there the महत् should not be taken as the immediate cause (*i. e.* producer) of these तन्मात्रs. व्यास has himself said at another place (यो. सू, I. 45) that these तन्मात्रs are the products of अहङ्कार.

माठर and गौड° hold that these तन्मात्रs singly produce the महाभूतs. The other commentators hold that each succeeding महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्रs. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायु; शब्दतन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजस् and so on. But this theory of वाच° violates the orthodox पञ्चीकरण theory of the वेदान्तिन्s. The point is noticed by कल्पतरुकार, who says—

सम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम् ।
तथापि युक्तिदृष्टत्वाद्वाचस्पतिमतं शुभम् ॥
पृथिव्यनलात्मत्वं गगने पवने ऽपि चेत् ।
रूपवत्त्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां चाक्षुषत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥
अर्द्धभूयस्त्वतः क्षित्याद्यविभावनकल्पने ।
व्यवहारयथाप्राप्ता मुधा पञ्चीकृतिर्भवेत् ॥
अनपेक्ष्य फलं वेदसिद्धेत्येवेष्यते यदि ।
त्रिवृत्कृतिः श्रुता पञ्चीकृतिर्न क्वचन श्रुता ॥

(quoted by वंशीधर in his comm. on तत्त्वकौमुदी, p. 293 Chow. S. S.).

माठर gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहङ्कार—चतुःषष्टिवर्णैः परादिवैखरीपर्यन्ताभिधेयैर्यत्किमप्यभिधीयते बुद्धया समर्थ्य तत्सकलमाद्यन्ताकारहकारवर्णद्वयग्रहणेनोपरिस्थितपिण्डानुकारिणा बिन्दुना भूषितः प्रत्याहारन्यायेनाहङ्कार इत्यभिधीयते ॥

XXIII

गौड० and माठर curiously divide ज्ञान and वैराग्य into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414), as ज्ञान means only प्रधानपुरुषान्यताज्ञान in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest. Similarly, the आभ्यन्तर-वैराग्य (*viz.*, प्रधानमप्यत्र स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशमिति विरक्तस्य मोक्षेप्सोर्यदुत्पद्यते) is the principal वैराग्य which leads to the बाह्यवैराग्य also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोक्षेप्सु ?

बालराम does not read गरिमा in his text of तत्त्वकौमुदी. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी, जय०, माठर and गौड० mention nine kinds of ऐश्वर्यs although each one (except वाच०) says अष्टविधमैश्वर्यम्. It seems, therefore, that बालराम's text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी and वंशीधर's edition, however, combine ईशित्व and वशित्व and thus make the total eight.

जय० reads यत्रकामावशायित्वम् in place of यत्रकामावसायित्वम्, and derives it as—कामेनेच्छयावशेतुं शीलं यस्य स यत्रकामावशायी । तस्य भावः यत्रकामावशायित्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वात् धातूनां ' शी ' तिष्ठतौ वर्तते ।

XXV

अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds —



This is the scheme adopted by वाच० and others. But विज्ञान० (on सां. सू. II. 18) would have—

अहङ्कार

सात्त्विक	राजस	तामस
मनस्	the ten इन्द्रियs	पञ्चतन्मात्राs.

In support of his classification, विज्ञान° quotes from some स्मृति—

वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।
अहंतत्त्वाद्विकुर्वाणान्मनो वैकारिकादभूत् ॥
वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः ।
तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥
तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।

But this explanation is wrong; for सत्त्व and तमस् are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile रजस्. वंशीधर's explanation, *viz.*,—' समष्टीन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽल्पसत्त्वत्वेन राजसकार्यत्वेनैव स्मृतिषु निर्दिष्टान्यत्र तु व्यष्टीन्द्रियापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्त्वत्वेन सात्त्विकाहङ्कारकार्यतयोक्तानीत्यविरोधः । " is very lame (See सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदीटीका of वंशीधर. Chow. S. S., p. 343; see further बालराम, pp. 177–178 and Sovani, p. 415).

XXVII

The first phrase उभयात्मकं, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संकल्पकं मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गौड° interprets संकल्पकं as प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति, *i. e.*, which determines the functioning (of the two sets of इन्द्रियs). वाच° understands संकल्पकं as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति *i. e.* perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जय° and चन्द्रिका agree with वाच°. What वाच° means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is

sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or complex-perception. The first is नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं आलोचनज्ञानं, and, therefore, निर्विकल्पक; the second is नामजात्यादिसंयुक्तं ज्ञानं, and, therefore, सविकल्पक. In his support, वाच० cites अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं etc., from कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक (on मी. सू.. I. 4., verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.).

The reading adopted by भट्टोत्पल is—संकल्पकमत्र मनः, तच्चेन्द्रियमुभयथा समाख्यातम् । (See S. N. S., p. 126; but he quotes संकल्पकमत्र मनः, उभयात्मकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् in J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 631). The Chinese version of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā also reads "Manas is that which discerns" and thus agrees with भट्टोत्पल's reading. उभयात्मकत्व has been thus illustrated by परमार्थ—" It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time. " (Tak. S. K., p. 35).

इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्—जय० remarks :—यथान्यदिन्द्रलिङ्गं तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच० criticises this view :—इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम्, न त्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् । महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

माठर reads ग्राह्यभेदाच्च in place of बाह्यभेदाश्च. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. माठर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the नानात्व of इन्द्रियs, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and ग्राह्यभेदात्.

The question is—how can one अहङ्कार create these manifold इन्द्रियs whose functions differ? This question is raised by उद्योतकर in his न्यायवार्तिक (Chow S. S., p. 70)—यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाण्येकात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादैकात्म्याद्विषयव्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वं सर्वार्थमेकं वा सर्वार्थमति स्यात् । The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणs, accompanied by धर्म and अधर्म, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार (*i. e.* the इन्द्रियs) differ in their functions.

इह सांख्यानां स्वभावो नाम कश्चित् कारणमस्ति । This seems to be an interpolation or a mistake. In the first place, स्वभाव is not

recognised as a cause in the सांख्य philosophy. माठर, in his वृत्ति on the 31st कारिका says—इह सांख्ये पुरुषेश्वरस्वभावा न कारणम्। Secondly, even गौड॰ himself says so in the भाष्य on the 61st कारिका—सर्वकर्तृत्वात् कालस्यापि प्रधानमेव कारणम्। स्वभावोऽप्यत्रैव लीनः। तस्मात् कालो न कारणं, नापि स्वभाव इति। Whosoever is responsible for the mistake, he has continued his notion of स्वभाव being a कारण, further in the भाष्य. cf. अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण, नाहङ्कारेण, न बुद्ध्या न प्रधानेन; न पुरुषेण, स्वभावात् कृतगुणपरिणामेनेति।

But if we compare माठर on the 31st कारिका, we find—अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण न बुद्ध्या नाहङ्कारेण न प्रधानेन न पुरुषेण न स्वभावेन कृतम्, गुणपरिणामेनेति। On the basis of माठर's reading, I propose that we ought to read न स्वभावात्, कृतं गुणपरिणामेनेति। That is, this, नानात्व is not caused by God............or Spontaneity, but by the modification of the Attributes.

Wilson has translated it—"but from modification of qualities produced by spontaneity." Keeping the text as it is, I have tried to steer clear of *spontaneity* as the cause. My translation is—"but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes." But to have this sense even we ought to read स्वभावकृतगुणपरिणामेनेति.

परमार्थ seems to translate the word स्वभाव by 'Special Being' or 'a Special Dharma', which may be called "Being".

The reading गुणानामचेतनत्वान्न प्रवर्तते; प्रवर्तत एव is also faulty. I think we ought to read गुणानामनामचेतनत्वान्न प्रवृत्तिः; अस्त्येव प्रवृत्तिः।

The following classification of the organs by परमार्थ, has no parallel in any commentary.

"Among the organs, there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double; (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body. 'To avoid danger' (relates to the eyes and ears, which) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. 'To protect the body' (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects

approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body, according to these objects." (Tak. S. K., p. 37).

माठर reads रूपादिषु in place of शब्दादिषु in the text. बालराम also adopts this reading and observes :—चक्षुरादिक्रमेण पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणामभिधानात् 'शब्दादिषु' इति पाठो न सन्निवेशितः। (p. 184, 1n.)

The word मात्र stands in the sense of "uniqueness" according to गौड॰ and माठर; but, according to वाच॰, this word means "bareness." परमार्थ, seems to waver between the two senses. [See, Tak. S. K., pp. 37–38; S. N. S., p. 63, 1n. and J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632 (1)].

XXIX

स्वालक्षण्यम्। गौड॰ and माठर read स्वालक्षण्या.

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च। Does the word करणं stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or त्रयोदशविध करण? While वाच॰ adopts the former view, all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माठर curiously says at one place —समस्तस्यान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः। विज्ञान॰ also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on सां. सू. II 31). But वाच॰, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, *viz.*, स हि प्रयत्नभेदः शरीरोपगृहीतमारुतक्रियाभेदहेतुः सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथाहुः 'सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च' इति। बालराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियशब्देनान्तःकरणत्रयमेव ग्राह्यं, न तु बाह्येन्द्रियमपि, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, *viz.*, perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरणs and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function

simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिकs there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः (*ibid*, III. 2. 58), अलातचक्रदर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात् (*ibid*, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैयायिकs, the mind is अणुपरिमाण. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपद्वृत्ति.

In the case of अनुमान and शब्द, only the three अन्तःकरणs function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses *at that particular moment.*

XXXI

आकूत—Davies observes :—'*Ākūta* is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by *Absicht* (=purpose), *Antrieb* (=motive). Colebrooke's translation is " incited by mutual invitation."... ......The meaning of " incitement to activity, " mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of *ākūta*......It is composed of *ā*, to, towards, and *kū*, to cry. Gauḍapāda says that it means *ādarasambhrama* (respectful eagerness in action). ' (p. 68, 1n).

Davies is wrong in considering that गौड० is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, 1n). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for पुरुषार्थ.

The spirit of the सां. सू., " स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता " (III. 56) and " ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा " (III. 57), goes directly against the theory of the कारिकाs, where no ईश्वर is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञान०'s remark, *viz*, प्रकृतिलीनस्य जन्येश्वरस्य सिद्धिः ' यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः सर्वसम्मतैव, नित्यस्येश्वरस्यैव विवादास्पदत्वादित्यर्थः ॥.........नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेधविरोधस्तत्राह—' ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा '। सान्निध्यमात्रेणेश्वरस्य सिद्धिस्तु सर्वसम्मतेत्यर्थः। (सां. सू. III. 57).

The word पुरुषार्थ has been rendered as "The will of Spirit" by परमार्थ. The idea of the Spirit having a will is further strengthened by परमार्थ—"Spirit has this will: 'you have to manifest yourself, and find for me a solitary existence'. To obey this will of Spirit, the three guṇas produce all the organs. It is in accord with the will of Spirit that each one acquits itself of its appropriate function; besides the will of Spirit, there is not any other instigator." (Tak. S. K., p. 41) This soul of परमार्थ is more akin to the ईश्वर of the नैयायिकs who is endowed with इच्छा (and other गुणs); such a soul is foreign to सांख्य [See also, J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632, (*m*)].

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus "the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to *manas*." (*ibid*). According to गौड०, आहरण and धारण belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. माठर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच० followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. According to परमार्थ, आहरण belongs to अन्तःकरण, प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs and धारण to कर्मेन्द्रियs [see Tak. S. K., p. 42].

The word दशधा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच० takes दशधा with आहार्य, धार्य and प्रकाश्य each. The objects *seized* by the इन्द्रियs, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is *retained* by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also दिव्य and अदिव्य, and so tenfold. The objects *manifested* by the बुद्धीन्द्रियs are also tenfold because of being divided into दिव्य and अदिव्य varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects

seized, retained and *manifested* are altogether ten, *viz.*, five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

वाच० explains why काल is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकसूत्र "अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपच्चिरं क्षिप्रमिति लिङ्गानि" (II. 2. 6), काल is *one* category which is divided into three parts-past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रशस्तपाद clarifies this point—" एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भक्रियाभिनिर्वृत्तिस्थितिनिरोधोपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचारः; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काल. To this वाच० replies—Why should we first assume one काल and then assume different circumstances or उपाधिs to make this काल multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपाधिs only? Cf. स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवाभासते-योगभाष्य on III, 52.

XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, *i. e.*, तन्मात्रs. विशेष = specific, *i. e.*, पञ्चमहाभूतs.

XXXV

The word द्वारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जय०'s phrase द्वाराण्यस्य सन्तीति. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of द्वारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुरुष, as

is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one). परमार्थ renders त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि as "the three internal organs master the gate." (Tak. S. K., p. 44).

XXXVII

वाच॰ interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौड॰, on the other hand, interprets the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. माठर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार.—

अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैनं सुप्तं प्रबोधय ।
प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥
मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः ।
तत्त्ववृन्दं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥
योऽसौ सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।
देहीति पदमुच्चार्य हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

माठर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुष्ठेयतया, किं तु सांख्यानां पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण च निःश्रेयसहेतुः । उक्तं च—

हस पिब लल मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुरु च मा शङ्काम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्स्यसे मोक्षसौख्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

Why तन्मात्राs are called अविशेषs?—This has been explained by गौड॰ and माठर as देवानामेते सुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिताः, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राs, being evolved out of त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह (= रजस् and

तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच०, *viz.*, न चैषां शान्तत्वादिरस्त्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राs, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—"(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter......... It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तघोरमूढैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्विशेषः (Kār. 40);—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. सू. सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान०. लिङ्गशरीरं, तच्च सर्गादौ समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात् (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—यद्यपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्व्यक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो नानात्वमपि भवति। But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य?

The word लिङ्ग is explained as प्रलयकाले महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं करणोपेतं प्रधाने लीयते by गौड०. वाच० and माठर agree with it. But, परमार्थ means by it, "endowed with the mark of subtlety", and explains it as:—"The subtle body migrates through the existences and it is what the sages alone see. (That is why one says it has the mark of subtlety)." (Tak. S. K. P. 50).

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अहङ्कारस्य च बुद्धावेवान्तर्भाव: ।

XLI

A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, *viz.*, intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अङ्गुष्ठमात्र: पुरुष: in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माठर is विना अविशेषै:, whileas वाच० has विना विशेषै:. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL. So विना विशेषै: means विना सूक्ष्मै: शरीरै:. But this is confusing because, to say that the लिङ्ग (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूक्ष्मशरीर (composed of लिङ्ग and पञ्चतन्मात्राs) is not logical. गौड०'s explanation is better when he says that लिङ्ग cannot exist without अविशेषs *viz.*, the five subtle elements.

The reading of परमार्थ also seems to be विना अविशेषै:, and he agrees with गौड० in explaining अविशेष as the five subtle elements. (Tak. S. K. p. 50). चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator :—केचित्तु स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकामिदामिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्गं समुदायात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेषै: स्थूलदेहैर्विना निराश्रयं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाश्रित्यैव तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीरस्यान्यथासिद्धिरिति भाव: ॥

XLIII

According to वाच० and जय० dispositions may be divided like this—

- भावा:
  - प्राकृता:
  - वैकृता:
    - करणाश्रयिण:
    - कार्याश्रयिण:

The प्राकृतभावs, which are innate, are of four kinds, *viz.*, धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिल only. Those depending on the instruments (करणाश्रयिण:) are eight *viz.*, धर्म, अधर्म, ज्ञान, अज्ञान, वैराग्य, अवैराग्य, ऐश्वर्य and अनैश्वर्य. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कार्याश्रयिण:) are also eight, *viz.*, five when the body is in the womb and three, *i. e.*, childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड० and माठर, however, divide the भावs into three kinds—सांसिद्धिक, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य are born along with कपिल, so they are सांसिद्धिक or innate in his case; but they come to सनक, सनन्दन, सनातन and सनत्कुमार (the four sons of ब्रह्मन्) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वैकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

परमार्थ, however, explains सांसिद्धिक-भावs "as the state acquired by goodness", *i. e.* acquired by good deeds performed in previous birth. But this does not agree with the case of कपिल, whose भावs are सहोत्पन्न.

XLIV and XLV

According to माठर, the सूक्ष्मशरीर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य, ऐन्द्र, पित्र्य, गान्धर्व, याक्ष, राक्षस and पैशाच. गौड० gives सौम्य for पित्र्य, and याक्ष has been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूक्ष्मशरीर sinks to the five states of पशु, पक्षी, मृग, सरीसृप and स्थावर. The प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माठर includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिs) in this bondage. The वैकारिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकारs of प्रकृति (*i. e.* the evolutes); but according to माठर, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, *viz.*, the ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य and others, as the *summum bonum*. These three

kinds of bondages are explained by वाच० at length in his तत्त्ववैशारदी on योगभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतिलयः, stands for महदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि, according to वाच०; but, according to गौड० and माठर. the word denotes प्रधानबुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्राः.

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गौड० and माठर illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अशक्ति, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is तुष्टि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the post. The explanation of वाच० is better. विपर्यय is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. "Incapacity (अशक्ति) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (तुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue." (Davies, pp. 84–85).

XLVII

विपर्यय or अविद्या is of five kinds :—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग, द्वेष and अभिनिवेश, which are called तमस्, मोह, महामोह, तामिस्र and अन्धतामिस्र by the कारिका.

XLVIII

तमस् or अविद्या is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five usbtle elements.

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varities of Attainment or सिद्धिs as the *summum bonum*.

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attachment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings.

तामिस्र or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense (mentioned above) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धिs.

अन्धतामिस्र or अभिनिवेश is also of eighteen kinds and arises from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धिs or the ten objects of sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स चायमभिनिवेश: क्लेश: स्वरसवाही कृमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरसंभावितो मरणत्रास उच्छेददृष्ट्यात्मक: पूर्वजन्मानुभूतं मरणदु:खमनुमापयति (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 9). " मरणत्रासोऽन्धतामिस्र उच्यते । " (जय० p. 51).

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विपर्ययs.

XLIX

The quotation in वाच०, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant (मुग्धता: for मन्दता:) in the सांख्यसंग्रह (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 77). गौड० uses प्रसुप्ति (or paralysis) for कुष्ठ, and उपजिह्विका for जडता. Cf. " जिह्वाया जाड्यम्," in जय०, p. 52. माठर and गौड० adopt गुदावर्त for उदावर्त (=obstruction of bowels).

L

माठर (and not गौड०, as S. N. S. says, page 91, 1n) reads आध्यात्मिक्य: in place of आध्यात्मिका:. आध्यात्मिका: is grammatically wrong, asआध्यात्मिक is derived from अध्यात्म + ठञ्("अध्यात्मादेष्ठञिष्यते" वार्तिक on पाणिनि IV. 3, 60). आत्मनि = अध्यात्मं, is an अव्ययीभाव compound in the sense of locative case, according to "अव्ययं विभक्ति०" पाणिनि II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination ङीप् (and not

टाप्) is added to आध्यात्मिक by the सूत्र of पाणिनि, "टिड्ढाणञ्०" IV. 1. 15 and the form will be आध्यात्मिकी.

The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators:—

	वाच०	जय०	माठर	गौड०
1.	पारम्	सुतारम्	तारम्	सुतमः
2.	सुपारम्	सुपारम्	सुतारम्	पारम्
3.	पारापारम्	lost	सुनेत्रम्	सुनेत्रम्
4.	अनुत्तमांभः	अनुत्तमांभः	मरीचम्	अनुत्तमांभासकम्
5.	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभसिकम्	नारीकम्

If अर्जन, रक्षण, क्षय, भोग (or संग, according to गौड०) and हिंसा are named in the order given above, then गौड० calls the last two as नारीक and अनुत्तमांभसिक respectively—, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Rāmāvatāra S'arma has tried to explain these varieties of तुष्टि as follows:— धनार्जनदुःखपारप्रापयितृत्वात् पाराख्येयं तुष्टिः । .... अर्जनदोषदर्शनेऽपि कदाचिद्भोगाभिलाषेण प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्, रक्षणभयार्तस्य तु प्रवृत्तेरतितरामसंभव इति तदीयायास्तुष्टेः सुपारता, क्षयं भावयतः कदाचित् प्रवृत्तिः कदाचिदप्रवृत्तिः इति तदीया तुष्टिः पारावाराख्या (read पारापाराख्या ?), भोगे रोगभयं भावयतस्तुष्टिः स्वार्थपरेति तस्या उत्तरेतराम्भस्त्वम्, हिंसादोषतस्तस्यास्तुष्टेस्तु कारुण्यमूलकत्वादुत्तमाम्भस्त्वम् ॥ बालराम, pp. 219–220.

The nine तुष्टिs are thus tronslated into Chinese.

(1) अम्भः = lubricating water.
(2) सलिलम् = moving water.
(3) ओघः = running water.
(4) वृष्टिः = lake water.
(5) सुतमः = water [which has] well penetrated.
(6) पारम् = water easy to cross.
(7) सुनेत्रम् = water which gushes well.
(8) नारीकम् = transparent water.
(9) अनुत्तमांभसिकम् = excellent and pure water.

(Tak. S. K. p. 62)

I am tempted to quote the interesting explanation of these terms given by Fuji, the Japanese commentator, and quoted by Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri in Tak. S. K., p. 62, 1n.

(1) 'lubricating water,' because *Nature* penetrates all, as water lubricates all; (2) 'moving' because by the *necessary* objects one purifies oneself as water which is moving and of little depth purifies all; (3) 'running', because with *time* a river joins the ocean; (4) 'lake-water', because the *influence* of the acts committed in other existences is like the water ef the lake which the rain refills; (5) 'well-penetrated' because one renounces the *acquisition* of riches, as a desiccated ground is irrigated by water; (6) 'easily crossed', because one has not to occupy oneself any more with *protecting*, as [in the case of a piece of] water that has been crossed; (7) gushes without ceasing; (8) 'transparant', for there is no more *attachment;* (9) 'excellent and pure', for not to *injure* others is like water of the purest and most excellent quality.

LI

No commentator has given the names of **असिद्धिs**; **जय॰** which gives them—**तासां चासिद्धीनां मोषस्तुष्णमानरमित्याख्या: (?) संज्ञा:**—, has a defective reading.

वाच॰ criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article ("Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṁkhya-Kārikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, iii, p. 429), belongs to **जय॰**; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.

Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिs according to वाच०

1. अध्ययन
|
2. शब्द
|
3. ऊह
|
4. सुहृत्प्राप्ति
|
5. दान
|
6. प्रमोद — 7. मुदित — 8. मोदमान

The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.

परमार्थ's original gives a very beautiful tale in explaining how दान secures सिद्धि.

" A brāhmin is hated by others. and he sees it, he becomes an ascetic; when he has become an ascetic, his master and his fellow-disciples also hold him in hatred and do not communicate knowledge to him. Conscious of his little chance, he betakes himself to a distant village to remain there, saying to himself : ' In this village, there are no brāhmins; I can pass there my summer(varṣa)retreat.' During his sojourn, one makes him many gifts. He gives the superfluous to his friends and to his acquaintances. He gives of it even to women and to shepherds, All the inhabitants of the village cherish him. At the end of the summer-retreat, everybody makes gifts to him : the triple staff, the water bowl, clothes etc.; at the approach of a festival of S'akra, he says to the villagers: ' Who wishes to accompany me to my native country to be present there at the festival? Those who wish to accompany me should bring each one a gift for

me.' Arrived at his place, he betakes himself to his old master. Choosing the best gifts, he makes an offering of them to him. Then, the master, the fellow-disciples and the others commence to love him. His master, by way of gift, communicates knowledge to him. By that knowledge he arrives at absolute knowledge and final Deliverance. That perfection then is acquired by gifts." (Tak. S. K. p. 65)

These eight सिद्धिs, *viz.* तार, सुतार, *etc.* are thus translated by परमार्थ.

(1) तार = Crossing by oneself.
(2) सुतार = Crossing well.
(3) तारतार = Crossing all.
(4) प्रमोद = Crossing with joy.
(5) प्रमुदित = Crossing with an excessive joy.
(6) प्रमोदमान = Crossing with full joy.
(7) रम्यक = Crossing by love.
(8) सदाप्रमुदित = Crossing by universal love.

परमार्थ adds to it a lengthy explanation of his own which slightly differs from the original commentary at places. For instance, the दान-सिद्धि, which is equal to सदाप्रमुदित, is explained by परमार्थ thus:—

'Crossing by universal love'. A man of this class, after having been hated by all, gives in alms all his goods and thus makes himself loved by all. Since all wish him to attain Deliverance, one says in this case 'Crossing by universal love.'

While वाच० construes अङ्कुश as निवारक and refers by it to विपर्यय, अशक्ति and तुष्टि, विज्ञान० (on सां. सू. III. 44) explains अङ्कुश as आकर्षक and refers by it to the three सिद्धिs, *viz.* ऊह शब्द and अध्ययन, leaving सुहृत्प्राप्ति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाच० as follows—कश्चित्त्वेतासामथसिद्धीनामङ्कुशो निवारक-पूर्वत्रिविधो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिरूपो भवति बन्धकत्वादिति व्याचष्टे तन्न। तुष्ट्य-

भावस्याशक्तितया बाधिर्यादिवत् सिद्धिविरोधिताळाभेन तुष्ट्यतुष्ट्योः सिद्धिविरोधित्वासंभवात्. In reply to this it may be said that तुष्टि and अतुष्टि are not mutually contradictory, but positive धर्मs. See Sovani p. 427.

LII

The word लिङ्ग has been explained as महत्तत्वं बुद्धिरिति by विज्ञान (on सां. सू. III 45). But this is not correct. वाच० is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks :— "Some commentators make the *linga* itself to be *Buddhi* (intellect) and *bhāvas* to be its conditions. The former interpretation (*i. e.* वाच० H.) is preferable, for the *linga*, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to 'intellect'. (p. 90).

Curiously enough, Colebrooke translates न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः as 'without person there would be no *pause* of dispositions.' This is accepted by Wilson also in his translation of the गौड०. But, the word in the text is निर्वृत्ति and not निवृत्ति. I have, therfore, translated it as 'without *linga*, there can be no *elaboration* of dispositions.' Because, virtue and the rest are acquired by the formation of gross and subtle bodies. The Spirit cannot experience or acquire virtue or vice. For this purpose, there is always the necessity of gross and subtle bodies. Therefore, Wilson's explanation 'but is equally necessary for their occasional *cessation*' (p. 216) is quite beside the mark. (See also Davies, p. 89 with 1n; S. N. S., p. 97).

LIV

सत्त्वविशाल means where सत्त्व predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after मोक्ष? To this the सूत्र replies :— आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्धेयः (सां. सू. III 52). विज्ञान explains

it as—तत्राप्यूर्ध्वंगतावपि सत्यामावृत्तिरस्त्यत्र उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगादधोऽधोयोनि-जन्मनः सोऽपि लोको हेय इत्यर्थः. This very idea is expressed in the next कारिका.

According to गौड० there are sixteen forms of creations—"that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements." (Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गौड० takes दैव, मानुष and तैर्यग्योन (= two, जङ्गम and स्थावर), and divides each of them into four classes, *viz.*, अभौतिक, लिङ्ग, भाव and भूत.

The phrase ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः refers to all the three creations above, in the middle and below. Davies thinks (p. 90. 2*n*) that Wilson construes this phrase with मध्ये रजोविशालः. Thereupon, Davies remarks, 'Brahmā does dot belong to it (*i. e.* midst), but to the region "above"'. I think Davies has misunderstood Wilson who does not distinctly join the two phrases given above. (See Wilson, p. 220). परमार्थ explains ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः as "Brahmā is at the commencement and pillar at the end." He goes on to explain स्तम्ब—"Why is the last of all the creations called 'pillar'? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks etc., support the three worlds; that is why one calls it 'pillar.'" (Tak. S. K., pp. 69–70).

LV

पतञ्जलि also expresses the same idea—'परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः' (यो. सू. II. 15). Compare also, 'समानं जरामरणजं दुःखम्' (सां. सू. III. 53).

स्वभावेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वत एव सर्गो दुःखरूपः, विवेकिनामिति शेषः।

माठर reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समासेन in place of स्वभावेन in the text. The former term he explains as त्रिषु लोकेषु and the latter as संक्षेपेण.

LVI

The illustration of a cook cited by वाच० and the (सां. सू. III 63)—विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूदवत् पाके, has got this disadvantage that सूद is चेतन. The illustration of गौड० *viz.*, यथा कश्चित् स्वार्थं त्यक्त्वा मित्रकार्याणि करोति, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड०, *viz.*, तथा चोक्तं कुम्भवत् प्रधानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते, is better, because कुम्भ is non-intelligent.

चन्द्रिका quotes two योगसूत्रs in support of the purport of this कारिका—" तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा " (II 21) and " कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् (II 22).

LVII

माठर, गौड० and जय०, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति (of प्रधान) both, while as वाच० speaks of प्रवृत्ति only.

LVIII

औत्सुक्य means इच्छा; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुणs in सांख्य philosophy. It is not the इच्छा of the नैयायिकs according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being. परमार्थ explain औत्सुक्य as 'incertitude'. (Tak. S. K. p. 72).

LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे ? Is it पुरुष which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than myself ? The first meaning is adopted by माठर ; वाच० and गौड० would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति.

The next difficulty is about the meaing of the term सुकुमारता. जय० explains it by 'subtlety', वाच० and माठर, by 'bashfulness', and गौड० by 'enjoyability'.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नटी but here to a कुलवधू.

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गौड॰, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction

"पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य"—वाच॰ explains it as—अप्रमत्तां यथैनां परपुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति। This is not a good interpretation. गौड॰ is much nearer the mark when he says—अहमनेन परपुरुषेण दृष्टास्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति।

LXIII

Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks (see Tak. S. K. p.77), "This verse is lacking in the Chinese text. That is perhaps an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546), though I cannot give the special reason for it. One may, however, affirm that the original of the Chinese translation did not contain that verse, for there is no room to suppose that the translator had by error jumped over this verse and the commentary, if all the time there had been one. This verse is found in the *Sūtra*, III. 73."

On page 58 of our text, read एतानि सप्त प्रोच्यन्ते धर्मः, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यं in place of धर्मः, ज्ञानं, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यम्.

LXIV

The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय॰, गौड॰ and माठर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्वs. वाच॰ clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नास्मि, न मे and नाहम्, as given by various commentators.—

	वाच॰	माठर	गौड॰	जय॰
नास्मि	अहं क्रियावान् नास्मि।	नास्मि तत्त्वानि॥	नाहमेव भवामि।	सूक्ष्मशरीरे भौतिके च न भवामि, अपि तु प्रकृतिः।
न मे	न मे स्वामित्वास्ति।	न मे तत्त्वानि।	न मम शरीरम्; यतोऽहमन्यः, शरीरमन्यत्।	न ममेदमपि तु प्रकृतेः।
नाहम्	अहं कर्ता न	नाहं तत्त्वानाम्।	अहङ्काररहितोऽहम्।	नाप्यहं प्रकृतिः।

LXVI

प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य—The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (*i. e.*, पुरुषार्थs). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more पुरुषार्थs. So, in the case of *this particular Spirit*, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

LXVII

S. N. S. remarks—" Curiously enough, Paramārtha seems to understand this verse without importing any notion of *jivanmukti.* His rendering runs thus: Because of full and perfect knowedge, dharma, etc., have no longer any influence; transmigration is arrested like the body (or force) of the potter's wheel, whose motion one interrupts: see B. F. E. O., IV, 1056. This is, of course, hardly satisfactory. " (p. 116, 1n).